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Introduction 
Loming off a landslide victory over Adlai Steven­
son in the November 1956 election, President Dwight D. Eisenhower be­
gan his second administration seemingly poised to continue the policies of 
his first term. Ironically, however, 1957 would become one of the longest 
and most difficult years of his presidency. Over the course of the year, he 
struggled with congressional cuts to his defense budget, faced a racial crisis 
over segregation in Little Rock, saw the Soviet Union launch the first sat­
ellite into space, and observed the economy sinking into a recession. The 
results were dramatic. In less than a year his popularity in the polls had 
fallen over twenty percentage points.1 
The crises Eisenhower faced at the end of 1957 can be traced to both 
domestic and foreign policy issues. Without underemphasizing the wide­
spread disenchantment with Eisenhower's handling of race relations and 
the economy, the concern of most Americans in late 1957 lay elsewhere. 
For the first time, the Soviet Union had made a significant technological 
advancement ahead of the United States. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet 
Union shocked the world with the launch of Sputnik. Coupled with the 
Kremlin's earlier claim of a successful test of an intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM), the launch of Sputnik II on November 3, and the embar­
rassing failure of the U.S. Vanguard rocket in December, the Soviet satellite 
represented a clear challenge to U.S. technological superiority. More im­
portant, it raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might be able to 
launch a surprise nuclear attack against the United States using this new 
missile technology. Eisenhower's attempts to minimize the implications 
of the Soviet accomplishments only inflated fears, as many Americans as­
sumed he was trying to conceal U.S. military weaknesses.2 
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In the midst of this uproar, Eisenhower received a top-secret report pre­
pared by a blue-ribbon committee of leading scientific, engineering, eco­
nomic, and military experts. The panel, called the Gaither committee in 
recognition of its first chairman, H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., emphasized both 
the inadequacy of U.S. defense measures designed to protect the civil 
population and the vulnerability of the country's strategic nuclear forces in 
the event of a Soviet attack. The Gaither committee members viewed these 
defense measures—ranging from a missile system to defend the continen­
tal United States to the construction of shelters to protect the popula­
tion from radioactive fallout—and the maintenance of sufficient strategic 
forces to launch military strikes against Soviet targets as essential for the 
preservation of U.S. security. They concluded that in the case of a surprise 
Soviet nuclear attack, the United States would be unable to defend itself 
with any degree of success. The report emphasized the urgent need for 
the Eisenhower administration to strengthen the country's continental 
and civil defenses and to accelerate the development of its strategic strik­
ing power. It stressed that the United States either had to respond imme­
diately to the expanding Soviet military capabilities or face potentially grave 
consequences. 
The Gaither committee recommended that the United States reduce 
the vulnerability of its strategic forces, strengthen and enlarge its nuclear 
ballistic missile capabilities, improve the ability of the armed forces to wage 
limited military operations, reorganize the Department of Defense, and 
construct fallout shelters to protect the civilian population. These recom­
mendations would cost $44.2 billion, spread between 1959 and 1963. The 
price was high, but the committee concluded that the costs for not insti­
tuting them would be higher yet—the possible subjugation of the United 
States to the Soviet Union. It emphasized, "The next two years seem to us 
critical. If we fail to act at once, the risk [of not preparing for a Soviet 
attack], in our opinion, will be unacceptable."3 The committee accentu­
ated that by the end of this two-year period the Soviet Union would pos­
sess sufficient nuclear forces to overwhelm U.S. defenses and to eliminate 
U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities. The only way the United States could 
avoid this "risk" was to adopt the recommendations advocated by the 
committee. 
Eisenhower evaluated the Gaither report in the same manner as he stud­
ied most national security issues. He used the National Security Council 
(NSC) as the nexus for discussion of the committee's conclusions and rec­
Introduction 
ommendations. After receiving the report in November 1957, the NSC 
assigned to various government agencies the responsibility for analyzing 
specific parts of the report. By January 1958 the NSC was ready to discuss 
the report itself and the agencies' comments. For almost six months, the 
Gaither report or issues direcdy related to it dominated NSC discussions. 
During the remainder of the Eisenhower administration and throughout 
the Kennedy administration, these same issues reappeared periodically in 
discussions of U.S. national security policies. 
The Gaither report significantly influenced Eisenhower's national secu­
rity policies for the remainder of his presidency. Of all the Gaither commit­
tee recommendations, Eisenhower disagreed with only a few. While he 
opposed construction of fallout shelters and the expansion of military ca­
pabilities to wage limited war, he approved the implementation of most of 
the other recommendations, at least in part. His requests for supplemen­
tary appropriations to the FY 1958 defense budget and increases to the 
FY 1959 budget reveal the importance of the Gaither report. Between 
the two budgets, Eisenhower added nearly $4 billion in defense spending, 
an almost 10 percent increase in annual expenditures. He accelerated the 
development and deployment of ICBMs, intermediate-range ballistic mis­
siles (IRBMs), and the Polaris submarine system for launching missiles. 
He ordered the reduction of Strategic Air Command (SAC) vulnerability 
through the construction of early warning radar, the dispersal of SAC 
forces to a larger number of airfields, and the implementation of alert pro­
grams. Furthermore, he sought and received congressional approval for the 
reorganization of the Defense Department. 
The influence of the Gaither report did not end with these changes. As 
a senator and then as president, John F. Kennedy championed many of the 
same programs. After the contents of the report were leaked to the media 
in December 1957, many critics, including Kennedy, challenged Eisen-
hower's policies. The Massachusetts senator questioned why the United 
States was not doing more to overcome the apparent Soviet lead in military 
preparedness. While Eisenhower refused to expand military spending be­
yond certain levels, Kennedy did not show the same inhibitions. In the 
1960 campaign and during his presidency, Kennedy received advice from 
at least a dozen Gaither committee members. His "flexible response" mili­
tary strategy reflected much of the advice contained in the Gaither report. 
He accelerated ballistic missile developments, expanded limited war capa­
bilities, and advocated civil defense programs. 
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Key Historiographical Debates 
The Gaither committee's conclusions and recommendations had a clear 
influence on the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. The report 
itself, however, has been ignored or at least underemphasized by most 
scholars.4 One of the main reasons for this slight is that scholars focused on 
Sputnik as the cause of the changes in Eisenhower's policies. While the 
satellite obviously magnified concerns about Soviet missile capabilities, the 
Gaither report provided specific recommendations to overcome any pos­
sible deficiencies in U.S. military preparedness. Only in the past decade, as 
the Eisenhower Library, the National Archives, and other depositories have 
begun to release previously classified documents, has the true importance 
of the Gaither report become apparent. 
The historiography of the Gaither committee is very limited. Only 
four scholars—Morton Halperin, Fred Kaplan, Gregg Herken, and Peter 
Roman—have performed substantive research on this topic. With the ex­
ception of Roman, all of them have relied on the Gaither report itself, 
secondary sources, and/or interviews to obtain their evidence. Roman has 
tapped into some recently declassified documents to bolster his arguments. 
While they all examine some of the committee's findings, none of them 
analyze why it reached the conclusions that it did or exactly how influential 
it was in changing Eisenhower's policies. 
Halperin's 1961 study remains the best published source of information 
on the Gaither committee. Halperin used primarily newspaper reports and 
congressional testimony as the basis for his analysis. He was chiefly con­
cerned with how the presidential decision-making process worked and did 
not attempt to evaluate the bases for the committee's conclusions or its 
impact on the Eisenhower administration. In his study, he argues that the 
Gaither committee revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of the 
president acquiring advice from civilian experts. On the positive side, he 
states, an independent committee can supply "an additional source of in­
formation for the President, unencumbered by future and past policy re­
sponsibility." 5 However, on the negative side, the "fear of civilian expertise 
and the inability of the Gaither group to put any influence back of its rec­
ommendations combined with the motives discussed above [bureaucratic 
struggles between government agencies and military branches] to explain 
the failure of administration agencies to support the Gaither proposals."6 
For over twenty years, Halperin's article represented the most compre­
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hensive attempt to evaluate the Gaither committee. In the 1980s, both 
Kaplan and Herken added to Halperin's assessment in their analyses of the 
role of experts in decision making.7 Kaplan examines the influence oi the 
RAND Corporation in the development of U.S. nuclear strategy, arguing 
that its strategic analysts played a pivotal role in the Gaither committee's 
evaluation of Soviet military capabilities. He stresses in particular the influ­
ence of RAND experts Andrew Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and Spurgeon 
Keeny.8 While Kaplan asserts that these experts influenced the conclusions 
of the Gaither committee, he concludes that Eisenhower accepted few of 
the committee's findings: "Eisenhower did not take [Robert] Sprague's 
comments enough to heart, did not take the Gaither Report so seriously, 
as to believe that their fears warranted spending tens of billions of dollars, 
on top of an already expanding budget, to shore up a deterrent that he 
thought was, for the time being, already quite adequate."9 
Herken also explores the role of experts in developing U.S. nuclear 
policy. He argues that "American nuclear policy since 1945 has always 
been influenced, if not determined, by a small group of civilian experts— 
scientists, think-tank theorists, and academics."10 He stresses that while 
Eisenhower rejected most of the Gaither recommendations, the report did 
stimulate the president and other experts to reexamine the importance of 
arms control. He points to the experiences of three Gaither committee 
members—Herbert York, Jerome Wiesner, and Spurgeon Keeny—as ex­
amples of experts who began to realize, after their work on the Gaither 
committee, the impossibility of constructing an effective missile defense sys­
tem. Herken concludes that "the report would seem in retrospect the begin­
ning of a fundamental change in attitude of scientists toward the arms race."l * 
While Halperin, Kaplan, and Herken focus on the role of experts, they 
perform only a cursory examination of the committee's conclusions and 
recommendations and spend even less time analyzing how and why it devel­
oped thefindings that it did. Roman takes a different approach. He is con­
cerned with Eisenhower's role in nuclear force planning from the launch 
of Sputnik to the Kennedy inauguration. He argues that "Eisenhower was 
an active participant in force planning who succeeded in manipulating the 
decision process, enabling him to impress his policy objectives on the out­
comes." 12 While stressing the impact of the Gaither committee on the nu­
clear debate during 1958, he criticizes it for failing "to resolve four aspects 
of nuclear deterrence. These were: the credibility of nuclear deterrence, 
reaction time for nuclear forces, reliance on nuclear weapons in the U.S. 
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defense posture, and whether strategic systems should be designed to dis­
arm the Soviet Union or to retaliate.'713 In making his arguments, Roman 
was the first scholar to use newly declassified documents to show the influ­
ence of the Gaither committee. 
This brief overview of the arguments of four scholars is not meant to 
imply that the Gaither committee has not been discussed elsewhere. How­
ever, most other analyses rely on these authors for their evidence.14 A com­
mon feature of all the literature is a lack of discussion of the Gaither 
committee itself. Who were its members? What were their backgrounds? 
How did they approach their study? Why did they devise the conclusions 
and recommendations that they did? The limited historiography now avail­
able provides glimpses at some very compelling issues. Halperin's use of 
the Gaither committee as a case study on decision making sheds much light 
on the benefits and drawbacks of using civilian committees. Both Kaplan 
and Herken reveal the important role of experts in advising the Eisenhower 
administration. Finally, Roman makes it clear that the Gaither committee 
had a significant influence on the development of Eisenhower's national 
security policies in the late 1950s. 
Yet despite these studies, much of the Gaither committee's history is still 
obscure. Until recently, scholars faced severe hardships in studying the 
committee. Although its report was declassified in the early 1970s, other 
information related to the committee has been restricted. The release of 
documents over the past few years, however, allows scholars to examine the 
Gaither committee in much greater detail. The new information provides 
an opportunity to acquire a greater understanding of the Gaither commit-
tee's significance in the development of national security policies, Eisen-
hower's decision-making system, the president's use of civilian experts to 
gain policy advice, and the debates over civil defense. 
Scholars over the past two decades have reversed initial assessments of 
Eisenhower as a do-nothing president who spent more time on the golf 
course than at the White House. While critical evaluations of Eisenhower's 
handling of important issues, in particular civil rights and the developing 
nations, are becoming more prevalent, most scholars rank Eisenhower as a 
very good president.15 While this study does not attempt to minimize the 
failures and weaknesses of the Eisenhower presidency, it does show that 
Eisenhower established a distinct decision-making system, followed a con­
sistent set of values, and actively participated in decision making during his 
presidency. Although the leak of its report caused him to regret having 
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created the Gaither committee, that did not stop him from carefully evalu­
ating the committee's findings to determine which ones would enhance 
U.S. security. 
Eisenhower based his decisions on an established set of values and a 
highly organized decision-making system. In addressing national security 
issues, Eisenhower analyzed the impact that a decision would have on both 
the country's military security and its economic strength.16 In an impas­
sioned plea to the NSC in 1955, he told his advisers: 
Budget-Making time is always difficult and expenses are mounting. Never­
theless, no official of the Government is truly performing his duty unless he 
clearly realizes that he is engaged in defending a way of life over a prolonged 
period and unless he is constantly aware of the weight offinancial burden that 
our citizens are willing and able to bear. Our Government could force upon 
our citizens defense and other spending at much higher levels, and our abun­
dant economy could stand it—for a while; but you cannot do it for the long 
pull without destroying incentives, inflating the currency, and increasing gov­
ernment controls. This would require an authoritarian system of government, 
and destroy the health of ourfree society. 
We must, of course, do what we must do to defend ourselves. We must 
not put dollars above the security of the United States. But we must prove, if 
we are to demonstrate the superiority of our system, that in times of unprece­
dented prosperity we can pay as we go without passing on intolerable burdens 
to coming generations. 
Consequently, every official of this Government must search out places 
where we can save a dollar which could be used somewhere else where its 
contribution would be vital. This issue is critical. This doctrine should be 
remembered and preached in every waking hour by every official in this 
administration.17 
Almost four years after leaving the White House, Eisenhower described 
his belief system in a letter to his brother. At the time, he was trying to 
provide direction to the Republican Party after it had been soundly de­
feated in the 1964 presidential election. His advice for his party reflected 
the values and principles that guided his decision making. In the letter to 
his brother, he summarized his basic convictions: 
A. Americans, individually and collectively, should strive constantly for 
greater excellence in the moral, intellectual and material structure of the 
nation. 
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B. The individual is of supreme importance. The rights guaranteed to him 
and the states by the Constitution and the "Bill of Rights" must be jeal­
ously guarded by government at all levels. The purpose of government 
is to serve, never to dominate. 
C. The spirit of the people is the strength of our nation; human liberty and 
the American system of self-government with equal rights for all are the 
mainspring of that spirit. . . . 
D. To be secure and stay free we must be strong morally, economically and 
militarily. This combination of strength must be used prudently, care­
fully andfirmly to preserve peace and protect the nation's vital interests 
abroad. 
E. Political power resides in the people; elected officials are expected to di­
rect that power wisely and only as prescribed by the Constitution. 
F. Government must have a heart as well as a head. Republicans . . . insist 
that solutions must conform to common sense and recognize the right 
and duty of local and state government normally to attack these at their 
roots before the Federal Government acts. 
G. America cannot truly prosper unless all major areas and groupments 
[sic] in our society prosper. Labor, capital and management must learn 
to cooperate as a productive team, and reject any notion of "class war­
fare" bringing about maximum prosperity. 
H. To protect all our citizens, and particularly workers and all those who 
are, or will be, dependent on pensions, savings and insurance in their 
declining years, we strive always to prevent deterioration of the cur­
rency. In the constant fight against inflation we believe that, except in 
emergencies, we should pay-as-we-go, avoiding deficit spending and 
adverse balance-of-payments. 
I. Under God we espouse the cause offreedom and justice and peace for 
all people.18 
These values and convictions provided the cornerstones for Eisenhower's 
decision making. His creation of the Gaither committee and later analy­
sis of its report reflect these concerns. Eisenhower sought the best advice 
possible so that he could make the most informed decisions about U.S. 
national security needs. After receiving the committee's advice in No­
vember 1957, he carefully considered how its recommendations, if imple­
mented, would affect the way of life he sought to preserve. He accepted 
the recommendations that he believed were necessary to guarantee U.S. 
security without undermining individual freedom or economic solvency. 
Eisenhower's use of the Gaither committee represents one way he ob­
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tained counsel. When he entered office in 1953, he believed he could im­
prove the organization of the White House and the entire decision-making 
process. As far as decisions affecting national security, he viewed the NSC 
as the natural vehicle for obtaining advice. One of hisfirst directives was to 
have Robert Cutler study ways to make the NSC more efficient and better 
able to provide guidance to his presidency. Cutler recommended signifi­
cant changes in the operations of the NSC. He suggested that the president 
attend as many NSC meetings as possible, that the council meet regularly 
each week, and that a new planning board be established to prepare study 
papers for the full council. While Eisenhower did not normally call for the 
NSC to make decisions, he did use it to obtain advice, as a forum for vig­
orous discussions, and as a means to disseminate policy to his key advisers.19 
Seldom did Eisenhower make decisions involving national security is­
sues without at least consulting the NSC. It must be stressed, however, that 
the NSC always remained an advisory body, not a decision-making one. 
When a reporter suggested in 1957 that the NSC made decisions, Eisen­
hower responded, "The National Security Council is set up to do one 
thing: advise the president. I make the decisions, and there is no use trying 
to put any responsibility on the National Security Council—it's mine."20 
He also used it as a channel to acquire advice from civilian experts. While 
Halperin, Kaplan, and Herken persuasively argue that Eisenhower used ex­
perts on several occasions, no scholar has systematically examined their use. 
The Gaither committee is a prime example of Eisenhower's use of a group 
of civilian experts to obtain policy advice. 
Critics of the effectiveness of Eisenhower's NSC have often relied on the 
conclusions reached by the Senate Committee on Government Operations 
in 1961. The committee stressed that Eisenhower's NSC was plagued by 
bureaucratic conflicts, compromised too often, and failed to challenge al­
ready established strategies.21 However, most scholars who have had access 
to internal NSC documents have raised serious questions about these as­
sessments. They argue that Eisenhower's NSC fostered vigorous debate, 
facilitated long-term planning, and provided valuable advice.22 This study 
of the Gaither committee supports the conclusion that the NSC played a 
pivotal and effective advisory role in Eisenhower's decision-making system. 
Eisenhower established the Gaither committee to obtain advice that he 
hoped would be untainted by bureaucratic interests. This approach had 
worked for him previously, when he created the Solarium task forces in 
1953 and the Killian committee in 1954. He established Project Solarium 
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during thefirst year of his presidency to evaluate different national security 
policies. After the Soviet Union tested a hydrogen bomb and demonstrated 
increasing capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons against the United States, 
he created the Killian committee to analyze the ability of the Kremlin to 
launch a surprise attack against the United States. After the groups com­
pleted their studies, Eisenhower incorporated many of their recommenda­
tions into his national security programs. 
Eisenhower's use of experts to acquire advice demonstrates the coopera­
tion of the federal government with leading scientific, engineering, busi­
ness, and educational professionals that had developed in World War II and 
increased during thefirstfifteen years of the Cold War.23 The government's 
use of experts continued during the Truman administration. It was Eisen­
hower, however, who brought experts to central areas of policy making. 
Herken eloquently concludes, "During thefifteen years since the dawn of 
the atomic age this nucleus of experts had for the most part merely wit­
nessed the making of strategy and policy on the bomb. They had remained 
on the sidelines of the great national debate over defense. . . . Henceforth, 
they would be at its center."24 
In creating the Gaither committee, Eisenhower turned to leading ex­
perts who were either specialists in particular disciplines or possessed a 
broad understanding of national security issues. He asked the committee 
to evaluate whether the United States should embark on an expensive pro­
gram of constructing active and passive defenses, including anti-aircraft 
and antimissile weapons, early warning radar, and fallout shelters. Based on 
his desire to maintain a balance between economic and military security in 
his national security planning, Eisenhower believed a committee of experts 
would avoid making recommendations that benefited a particular govern­
ment department or military service but not necessarily the nation. He 
failed to recognize, however, that the Gaither committee members entered 
the study with preconceived beliefs based on previous experiences or affili­
ations that would color their interpretations and analyses. Furthermore, he 
never acknowledged or fiilly realized the contradiction between using a 
committee of experts that was removed from public scrutiny, on the one 
hand, and his emphasis on the individual's right to self-government, on the 
other.25 
The Gaither committee was composed of a group of experts with di­
verse backgrounds. Its initial director, Rowan Gaither, was well known for 
leading nonprofit research organizations such as the RAND Corporation 
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and the Ford Foundation. William Foster and Robert Sprague, who codi­
rected the committee after Gaither became ill, built their reputations in the 
chemical and electrical industries, respectively. James Killian and James 
Baxter were the respective presidents of Massachusetts Institute of Tech­
nology (MIT) and Williams College. Generals James Doolittle and James 
McCormack had illustrious military backgrounds and close ties to the busi­
ness community. Other members of the committee were equally note­
worthy. As a group they did not enter the Gaither study with a set agenda, 
political objective, or financial motive. However, they did share a concern 
for U.S. national security that went beyond their support for Eisenhower 
or his policies. 
Significance of This Study 
Eisenhower's second term proved to be a watershed period in the Cold 
War. At the time of the president's inauguration in January 1957, Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev was just consolidating his power in the Soviet 
Union. Over the next four years, the Cold War solidified and accelerated 
a technological arms race that dramatically raised the stakes of potential 
future conflicts. The Gaither committee stood at the forefront of the 
whirlwind of debates concerning U.S. national security policies and U.S.-
Soviet relations. Its recommendations precipitated increases in U.S. de­
fense spending and the nuclear arsenal; led to cultural debates about fallout 
shelters and the future of mankind in a nuclear world; raised questions 
about the right balance between domestic, foreign, and defense spending; 
and challenged traditional ways of decision making. 
Eisenhower's handling of the Gaither committee raises several questions 
about his effectiveness as president. While he made decisions based on es­
tablished convictions and the counsel of a well-organized advisory system, 
his failure to provide careful oversight of the Gaither committee allowed it 
to expand the scope of its study and challenge some of his fundamental 
principles. Eisenhower adamantly believed that U.S. strength rested on a 
careful balance of economic, military, and political power. He further em­
phasized the importance of protecting individual rights and democratic 
principles. Eisenhower foresaw the problem of reconciling the Gaither 
committee's recommendations with maintaining the balance of power that 
he saw as so important. However, he never successfully persuaded the 
American people that his program for meeting the challenges of the late 
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1950s was indeed the best strategy for the United States; therefore, it took 
almost every ounce of Eisenhower's energy to restrain the forces for change 
unleashed by the Gaither report and the Soviet launch of Sputnik. 
Eisenhower had good intentions and brought a dignity to the White 
House that has been lacking ever since. His mistake in his second term was 
to rely too much on his own reputation and sense of right and wrong when 
the nation wanted strong, dynamic leadership. Eisenhower failed to offer 
the reassurance and confidence that the people needed when their way of 
life seemed to be in question. Whether any president could have provided 
the necessary leadership in the late 1950s is open to question. It is clear, 
however, that Eisenhower never fully realized the depths of apprehension 
the populace felt. 
Eisenhower's Core Values and 
Decision-Making Systems 
Uwight D. Eisenhower won the 1952 presiden­
tial election against Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson despite having 
never previously held an elective office. While both parties had asked him 
to serve as their candidate in the 1948 election, he had constantly rebuffed 
any political overtures.1 It was only in early 1952 that he felt duty-bound 
to accept the Republican nomination for president. After Eisenhower's 
victory, retiring President Harry S. Truman questioned Eisenhower's abil­
ity to make the transition from military officer to president. Truman 
doubted whether Eisenhower could adjust to the political arena, where 
orders were often questioned and sometimes not followed.2 Truman's as­
sessment proved shortsighted. As George Reedy, a key aide to then Sena­
tor Lyndon Johnson in the 1950s, recalled, Eisenhower's "most important 
attribute . . . was that he had held a number of political positions that the 
public did not regard as political."3 While Eisenhower had only limited 
experience with Washington politics, he had dealt successfully with poli­
tics within the U.S. Army, at Columbia University, and as a commander of 
multinational military forces. This experience and training provided signifi­
cant preparation for his time as president. 
Before World War II, Eisenhower had pursued a successful, yet relatively 
undistinguished, career in the Army. After a quarter-century of service, he 
had risen to the rank of colonel but had little chance of advancing much 
further in the peacetime Army. Because of the limited size of the military, 
promotions were rare and far between.4 U.S. involvement in World War II 
dramatically altered Eisenhower's career. From working for General George 
Marshall's War Plans Division in Washington, D.C., to commanding Al­
lied forces in North Africa, to planning and implementing the defeat of 
13 
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President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower is shown speaking at a White House cere­
mony in January 1958. (National Park Service/Dwight D. Eisenhower Library) 
Germany in Western Europe, Eisenhower quickly rose in rank from an ob­
scure colonel to afive-star general whose name was recognized and praised 
around the world. 
After the war, Eisenhower served as the Army chief of staff from 1945 
to 1948. He then retired in order to become president of Columbia Uni­
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versity, where he remained from 1948 to 1951. However, his service to the 
nation did not end while he was there. From December 1948 to the late 
summer of 1949, he spent several days a week in Washington serving as the 
unofficial chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Upon Truman's re­
quest, in late 1950 he left Columbia to become the first supreme com­
mander of NATO's military forces. He remained in this position until he 
announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination in the late spring 
of 1952.5 His experiences during the war and afterward reinforced and 
clarified his basic system of values and beliefs. Conservative by nature, 
Eisenhower learned to cherish the American system of government and the 
freedoms it represented, to value the importance of a balanced budget for 
a sound economy, and to make decisions based upon a carefully organized 
and structured decision-making system. 
Eisenhower's Basic Values 
Specific values, based on a strong faith in the American democratic system 
of government and in the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, 
guided almost all of Eisenhower's decisions.6 While he contemplated Co­
lumbia University's offer of its presidency in June 1947, he reminisced 
about his military career. In a letter to longtime friend Everett "Swede" 
Hazlett, Eisenhower described how he had developed his beliefs: "I had 
absorbed several simple conceptions and observations that would remain 
with me until the end of my days." He then emphatically explained: 
I believe fanatically in the American form of democracy—a system that rec­
ognizes and protects the rights of the individual and that ascribes to the 
individual a dignity accruing to him because of his creation in the image of a 
supreme being and which rests upon the conviction that only through a sys­
tem offiree enterprise can this type of democracy be preserved. Beyond this I 
believe that world order can be established only by the practice of true coop­
eration among the sovereign nations and that American leadership toward 
this goal depends upon her strength—her strength of will, her moral, social 
and economic strength and, until an effective world order is achieved, upon 
her military strength.7 
Eisenhower'sfirmly held beliefs originated in a childhood characterized 
by rugged individualism, strict discipline, and moral piety. His parents in­
stilled in him and his brothers the principles of hard work, equality, and 
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individual responsibility.8 While these values provided the core of Eisen-
hower's belief system, he never systematically examined the concept of de­
mocracy before World War II.9 However, after the United States joined the 
Allies, he emphasized the importance of understanding exactly why the war 
was being fought. He argued, "Belief in an underlying cause is fully as 
important to success in war as any local esprit or discipline induced or pro­
duced by whatever kind of command or leadership action."10 In a letter to 
his son, Eisenhower identified this underlying cause. He explained that 
"no other war in history has so definitely lined up the forces of arbitrary 
oppression and dictatorship against those of human rights and individual 
liberty."11 In an order to his commanders in 1942, he added that each 
American soldier needed to recognize that "the privileged life he has 
led . .  . is under direct threat. His rights to speak his own mind, to engage 
in any profession of his own choosing, to belong to any religious denomi­
nation, to live in any locality where he can support himself and his family, 
and to be sure of fair treatment when he might be accused of any crime— 
all of these would disappear" if Hitler's armies prevailed.12 
In his memoirs of his World War II experiences, Eisenhower further il­
lustrated these beliefs as he reflected on past, present, and future U.S.-
Soviet relations. At a meeting in Berlin in late 1945, he met and developed 
a friendship with Marshall Grigori Zhukov, one of the Soviet Union's most 
successful military commanders.13 Sharing a common bond from the war, 
Eisenhower and Zhukov reminisced about their experiences. During these 
conversations, they discussed a variety of topics ranging from military 
strategy to the philosophical differences between democracy and commu­
nism. From these conversations, Eisenhower gained a greater understand­
ing and appreciation of the principles he supported "fanatically." 
As they discussed the use of infantry during the war, Eisenhower quickly 
realized that he placed a much greater emphasis on the life of the individual 
soldier than did Zhukov and other Soviet leaders. For instance, Zhukov 
indicated that when confronting German positions that were protected by 
land mines, it was standard Soviet military practice to send their infantry 
straight through the minefield rather than to stop and try to clear it.14 
While Eisenhower found the willingness of Russians to die for their coun­
try commendable, he was appalled that the Soviet leaders were so willing 
to sacrifice their soldiers to clear a minefield. Furthermore, Zhukov's sin­
cere dedication to communism, a system of government that Eisenhower 
saw as inherently evil, demonstrated how powerful and persuasive the com­
munist message could be. 
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Eisenhower's abhorrence of communism did not stem from any system­
atic study of that system of government.15 Rather, it developed from what 
he saw as communism's rejection of basic individual freedoms. He ex­
plained how Zhukov had asked him to try "to understand a system [of 
government] in which the attempt was made to substitute for such moti­
vations [individual aspirations] the devotion of a man to the great national 
complex of which he formed a part."16 For Eisenhower, such a govern­
ment placed the nation's welfare above the individual's welfare. He be­
lieved that while communism's appeal to the common good represented 
an admirable goal, in reality it resulted in "dictatorial rule."17 He later 
elaborated this belief by explaining, "The main issue [between the United 
States and the Soviet Union] is dictatorship versus a form of government 
only by the consent of the governed, observance of a bill of rights versus 
arbitrary power of a ruler or ruling group."18 
These conversations with Zhukov in many ways helped shape Eisen-
hower's views of the Soviet Union. While gaining a deep respect for Zhu­
kov as a military leader and for the willingness of the Soviet people to 
accept sacrifices for their nation, Eisenhower left Berlin with an even 
greater loathing of the Communist system and the lack of compassion the 
Soviet government seemed to have for its own people. After recounting 
these conversations, he concluded his memoirs with a strident defense of 
democracy and a rebuke of communism. "We [the democracies of the 
world]," Eisenhower emphasized, "believe individual liberty rooted in hu­
man dignity, is man's greatest treasure. We believe that men, given free 
expression of their will, prefer freedom and self-dependence to dictatorship 
and collectivism."19 
Before his election in 1952, Eisenhower never clearly articulated how 
he would translate these beliefs concerning democracy, individual free­
doms, and human dignity into specific policies. However, he did provide, 
on occasion, glimpses into how these guiding principles should be de­
fended. Eisenhower believed that the fundamental role of any U.S. presi­
dent was to defend these principles with unflinching determination. In 
performing this task, he recognized that preservation of the American way 
of life had to consider much more than military defense. Specifically, the 
defense of the United States involved the protection of its territorial 
boundaries and its citizens, while at the same time maintaining an economy 
that would allow the country to prosper.20 These goals—preserving a way 
of life, building a strong military, and overseeing a prosperous economy— 
came to guide Eisenhower's defense policies in the 1950s. 
18 Chapter One 
In testimony before the Military Subcommittee of the Senate Appropri­
ations Committee in 1950, Eisenhower attempted to describe the balance 
that the United States needed in its national security programs. While a 
strong military was obviously necessary, he resisted increases in defense 
spending that he thought might undermine the very way of life that it 
sought to protect. "If we should deem war imminent,5' Eisenhower testi­
fied, "there would be no expense too great and no preparation too elabo­
rate to meet what we would see as an impending crisis." However, he 
cautioned the subcommittee that this was not the case. He continued by 
arguing, "Since the purpose is to defend a way of life at the heart of which 
is the guaranteed freedom of the individual, we must not so over-burden 
or tax the resources of the country that we practically enslave or regiment 
people in the effort to keep them free from foreign aggression." He con­
cluded, "To wreck our economy, would be as great a victory for the Soviets 
as they could remotely hope for in a war."21 
In January 1952 President Truman presented to Congress an $85 bil­
lion budget that included approximately $65 billion in spending for na­
tional security programs. As submitted, the budget would have created a 
$14 billion deficit. Eisenhower was shocked at such spending levels and 
believed they represented the height of irresponsibility. In one of his clear­
est statements of the philosophy that guided his decision making, he ar­
ticulated the dangers of high budgets and deficit spending. He recorded in 
his diary: "I am greatly afraid that certain basic truths are being forgotten 
or ignored in our public life of today. Thefirst of these is that a democracy 
undertakes military preparedness only on a defensive, which means a long-
term basis. You do not attempt to build up to a D-day because, having no 
intention of our own to attack, we must devise and follow a system that we 
can carry as long as there appears to be a threat in the world capable of 
endangering our national safety."22 
He then explained that "it is necessary to recognize that the purpose of 
America is to defend a way of life rather than merely to defend property, 
territory, homes, or lives. As a consequence of this purpose, everything 
done to develop a defense against external threat, except under conditions 
readily recognizable as emergency, must be weighed and gauged in the 
light of probable long-term, internal, effect."23 This theme consistently 
appears in Eisenhower's public and private life. He stressed that U.S. 
strength resided in a way of life represented by a combination of "devotion 
to democracy," "free enterprise," "industrial and economic strength," 
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"moral probity in all dealings," and "military strength."24 Together these 
qualities set the United States apart from the rest of the world, especially 
the Soviet Union. Eisenhower believed that as long as the United States 
emphasized and protected these values, it would prevail in the Cold War. 
In Eisenhower's mind, the budget Truman had submitted failed to take 
adequate cognizance of the dangers inherent in deficit spending. He was 
especially concerned that the proposed national security programs were de­
signed to meet a specific period of danger in the future. Eisenhower be­
lieved the fallacy of such planning was that policy planners could never 
predict with any accuracy the future actions of a potential adversary. The 
Truman budget reflected the contention that 1954 was the year of maxi­
mum danger. Eisenhower disagreed. He stressed that national security 
programs should be based on what the country could afford over an indefi­
nite period. He viewed the Truman budget as contrary to that guideline. 
It emphasized a maximum year of danger without seriously considering the 
financial burdens that would be experienced by the United States in the 
years that followed. 
After critiquing the dangers of the Truman program, Eisenhower iden­
tified the defense philosophy that he would follow in his presidency. He 
explained that, as Army chief of staff and then as the unofficial chairman of 
the JCS, he had learned that planning for the long term was essential, since 
"one of the most expensive practices in the maintenance of military force 
is unevenness in the scale of preparedness and in yearly appropriations. 
Peaks in one year or a series of years, followed by unwise reductions in a 
period when economy is the sole watchword, tend to demand extraordi­
nary expenditures with no return."25 Eisenhower saw the proposed Tru­
man budget as a fiscal drain on the economy, because it produced large 
budget deficits without really increasing long-term U.S. security. He then 
added that he and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal had "very greatly 
hoped to produce a plan and budget that would be, in effect, an element 
of bipartisan policy and which would be as free as possible of the defects 
and costs brought about by yearly cuts or increases, usually due to impulses 
or aberrations of the moment."26 Although it had not yet been developed, 
Eisenhower was articulating the basic premise of his New Look policy. 
Eisenhower concluded his diary entry with a statement that exempli­
fied the essence of his national security philosophy: "We can say only that 
properly balanced strength will promote a probability of avoiding war. In 
this sense, we need the strength soon—but it must be balanced between 
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moral power, economic power, and purely military power."27 The goal of 
preserving and magnifying these trilateral "powers" guided Eisenhower 
in the development of his administration's economic and national security 
policies. 
During the 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower championed simi­
lar beliefs. He questioned the increased defense spending resulting from 
the Korean War and, more important, from National Security Council 68.28 
Between June 1950 and the 1952 election, spending for national security 
programs increased by more than 200 percent.29 Eisenhower challenged 
the efficacy of such high spending and openly wondered whether the 
United States could continue to afford such defense programs. In a cam­
paign speech in September 1952, he eloquently expressed these doubts. 
He argued that increasing spending on defense would not necessarily 
augment U.S. security. The key was to develop a defense strategy that the 
nation could afford for the indefinite future. "The real problem," he ex­
plained, "is to build the defense with wisdom and efficiency. We must 
achieve both security and solvency. In fact, the foundation of military 
strength is economic strength. A bankrupt America is more the Soviet goal 
than an America conquered on the field of battle."30 
Eisenhower's Cabinet advisers reinforced his economic advisers. During 
his two terms in office, Eisenhower relied heavily on his secretaries of the 
treasury, George Humphrey and Robert Anderson; the chairmen of the 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA); and the various directors of the Bu­
reau of the Budget. Although differing on certain economic points, they 
were allfiscal conservatives who despised budget deficits, abhorred infla­
tion, and supported a smaller role for the federal government in society. 
These advisers assisted Eisenhower in developing a moderate conservative 
economic policy that emphasized balanced budgets and low inflation while 
preserving and expanding New Deal legislation such as social security, un­
employment insurance, and bank deposit insurance.31 One recent scholar 
of Eisenhower's economic philosophy and policies persuasively concludes 
that the president "was more dependent on his economic advisers than on 
his national security advisers."32 
After Eisenhower accepted the Republican nomination, the outcome of 
the November election was a foregone conclusion. He had tremendous 
advantages over the Democratic nominee, Adlai Stevenson. First, retiring 
Democratic president Truman was unpopular. Second, the Democratic 
Party had been in power for two decades, and people were looking for a 
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change. Finally, Eisenhower was a military hero who Americans believed 
could end the Korean War. Together, this fame and the widespread disen­
chantment with the Truman administration formed the basis of Eisen-
hower's resounding victory. As he entered the White House, Eisenhower 
viewed the election as a mandate for his political and economic philosophy 
and endeavored to create a presidential administration that propagated his 
values.33 
On several occasions as the Army chief of staff and the unofficial chair­
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower had visited President Truman 
at the White House. While conceding that the visits did not allow him to 
acquire a full understanding of how the presidency operated, they left an 
impression that he did not like. In his memoirs, Eisenhower explained how 
he saw the reorganization of the White House as one of the priorities of 
his new administration: "With my training in problems involving organi­
zation, it was inconceivable to me that the work of the White House could 
not be better systemized [sic] than had been the case during the years I 
observed it."34 Eisenhower's military experience had led him to conclude 
that the best decisions were made only after careful consideration by all of 
those involved.35 The reorganization of the White House along the lines of 
a military staff system enabled Eisenhower to make careful decisions in a 
manner that reflected his basic political and economic philosophy. 
Contrary to the claims of some critics, Eisenhower did not see organi­
zation as an end in itself.36 He viewed it as an effective means of acquiring, 
analyzing, and synthesizing the vast information created by large adminis­
trative bodies. Eisenhower elucidated why developing and maintaining an 
efficient organizational system was critical for effective government: "Or­
ganization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent, even less can it, 
of itself, make the decisions which are required to trigger necessary action. 
On the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency 
and can easily lead to disaster. Organization makes more efficient the gath­
ering and analysis of facts, and the arranging of the findings of experts in 
logical fashion. Therefore organization helps the responsible individual 
make the necessary decision, and helps assure that it is satisfactorily car­
ried out."37 
Eisenhower carefully organized the White House to produce maximum 
efficiency.38 "Because of his long experience with military organization," 
Chester Pach concludes, "Eisenhower believed that clear lines of authority 
radiating from the Oval Office would ensure the smooth workings of his 
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presidency."39 One of Eisenhower's greatest criticisms of other presiden­
tial administrations was the lack of effective coordination within the White 
House. To overcome this problem, Eisenhower appointed Sherman Adams 
as his special assistant. Adams supervised the White House staff and pre­
pared the president's schedule. Additionally, Eisenhower appointed other 
subordinates to supervise specific areas of presidential policy such as 
congressional liaison (General Wilton B. "Jerry" Persons), racial minor­
ity issues (Maxwell Rabb), and top-secret national security matters (first 
General Paul T. "Pete" Carroll and then Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster).40 
By delegating authority within a well-designed organization, Eisenhower 
achieved a degree of efficiency that previous presidents had rarely expe-
rienced.41 
The Reorganization of the NSC 
The NSC structure that Eisenhower inherited in 1953 was still relatively 
new. It had been in existence only since 1947, when Congress established 
it as part of the National Security Act. As with any new organization, the 
NSC experienced its own share of growing pains. Before the outbreak of 
the Korean War in 1950, Truman rarely attended the NSC meetings. How­
ever, after the outbreak of the war and his acceptance of NSC 68, Truman 
turned more and more to the NSC for policy advice.42 For the remainder 
of his administration, NSC 68 guided many of Truman's national security 
policies.43 
Along with the Korean War, NSC 68 led the Truman administration to 
increase spending for national security programs from the programmed 
$13.5 billion for FY 1951 (July 1,1950, through June 30,1951) to more 
than $48 billion by December 1950. These spending levels continued for 
the remainder of the Truman administration and reflected a growing per­
ception of the Soviet threat. The important point is that only approxi­
mately 10 percent of the spending increase went toward the cost of the 
Korean War.44 It was the other 90 percent that raised Eisenhower's con­
cern. He did not believe that the Truman administration had carefully ana­
lyzed the long-term impact of such increases on the U.S. economy. 
When Eisenhower assumed the presidency, he was determined to re­
duce defense spending. In order to do this, he wanted to examine policy 
alternatives, ranging from containment to rollback, that might lead to a 
more efficient and effective defense policy. He anticipated that the NSC 
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would analyze these alternatives. One of Eisenhower's most important ad­
visers recalled that the president used the NSC to obtain "an integration 
of views which would be the product of continuous association between 
skilled representatives of all elements germane to national security."45 
However, Eisenhower did not believe that the NSC structure he inherited 
from the Truman administration was capable of performing such a study. 
Before he could assign the NSC this responsibility, he had to restructure it 
into the organization that he wanted.46 
Eisenhower turned to Robert Cutler, a key campaign aide and influen­
tial Boston banker, for advice concerning the reorganization of the NSC. 
After a brief study, Cutler recommended several changes to the NSC's 
structure. After the National Security Act had been revised in 1949, the 
NSC had only five statutory members: the president, the vice president, 
the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the chairman of the 
National Security Resources Board (NSRB). The chairman of the JCS and 
the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) acted as advisers. 
Three other groups—the CIA, the senior NSC staff, and the Interdepart­
mental Intelligence Committee—served in a variety of capacities. While 
the National Security Act had established this membership structure, it 
provided no specific guidance as to how the NSC should operate. Before 
the Eisenhower administration, the NSC did not operate in either a consis­
tent or a particularly systematic manner.47 
Cutler asked several government officials, including the former head of 
the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, how the NSC 
could operate more efficiently and effectively. Nitze recommended several 
specific changes in the NSC's operations. He stressed the need to create an 
advisory committee to formulate policy papers for consideration before the 
NSC. This committee would replace the NSC senior staff. The policy pa­
pers would contain both majority and minority opinions if no consensus 
could be reached, to ensure that the NSC discussed the issues that could 
not be resolved by the advisory committee. Finally, he concluded that the 
statutory membership of the NSC should remain the same.48 
Cutler incorporated many of Nitze's recommendations in his proposal 
to Eisenhower, including major changes in the NSC's structure. He pro­
posed that the president attend and serve as chairman of as many NSC 
meetings as possible. Cutler believed that one of the weaknesses of the 
Traman NSC was the failure of the president to take an active role in its 
meetings. He argued that the president had to be an integral part of the 
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meetings for it to operate most effectively. The original senior staff should 
be replaced by the newly created planning board, whose purpose would be 
to develop policy papers for NSC discussions. The planning board would 
consist of representatives from each of the statutory agencies of the NSC. 
The policy papers created would reflect a consensus opinion of its mem­
bers, but the board would submit any dissenting views to the NSC. Finally, 
Cutler recommended the appointment of a new adviser, a special assistant 
for national security affairs, to coordinate the activities of the planning 
board and the NSC.49 
A few days after he approved Cutler's recommendations, Eisenhower 
publicly announced plans for the restructured NSC. He appointed Cutler 
as his new special assistant for national security affairs. He expanded the 
NSC's membership to include the secretary of the treasury, the director of 
the Mutual Security Administration, and the director of the Office of De­
fense Mobilization (who replaced the NSRB chairman).50 As Cutler had 
recommended, Eisenhower established the planning board to develop pa­
pers for NSC discussions. Finally, he announced that the NSC would pe­
riodically seek civilian consultants "to bring to Council deliberations a 
fresh point of view, not burdened with departmental responsibilities."51 
Eisenhower's revamping of the NSC clearly shows how he desired to 
incorporate his philosophy and organizational beliefs into his decision 
making. First, he expanded the NSC's membership to obtain a more bal­
anced examination of national security issues. By including the secretary of 
the treasury and the budget director, Eisenhower emphasized the impor­
tance of analyzing the economic implications of any national security poli­
cies. Second, by appointing Cutler and by creating the planning board, he 
revealed his desire for an organization that would examine policy options 
more systematically. Finally, by occasionally turning to civilian consultants, 
he recognized the significance of obtaining advice independent of the gov­
ernment bureaucracy.52 
Project Solarium, NSC 162/2, and the New Look 
Having completed the reorganization of the NSC, Eisenhower turned to 
the federal budget deficit that he inherited from the Truman administra­
tion. Forecasts for Truman's FY 1954 budget predicted a shortfall of ap­
proximately $10 billion. To eliminate this deficit, Eisenhower knew he 
would have to cut military spending—over 66 percent of the total bud­
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get.53 Although Eisenhower had questioned Truman's refusal to increase 
spending beyond $15 billion in the late 1940s, he was very reluctant to 
accept budgets for national security programs that had tripled in three 
years to exceed $50 billion.54 As with his reorganization of the White 
House and the NSC, Eisenhower believed that his national security pro­
grams could be developed and implemented in a cheaper and more effi­
cient manner. 
In September 1952 the NSC asked Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, 
Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, and Director of Mutual Security Aver-
ell Harriman to prepare a report analyzing the status of U.S. national se­
curity policies. This small committee presented its report, NSC 141, to 
Truman as he prepared to leave office in January 1953. It recommended 
the continuation of existing policies and the appropriation of additional 
funds to improve continental defenses.55 This report served as the starting 
point for changes Eisenhower wanted to make in U.S. national security 
programs. 
At one of the NSC'sfirst meetings under the new administration, Cutler 
recommended that this report be used as the basis for the study and devel­
opment of new national security policies.56 During the spring, Eisenhower 
and his top advisers discussed ways to cut spending on national security 
policies while at the same time preserving U.S. military strength. In May, 
Eisenhower ordered the NSC to create three panels to review national se­
curity policy alternatives. The NSC turned to outside consultants to staff 
these groups. Operating under the code name Project Solarium, the panels 
launched a six-week investigation of current and future U.S. policies.57 The 
NSC's use of experts outside the government established a precedent that 
would be repeated several times in the Eisenhower presidency, as when he 
subsequently established the Gaither committee. 
The NSC appointed the directing panel of Project Solarium to develop 
guidelines for the study.58 The panel established three task forces—A, B, 
and C.59 The panel ordered task force A to assume the position advocated 
by NSC 141—the continuation of Truman's containment policies—and 
to recommend a national security policy based on that alternative. The 
panel assigned task force B the responsibility for developing a national se­
curity policy based on an explicit statement of the areas that the United 
States would automatically defend against a Soviet attack. Finally, the panel 
ordered task force C to develop a policy based on "rolling back" commu-
nism.60 As Glenn Snyder succinctly argues, Eisenhower's goal in creating 
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these task forces "was to highlight three dramatically different policy lines 
and to develop thoroughly the implications of each."61 
The directing panel, with Eisenhower's approval, selected seven mem­
bers for each task force. George Kennan, General James McCormack, and 
Admiral Richard Conolly served as the chairmen of task forces A, B, and C, 
respectively.62 The panels convened in June at the National War College in 
Washington, D.C., for a six-week study of their respective alternatives. The 
details of Project Solarium were of the highest confidentiality. George Ken-
nan stated years later, "It was all highly secret—you have no idea how well 
this was protected; nobody knew [about Project Solarium] the whole sum­
mer despite the fact that fifty to a hundred people were involved in it."63 
The directing panel ordered each task force to consider three possible 
courses of Soviet action before making their recommendations. First, the 
Soviet Union might decide to launch a war to achieve its policy objectives 
or to preempt a perceived military attack from the United States. Second, 
it might pursue an aggressive policy, having only a slight risk of war, of 
trying to weaken free world alliances. Finally, it might adopt a defensive 
posture to consolidate its current positions and place only a limited pres­
sure on the free world.64 These alternatives represented the generally ac­
cepted views of U.S. policymakers as to possible future Soviet actions. 
On June 26 the three task forces made preliminary presentations to the 
NSC. Cutler wanted to familiarize the council with the task forces' general 
arguments and to acquaint each task force with what the others were do­
ing. Not surprisingly, the recommendations followed the basic arguments 
assigned earlier to each task force. However, a common theme permeated 
their reports. The theme, best stated in task force A's report, was, "On the 
question of the relation of our defense effort to domestic economic prob­
lems, the position will be stressed that the U.S. economy can stand for a 
considerable length of time a higher level of defense expenditures than the 
currently operative ones." 65 
On July 16 each task force presented itsfinal report to the NSC. Under 
the direction of George Kennan, task force A recommended continuing 
the policies advocated by the Truman administration, making slight in­
creases in spending to improve continental defenses.66 The task force be­
lieved that the Soviet Union posed a threat in three broad areas: its 
maintenance of a strong and dangerous military establishment, its control 
of Eastern and Central Europe, and its ability to subvert democracy 
throughout the world.67 In light of these threats, Kennan's panel stressed 
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the need for flexibility in U.S. policy planning, as the directions of Soviet 
policy could never be predicted with great accuracy. It concluded that the 
United States needed "to recapture essentialflexibility, to effect better in­
tegration and cohesion within our strategy, and to improve its implemen­
tation" (15-16). 
Task force A criticized the rapid demobilization of American forces after 
World War II and warned that a similar policy at the conclusion of the 
Korean War would provide "the most likely invitation to aggression" (22). 
It therefore advocated a policy of maintaining military forces at a level suf­
ficient to fight either limited or general wars. Military force and equipment 
levels, the task force stressed, should be based on analyses of Soviet military 
capabilities, not on "the zigzags of Soviet political policy" (23). It argued 
that the United States needed to maintain adequate military capabilities to 
achieve its objectives and to resist any possible Soviet aggression. Flexibility 
was task force A's military strategy. The United States needed the capability 
to meet any Soviet aggressive move with an appropriate military response. 
Task force A identified the second objective of U.S. national security 
policy as rallying both Americans and non-Americans to the strategy of 
containing the Soviet Union. It believed that the public had to understand 
what was being done to counter the Soviet threat. Only a well-informed 
public would support the policies necessary to wage the Cold War. It 
placed considerable importance on maintaining European support for U.S. 
policies. Although the authors of the report believed that Americans would 
support increased defense spending and a greater reliance on nuclear weap­
ons, they expressed reservations that Europeans would do so. "A strong, 
vitalized and cohesive free Europe, orientated towards the same general 
objectives of the United States," the task force emphasized, "would be 
most important, if not decisive, factor in the successful resolution of the 
Soviet threat" (83). 
The last issue addressed by task force A concerned a topic of special 
interest to Eisenhower. He wanted to balance the budget as soon as pos­
sible and knew that defense spending had to be cut. He had therefore asked 
each task force to predict the probable costs of its policy recommendations 
assuming the Korean War would end in 1953.68 Task force A indicated that 
under its proposals, defense programs would cost between $43 billion and 
$44 billion for FYs 1954 and 1955 and would then gradually decline to 
approximately $35 billion per year. The task force believed that the U.S. 
economy was capable of meeting this burden of defense spending without 
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raising taxes. However, it supported the imposition of a new defense tax if 
additional revenue was needed to offset the increased costs. In the final 
analysis, it argued, "The United States can afford to survive."69 
The directing panel assigned task force B the alternative of drawing a 
line beyond which any move by the Soviet Union would precipitate a gen­
eral war with the United States. Under this strategy, the United States 
would explicitly state what Soviet actions would automatically lead to gen­
eral war. Supporters of this strategy assumed that if Soviet leaders knew the 
consequences of their actions, they would be more reluctant to act aggres­
sively. Task force B criticized the strategy of task force A as too ambiguous, 
and it strongly opposed continuing the policies of the Truman administra­
tion. It concluded that such a strategy "may be beyond the economic ca­
pabilities of the United States, will deprive the nation of the initiative, and 
will certainly divert the American people from the task of making the best 
possible use of their power and resources to be prepared to inflict decisive 
defeat on the Soviet Union if it imperils the vital security of this nation by 
continuing an active policy of expansion."70 Instead, the task force rec­
ommended developing a strategy based on waging a general war if Soviet 
bloc military forces advanced beyond their current borders. 
To facilitate the implementation of its strategy, task force B stressed that 
the United States needed to expand its offensive nuclear power. "Our 
policy," it concluded, "will bring into focus the central fact that U.S. stra­
tegic power is the ultimate military deterrent to Soviet aggression" (13). 
The task force proposed that by relying on nuclear weapons, the United 
States would be able to avoid the costly expense of maintaining sufficient 
military forces to wage both limited and general wars. In addressing the 
costs of alternative B, the task force assumed a position similar to that of 
task force A. It emphasized that, regardless of the cost, the United States 
had to address the Soviet threat. "Whatever the evils of inflation, whatever 
the economic problems involved in efforts to control it," the task force 
argued, "these cannot be weighed in the same scales with the grave danger 
to our national survival" (20). It concluded, "Alternative B is in effect an 
announcement that the United States and the Free World will accept the 
risk of annihilation before they accept Soviet domination" (1-4). 
The directing panel ordered task force C to develop a national security 
policy based on the alternative of "rolling back" communism. This alter­
native proposed using every means available, except military force, to un­
dermine communist-controlled countries. Task force C stated its broad 
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objectives as "ending Soviet domination outside its traditional bounda­
ries, destroying the communist apparatus in the Free World, curtailing So­
viet power for an aggressive war, ending the Iron Curtain, and cutting 
down the strength of any Bolshevik elements left in Soviet Russia."71 It 
believed that the only way to achieve these goals was to take the foreign 
policy initiative away from the Soviet Union. Alternative C required the 
United States to assume a much more aggressive policy. Believing that 
the United States had forfeited the initiative by only reacting to Soviet 
moves, it argued that the only way to regain the advantage in the Cold War 
was "by waging a political offensive." The task force stated more explicitly 
that "we must proceed to bring about the political subversion and liqui­
dation of the conspiracy against us" (9). 
To regain the initiative, task force C proposed two strategies—sub-
verting communism and continuing a military buildup. Subversion was 
the policy of action, and military buildup was the insurance if subversion 
failed. Task force C recommended: "In carrying out this policy [of sub­
version], we recommend that this Government aggressively, both overtly 
and covertly, attack the Communist apparatus wherever it be found in 
the world. . . . What we seek to do is to harass and hound every conceiv­
able Communist activity using all available political, legal, financial and 
economic devices in our possession" (22). The task force placed few limi­
tations on possible U.S. subversive policies. It argued, "All means of ac­
tion . . .—short of preventive war—are available under the Alternative" 
(85). It recognized that this policy embodied a greater risk of war but ar­
gued that the only way to win the Cold War was to be aggressive. 
Task force C's evaluation of the expense of its policy revealed a greater 
initial cost than either alternative A or B but a smaller amount in the long 
term because the Cold War would have ended in victory. It called for 
$60 billion annual defense budgets for FYs 1954 and 1955 and $45 billion 
for each year thereafter until the United States won the Cold War (62). It 
argued that the cost was worth the benefits of victory. By assuming this 
policy, the United States would prevail in any type of conflict with the So­
viet Union. 
After receiving the task force presentations, the NSC ordered the Plan­
ning Board to analyze the reports and to develop a policy paper incorpo­
rating the best features of each one. The Planning Board established an ad 
hoc committee of representatives from each of the statutory members of 
the NSC. For three weeks the committee studied the three reports. Robert 
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Bowie, director of the Policy Planning staff and the State Department rep­
resentative on the Planning Board, stated that "the planning board worked 
on this . . . and attempted to build on what had been in the task force 
reports, particularly Task Force A which was pretty much recognized as the 
principal basis on which the president had come down."72 The Planning 
Board presented the draft of its policy paper to the NSC on September 30. 
This policy paper evolved through three broad stages: NSC 162, 162 /1  , 
and 162/2.7  3 
In the final version, the NSC established the basic goal of having the 
United States meet the perceived Soviet threat while avoiding economic 
ruin.74 Not surprisingly, it incorporated recommendations from each of the 
Solarium task forces. While it viewed the world through the spectrum of 
an East-West struggle, as did the task forces, it placed a much greater em­
phasis on economic security than any of them did. To achieve its national 
security goals, it established three requirements: 
a. Development and maintenance of: 
1. A strong military posture with emphasis on the capability of inflicting 
massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power; 
2. U.S. and allied forces in readiness to move rapidly initially to counter 
aggression by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas and lines of 
communication; and 
3. A mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, 
adequate to insure victory in a general war. 
b. Maintenance of a sound, strong and growing economy. 
c. Maintenance of morale and free institutions and the willingness of the 
U.S. people to support the measures necessary for national security.75 
These requirements embodied most of task force A's recommendations.76 
The differences arose in NSC 162/2's emphasis on both economic and 
military strength. 
The NSC also adopted the principle that both tactical and strategic 
atomic weapons would be used in wartime.77 To differing degrees, each 
task force had recommended a greater reliance on these weapons in case of 
a military conflict. Accepting this premise, the NSC argued: "The major 
deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the manifest determina­
tion of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory 
striking power if the area is attacked."78 The true meaning of "massive 
retaliatory striking power" became much clearer when the NSC empha­
sized the important role of nuclear weapons in any type of conflict. "In the 
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event of hostilities," it stated, "the United States will consider nuclear 
weapons to be as available for use as other munitions" (593). 
While the NSC recognized that the efficacy of atomic deterrence could 
be limited, even so it believed that reliance on nuclear weapons provided 
the most cost-efficient strategy for successfully waging the Cold War. It 
concluded that if Soviet leaders knew there were certain actions that would 
lead automatically to a U.S. nuclear counterattack, then they would pursue 
a more cautious policy. This concept of clearly declaring specific responses 
to possible Soviet actions is reminiscent of task force B's "drawing the line" 
(581). The idea in NSC 162/2 was not to define an entire policy around 
this concept but to warn the Kremlin leaders of the possible consequences 
of their actions. The NSC believed that if the United States explicitly stated 
its position regarding Soviet aggressive moves, then U.S. military officials 
would be able to develop plans based on more clearly defined policies. 
In addressing the policy of "rolling back" communism, NSC 162/2 
concluded that there was little likelihood of detaching a country from the 
Soviet bloc. However, it did recommend that the United States "take overt 
and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige and ideology as effec­
tive instruments of Soviet power" (595). NSC 162/2 accepted task force 
C's premise that communism could be thwarted in countries not firmly 
aligned in the Soviet bloc. The idea was to undermine the governments of 
countries that had communist leanings but at the same time were not di­
rectly tied to the Soviet Union. The Eisenhower administration clearly 
adopted this position in its later policies toward such countries as Iran and 
Guatemala.79 
NSC 162/2 represented the Eisenhower administration's clearest ex­
pression of its "New Look" national security policy. It emphasized that 
military plans would be developed under the assumption that atomic weap­
ons would be used in future conflicts, it authorized the use of both overt 
and covert operations to achieve U.S. goals, and it recognized the impor­
tance of economic strength to U.S. security. The paper also stressed the 
importance of the rest of the world to the United States. It stated, "The 
assumption by the United States, as the leader of the free world, of a sub­
stantial degree of responsibility for the freedom and security of the free 
nations is a direct and essential contribution to the maintenance of its own 
freedom and security."80 
The development of NSC 162/2 clearly reveals the importance Eisen­
hower assigned to examining policy alternatives thoroughly within a tightly 
organized decision-making system. By stressing his economic and political 
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philosophies to the participants in this system, he provided guidance for 
the development of his policies. General Andrew Goodpaster, a member of 
task force C and later Eisenhower's staff secretary, recalled that in the NSC 
meetings the president wanted to bring together all of the people involved 
with an issue. Eisenhower "had what amounted to a tacit rule that there 
could be no non-concurrence through silence. If somebody didn't agree, 
he was obliged to speak his mind and get it all out on the table . . . and 
then in light of all of that, the President would come to a line of action, he 
wanted everybody to hear it, everybody to participate in it, and then he 
wanted everybody to be guided by it."81 This approach allowed Eisen­
hower to select his preferred national security policy alternatives. 
The Threat of Surprise Attack and the Killian Committee 
In early 1954 Eisenhower again turned to the NSC and outside consultants 
to examine a problem that had been bothering him for many months. Re­
cent technological advances, including the successful Russian test of the 
H-bomb and the development of long-range aircraft, raised the question 
of whether the Soviet Union could launch a successful surprise attack 
against the United States.82 The lack of concrete intelligence concern­
ing Soviet military capabilities or intentions accentuated the concern. In 
March, Eisenhower turned to the Science Advisory Committee of the Of­
fice of Defense Mobilization to study whether the Soviet Union had the 
capability or intention of launching an attack against North America and 
what the United States could do to prepare for that possibility. 
Eisenhower's fears mirrored the concerns of many earlier U.S. policy-
makers. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, U.S. officials recog­
nized the preponderance of U.S. world power.83 However, after the Soviet 
detonation of the atomic bomb in 1949, U.S. superiority became less cer­
tain, and accurate assessments of Soviet intentions became even more para­
mount. Ever since Pearl Harbor, Americans had experienced a forbidding 
sense of vulnerability. The Soviet atomic test then raised the specter that 
the Kremlin leaders might one day acquire the capability to attack the 
United States. In assessing the significance of Soviet possession of the 
bomb less than two months later, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vanden­
berg revealed, "There are strong reasons to believe that a sudden surprise 
attack by Soviet atom bombers would result in not only inflicting unthink­
able mortalities on our people and our industry, but also might cripple our 
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strategic air forces, thereby denying us the means to redress the balance 
through retaliation."84 In a separate memorandum on the same day, Van­
denberg discussed the inadequacies of U.S. air defenses and asserted that 
"almost any number of Soviet bombers could cross our borders and fly to 
most of the targets in the United States without a shot being fired at them 
and without even being challenged in any way."85 
During the early 1950s, a Soviet surprise attack was not expected, but 
the possibility could not be ignored. Most intelligence estimates from this 
time period, including National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 3, NIE 48, 
and NIE 64, concluded that the Soviet Union would not deliberately ini­
tiate war.86 Retired Air Force General Idwal Edwards chaired a committee 
for the NSC that examined the capability of the Soviet Union to injure the 
United States and concluded that if the Soviet leaders launched an attack, 
it "would be an act of desperation and not an exercise in military judg-
ment."87 However, while Edwards's committee and the other NIEs did 
not expect an attack, they would not eliminate that possibility. For ex­
ample, after arguing that the Soviet Union would probably not initiate a 
general war against the United States, NIE 48 quickly equivocated and 
stressed that "Soviet courses of action can never be predicted with confi­
dence. In particular the possibility of deliberate initiation of general war 
cannot be excluded at any time merely because such initiation would con­
tradict past Soviet political strategy."88 
Eisenhower also received a steady stream of conflicting reports concern­
ing Soviet capabilities and U.S. vulnerabilities. A notable deficiency in most 
of these reports was the lack of a detailed analysis of Soviet intentions. In 
1953 the Strategic Air Command (SAC) initiated Operation Tailwind to 
discover "How well could SAC survive a Pearl Harbor type of attack?"89 
Simulating one possible Soviet attack scenario, SAC launched ninety-nine 
bomber sorties against targets in the United States during a forty-eight-
hour period when the Air Defense Command (ADC) was on alert for an 
attack. Despite the attack warning and its alert status, the ADC intercepted 
only six bombers.90 This dismal performance supported SAC's contention 
that "it is extremely difficult to effectively prevent penetration of coordi­
nated heavy bomber attacks which hit the early warning screen from many 
directions simultaneously."91 
Influenced in part by Operation Tailwind, the NSC examined U.S. con­
tinental defenses during the summer of 1953. It emphasized, "The present 
continental defense programs are not now adequate to prevent, neutralize 
34 Chapter One 
or seriously deter the military or covert attacks which the USSR is capable 
of launching, nor are they adequate to ensure the continuity of govern­
ment, the continuity of production, or the protection of the industrial 
mobilization base and millions of citizens in our great and exposed met­
ropolitan centers." It then concluded, "This condition constitutes an 
unacceptable risk to our nation's survival."92 The NSC therefore recom­
mended improving intelligence-gathering capabilities, expanding radar 
coverage, increasingfighter-interceptor and anti-aircraft forces, developing 
plans for government continuity after an attack, and adopting new civil 
defense programs.93 These recommendations closely mirrored the views of 
the JCS at the same time.94 
While these reports made it clear that U.S. defenses were inadequate to 
stop a Soviet attack, the question remained whether the Soviet Union in­
tended to take such actions or even whether it could do so. In a striking 
report, "Magnitude and Imminence of the Soviet Air Threat to the United 
States," neither the Air Force, the Navy, nor the JCS expected the Soviet 
Union to launch an attack before the end of 1957.95 The Navy represen­
tative summarized this position by arguing, "The preservation of the se­
curity of the USSR under the worst possible contingencies of war will loom 
large in their estimate of the situation. In the Soviet mind, overwhelming 
strength will be required. It is not believed that the Soviets are likely to 
conclude, between now and 1957, that they have such strength."96 
However, Soviet advances in both atomic weapons technology and 
long-range bomber capabilities clouded these conclusions. While it would 
have been difficult for the Soviet Union to launch an attack, its testing of 
the H-bomb in 1953 and its introduction of new medium- and long-range 
bombers in 1954 indicated that it was acquiring the capability to do so.97 
More important, the destructive power of nuclear weapons gave an aggres­
sor the potential capability to win a war through a carefully planned first 
strike.98 At this stage, the perception among U.S. policymakers that the 
Soviet Union sought world domination became widespread. Charles Boh­
len, the State Department representative on Truman's NSC senior staff, 
concluded that "there is no important disagreement [among policymak­
ers] that if matters reach the point where the Soviets attain the capability 
of delivering a 'decisive' initial blow on the United States without serious 
risk to their own regime, they would do so."99 
The question of whether the Soviet Union would launch an attack if it 
could was further complicated by American memories of Pearl Harbor. 
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The Japanese had caught the United States by surprise and had mounted a 
devastating attack against U.S. naval and air forces. The introduction of 
nuclear weapons raised the stakes if a similar attack was used to start a new 
war. Jack Nunn, in a pioneering study of the importance of Soviet first-
strike capability, carefully articulates how this capability, when tied to the 
memories of Pearl Harbor, changed U.S. perceptions of its vulnerability. 
"The Japanese attack," he argues, "was etched on the collective U.S. con­
sciousness, the name linked with a vision of a surprise attack—pitting a 
calculating aggressor against an unaware and unwarlike democracy." 10° 
One of Eisenhower's greatest problems was that he did not know what 
the Soviet Union planned to do.101 While he did not expect the Kremlin to 
order an attack, he could not rule out that possibility. If the Soviet Union 
possessed the capability to attack the United States with nuclear weapons 
and U.S. defenses remained vulnerable to such an attack, the enemy posed 
a potentially deadly threat. This cruel dilemma bedeviled Eisenhower. 
While he did not expect an attack, the assumption that the Soviet Union 
might attack, if it believed it could do so without suffering devastating 
retaliation, formed the basis of U.S. policies.102 In essence, Eisenhower 
had to base his policies on a strategic alternative that he did not expect to 
happen. 
In 1954 Eisenhower continued to view U.S. strength with confidence. 
However, technological advances in both weaponry and delivery capabili­
ties raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might soon be able to 
launch a devastating surprise attack against the United States. In March 
1954 he expressed this concern to his Science Advisory Committee and 
asked its members whether technological means existed to obtain early 
warning of a Soviet surprise attack and to defend the United States if such 
an attack did occur.103 His concerns led to the creation of a special com­
mittee to address these technological questions.104 
In July 1954 Lee Dubridge, the chairman of the Science Advisory 
Committee, proposed a study that would analyze Soviet capabilities and 
explore possible scientific and technological means to meet any threat. 
Upon Eisenhower's request, James Killian, president of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) and a member of the Science Advisory 
Committee, agreed to serve as chairman of the soon-to-be-created Tech­
nical Capabilities Panel (TCP). From September 1954 to February 1955, 
this panel, known as the Killian committee, assessed the Soviet Union's 
strengths and weaknesses, the vulnerability of the United States to surprise 
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attack, and the measures needed to improve U.S. offensive and defensive 
capabilities. The committee presented its 190-page report to the NSC in 
February 1955.105 
The TCP's activities, conclusions, and recommendations are of striking 
importance to understanding the Gaither committee. As later chapters will 
show, many of the Gaither committee's conclusions and recommendations 
reflected the influence of the TCP. Considering their respective member­
ships, this is not surprising. Of the nine members of the TCP's steering 
committee,five—James Killian, James Fisk, James Baxter, James Doolittle, 
and Robert Sprague—would later serve on the Gaither committee in sig­
nificant capacities.106 In addition,five consultants served on both the TCP 
and the Gaither committee.107 
In the preface to its study, the TCP's steering committee stated that its 
objective was to examine "the present vulnerability of the United States to 
surprise attack and ways whereby science and technology can strengthen 
our offense and defense to reduce this hazard."108 To address this prob­
lem fully, Killian asked outside consultants to sit on three panels that 
would examine specific problems related to technological changes. Panel 1, 
chaired by Marshall Holloway, examined U.S. offensive capabilities. Panel 2, 
headed by Leland Haworth, studied U.S. continental defense. Panel 3, di­
rected by Edwin Land, studied U.S. intelligence capabilities. The creation 
of these three panels reflected key assumptions that guided the steering 
committee. First, it viewed offensive and defensive weapons as integrated 
components in the defense of the United States. Second, it believed that 
continental defenses, ranging from early warning to anti-aircraft weapons, 
were inadequate. Finally, it recognized that the acceleration of Soviet tech­
nological developments increased U.S. vulnerability.109 
The TCP concluded that U.S. offensive forces, comprising at that time 
primarily the Strategic Air Command, were essential to reduce U.S. vul­
nerability to a surprise attack. In reaching these conclusions, it operated 
under the assumption that "both 'offensive' and 'defensive' forces are es­
sential to accomplish the general mission of defending the United States. 
Both are deterrents to surprise and, should war begin, both contribute to 
the destruction of the enemy power. Neither one alone is adequate to de­
fend the United States."110 The panel concluded that aircraft, and later 
missiles, would provide the United States with a deterrent capability that 
might force Soviet leaders to reevaluate any plans to launch afirst strike. If 
the Soviets did order an attack, the survival of an offensive striking capa­
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bility would allow the United States to retaliate through a devastating 
counterstrike. Finally, the existence of an offensive striking force gave the 
United States the option of launching a first strike if it so chose.111 While 
never the official policy of the United States, this option was still being 
seriously considered in different crisis situations in the 1950s.112 
In evaluating the threat of a surprise attack against the United States, 
the committee gave no real consideration to Soviet intentions. The Killian 
committee readily acknowledged that it based its conclusions on techno­
logical changes rather than on any reevaluation of Soviet intentions. It 
simply accepted the assumption that the Soviet Union's ultimate goal was 
world domination and that Soviet leaders would be willing to use any 
means to achieve it. Technological advances in weaponry and delivery sys­
tems magnified the threat. The committee was particularly concerned with 
the Soviet development of a hydrogen bomb and its research into ballis­
tic missiles. "This evolution of nuclear bombs and the means to deliver 
them," the committee stressed, "has given warfare a potential for swift, 
complete destruction and sudden decisiveness that is revolutionizing our 
concepts of offense and defense."113 
The Killian committee concluded that advances in delivery capabilities 
posed a greater threat than improvements in nuclear weaponry. While it 
did not rule out further advances in warhead design and/or yield, it 
stressed that such advances would be relatively minimal. Equally impor­
tant, it noted that the United States would not be able to maintain its lead 
in warhead technology for long, since present "technology is already near 
the upper limit of yield per ton of bomb allowed by nature" (7). With the 
imminent emergence of virtual equality in the field of nuclear weaponry, 
advances in delivery systems became pivotal in the military balance of 
power between the Soviet Union and the United States (14). 
The committee examined the effectiveness of two types of delivery sys­
tems: bombers and ballistic missiles. It argued that "attack by manned 
bombers will continue to be a threat long after the advent of the intercon­
tinental missiles" (76). However, it did emphasize the potential strategic 
and psychological consequences of the development of the ICBM. It con­
cluded, "In the hands of the Soviets such a weapon [the ICBM] would 
represent an even greater jump in capability since it would to a considerable 
extent wipe out the present geographical advantage enjoyed by the U.S." 
It further stressed, "With such a capability the Soviets could put pressure 
on much of the world outside of the U.S., either by direct threat to them 
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or by threat against the U.S. It, therefore, appears urgent to achieve this 
type of capability before the Soviets, in order to at least match threat with 
threat" (64). 
The defense problems raised by both long-range bombers and ballistic 
missiles brought into focus the issues before panels 2 and 3. Offensive strik­
ing forces would be useless if they could be destroyed before the United 
States could launch a retaliatory strike. This dilemma forced the panels to 
determine the impact of technological advances in several areas. Panel 2 
had to analyze whether the threat raised by these advances could be coun­
tered by improving U.S. defenses. Panel 3 had to determine how techno­
logical advances could strengthen U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities. 
For both panels, technology could either undermine or strengthen U.S. 
security. 
In a scathing critique of U.S. continental defenses, the Killian commit­
tee concluded that "the United States is at present unacceptably vulnerable 
to surprise attack. Our military defenses are as yet numerically deficient 
and have serious qualitative weaknesses. The defenses could be avoided or 
overwhelmed and might even be unaware of an attack until the first bomb 
exploded. Under these circumstances our cities could suffer millions of 
casualties and crippling damage, and enough SAC bombers and bases 
could be destroyed to reduce drastically our ability to retaliate" (18). More 
specifically, the committee argued that if the Soviet Union launched an 
attack, the United States would receive little or no warning because of the 
weaknesses in its intelligence-gathering capabilities and the gaps in radar 
coverage at both high and low altitudes (75-76, 96-97, 101-2). These 
deficiencies opened the United States to a surprise attack if the Soviet 
Union decided to launch one. 
Because of the existing and expected advances in delivery capabilities 
and the deficiencies in continental defense, Edwin Land's panel examined 
how effectively technology was being used to acquire intelligence of the 
Soviet Union. In the mid-1950s the United States lacked a clear knowl­
edge of Soviet capabilities. The various U.S. intelligence agencies, includ­
ing the CIA and the intelligence departments within each branch of the 
military, based their estimates of Soviet capabilities on limited firsthand evi­
dence, extrapolations from known U.S. weapons capabilities, estimates of 
Soviet manufacturing capabilities, and sightings of Soviet military hardware 
(often at military parades and air shows).114 The Killian committee aptly 
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concluded that "estimates of the specific capabilities and immediate inten­
tions of the Soviets have, at their center, only a very small core of hard 
facts" (emphasis in original).115 Quite obviously, intelligence estimates 
based on such evidence could not be totally reliable and might lead to in­
correct or at least ambiguous conclusions and recommendations. 
Although most of the section of the Killian report dealing specifically 
with the acquisition and interpretation of intelligence remains classified, 
enough evidence is available to indicate the committee's basic conclusions 
and recommendations. It emphasized that "there is a good possibility that 
an enemy's preparations for a massive surprise attack on the United States 
would be detected. However, this possibility is not a certainty" (24). Ac­
cordingly, it stressed, "Because we are unable to conclude that the United 
States surely will, or surely will not, have useful strategic warning in the 
event of a surprise attack, we recommend that our planning take serious 
account of both possibilities" (25). The committee stated that the United 
States "must find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which 
our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to 
minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross 
overestimation or gross underestimation of the threat" (44; emphasis in 
original). 
An important question is whether the committee believed that the 
United States should launch either a preventive or a preemptive war against 
the Soviet Union. While the committee never explicitly made either rec­
ommendation, evidence suggests that it supported maintaining a first-
strike capability.116 For example, it stated, "Our striking forces must blunt 
the attack at its source."117 In a more extensive analysis, it concluded, 
"The importance to the defense of the U.S. of an offensive air striking 
force stems from its ability to attack the Soviet long-range air force on the 
ground."11S By being able to strike at the "source" or "on the ground," 
the United States would be capable of preventive war or, at a minimum, 
preemptive war.119 
The final Killian report made several specific recommendations to limit 
the vulnerability of the United States to a surprise attack by the Soviet 
Union. The committee called for the acceleration of ballistic missile devel­
opment, the acquisition of additional bases for the Strategic Air Com­
mand, the completion of a comprehensive review of both U.S. and Soviet 
target systems, the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line, the 
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addition of gap-filler radar, the use of atomic weapons in defense against 
attacking bombers and/or missiles, and the study of ways to reduce civilian 
casualties in the event of an attack.120 
The Killian committee's findings had a tremendous influence on Eisen­
hower and his administration, especially in the areas of accelerating missile 
development and intelligence gathering. David Rosenberg argues that 
"the TCP .. . provided an important benchmark in the evolution of Eisen-
hower's thinking about nuclear strategy."121 Eisenhower acknowledged in 
his memoirs how he accelerated the development of both the IREM and 
the ICBM after receiving the Killian report.122 However, Land's intelli­
gence panel probably had the most important influence. It recommended 
the construction of an airplane capable of photographing the Soviet Union 
from high altitudes. The recommendation to build such a spy plane was 
so sensitive that it was presented to Eisenhower directly, instead of to the 
full NSC.123 Eisenhower accepted this recommendation and immediately 
initiated the U-2 program. In the view of retired CIA historian Donald 
Welzenbach, after the meeting of the TCP, "Killian and Land virtually con­
trolled the development of the nation's technical intelligence collections 
agencies."124 
The recommendations of the Killian committee that Eisenhower incor­
porated into his national security policies were tremendously influential. 
They laid the foundation for the acceleration of U.S. intelligence gathering 
and ballistic missile programs. The TCP exercise is a clear example of how 
Eisenhower sought advice from outside consultants who were experts in 
specific fields. Through the filter of his national security decision-making 
structure, Eisenhower ordered, received, and evaluated this advice. He ac­
cepted parts of it, modified others, and rejected some. The result of the 
entire process was a policy that reflected Eisenhower's desire to wage the 
Cold War based on a combination of political, military, and economic 
strength. 
Conclusions 
Eisenhower succeeded admirably in achieving his objectives during his first 
term as president. Starting with a systematic review of U.S. national secu­
rity programs in 1953, Eisenhower devised a military strategy based on his 
country's overwhelming superiority in atomic weapons and delivery capa­
bilities. He decided that, rather than react to every world crisis by deploy­
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ing troops or by increasing the defense budget, the United States would 
emphasize the deterrent power of atomic weapons. In so doing, he was 
able to cut overall defense expenditures by reducing the size of U.S. con-
ventional—nonnuclear—forces. This New Look strategy, as it was called, 
allowed Eisenhower to balance two of his first four annual budgets and to 
maintain the military capability necessary to launch a devastating counter-
strike if the Soviet Union decided to attack the United States. 
In all of his decisions, Eisenhower attempted to preserve what he viewed 
as the twin foundations of American society: democratic government and 
a viable capitalist economic system. When making decisions concerning na­
tional security matters, he believed these principles could be protected only 
by maintaining a careful balance between a sound economy—meaning low 
inflation and a balanced budget—and defense spending. An overemphasis 
on one would lead only to weakness in the other. Throughout his first term 
in office, Eisenhower struggled to maintain these twin goals while resisting 
almost constant calls for more spending.125 
To ensure the integration of his political and economic philosophies 
into his national security policies, Eisenhower employed a decision-making 
process that he had carefully designed at the inception of his presidency. 
Drawing on a complex system of committees and advisory groups and re­
viewing a problem or issue step by step, from the lowest to the highest 
levels of policy making, he believed, would facilitate the development of 
the best possible policy alternatives. Through this process, Eisenhower ex­
pected to obtain advice and guidance based on careful study and discus-
sion.126 On matters of national security, the NSC stood at the center of this 
process. Following the advice of Robert Cutler, Eisenhower streamlined 
the process for developing policy papers, established a standardized pro­
cedure for presentations at NSC meetings, set the precedent for using out­
side consultants, and expanded the NSC membership to include both the 
secretary of the treasury and director of the budget. 
Eisenhower used these new procedures to analyze national security is­
sues. On two occasions during his first term, the NSC turned to outside 
consultants to examine specific national security problems. In 1953 it cre­
ated three task forces as part of Project Solarium to examine policy alter­
natives. Eisenhower incorporated many of their final recommendations in 
his new national security policy—NSC 162/2. This policy emphasized the 
maintenance of an overwhelming offensive striking power, the use of tac­
tical nuclear weapons as well as conventional arms in future conflicts, and 
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the employment of covert operations to undermine communism. In 1954 
Eisenhower again turned to outside consultants when he ordered the cre­
ation of the Killian committee to analyze the vulnerability of the United 
States to a Soviet surprise attack. After receiving the committee's conclu­
sions, Eisenhower accelerated the development of both IRBMs and ICBMs 
and implemented the U-2 program to acquire intelligence of Soviet mili­
tary capabilities and possible intentions. 
Scholars such as H. W. Brands, I. M. Destier, Samuel Huntington, and 
Jeremi Suri have questioned the effectiveness of Eisenhower's organiza­
tional structure. They argue that rather than requiring policy advisers to 
make clear decisions on controversial issues, the NSC developed recom­
mendations based on compromise and consensus building. Eisenhower's 
critics claim that these recommendations were more often than not too 
broad or ambiguous. In either case, they provided only minimal guidance 
in developing specific policies.127 
While this may have been true in some cases, the examples presented in 
this chapter reveal an organizational system that produced the type of ad­
vice that Eisenhower sought.128 Eisenhower turned to the NSC and out­
side consultants to acquire the assistance he needed to make decisions. He 
utilized the recommendations he received from Project Solarium and the 
Killian committee to help formulate his policies. The committees and the 
NSC served Eisenhower as a means to explore different policy options in 
an environment conducive to open discussion and debate. From these al­
ternatives, Eisenhower was able to develop and augment his New Look 
policies. 
The examples of Project Solarium and the Killian committee reveal the 
reliance that Eisenhower placed on his decision-making system. He used 
outside consultants to obtain fresh appraisals concerning specific prob­
lems and the NSC as a forum for thorough discussion and debate. Through 
this system, he was able to develop policies that reflected his economic, 
military, and political philosophies. Although not without its faults, the 
organizational structure that Eisenhower constructed and used in making 
decisions concerning national security policies during his first term pro­
vided clear and effective guidance for waging the Cold War. 
The Establishment 
and Background of 
the Gaither Committee 
1 he New Look policies that Eisenhower adopted 
in 1953 and 1954 remained the centerpieces of U.S. strategy throughout 
his presidency as he relied on nuclear weapons and continued technological 
improvements to deter the Soviet Union, as well as covert and psychologi­
cal operations to wage the Cold War against communism. The experts in­
volved in both Project Solarium and the Killian committee helped devise 
the administration's policies. The results seemed positive. After a brief eco­
nomic downturn in 1954, the economy prospered. Furthermore, while the 
Soviet Union continued to strengthen its military forces, the United States 
augmented its own capabilities by placing greater emphasis on strategic 
nuclear power. 
Eisenhower's policies won acclaimfrom the American population. With­
out sacrificing security, defense spending was at its lowest since before the 
Korean War. In addition, the economy was experiencing steady growth 
with little inflation—one of Eisenhower's most important goals. After de­
feating the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson, in the 1956 presi­
dential election, he began his second term with hope and confidence. Un­
fortunately, the promising beginning to 1957 proved short-lived. By the 
end of the year, his administration was under attack from all directions. In 
late November 1957 he wrote to a friend, "Since July 25th of 1956, when 
Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez, I cannot remember a 
day that has not brought its major or minor crisis."l 
Of all the controversies that plagued Eisenhower in 1957, the question 
of civil defense had the greatest influence on the estabKshment of the 
Gaither committee. Debates raged over the implications of radioactive fall­
out, the correct balance between shelters and evacuation, and the require­
ments for stockpiling emergency materials.2 These controversies were not 
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new. Ever since the Soviet Union had acquired the capability of attacking 
the United States, the president and his advisers had recognized the po­
tential consequences of a nuclear exchange for the civilian population, the 
country's infrastructure, and the government's ability to continue to func-
tion.3 Months before the establishment of the Gaither committee, Eisen­
hower told the NSC "that the picture of the terrific destruction resulting 
from a nuclear attack warranted taking a look at the whole matter in terms 
of determining how much destruction the United States and its people can 
absorb and still survive." 4 
The question about civil defense that most concerned Eisenhower was 
how to develop a plan that would "avoid hysteria on one side and compla­
cency on the other."5 He recognized that U.S. civil defense programs were 
important to U.S. security, yet he did not want to adopt a plan that would 
undermine the way of life he sought to protect. He desired a middle 
ground between regimenting society in preparation for an attack and 
accepting the destruction of urban centers as unpreventable.6 In January 
1957 the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) recommended 
that the United States build a $32 billion shelter system. Eisenhower and 
his advisers had to decide whether to accept such a major undertaking. 
As he had in 1953 and again in 1954, Eisenhower turned to a group of 
experts to study the relationship between active defenses (interceptor air­
craft, anti-aircraft guns, and air defense missiles) and passive defenses 
(early warning radar, evacuation plans, and shelters). With the assistance of 
the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization 
(ODM), Eisenhower asked H. Rowan Gaither in May 1957 to establish a 
committee of experts, formally called the Security Resources Panel but bet­
ter known as the Gaither committee. Over the course of the summer and 
early fall, the committee examined U.S. national security programs. When 
it completed its final report in November, it made recommendations that 
reflected the preconceived biases and years of study of its expert members. 
Plans for Civil Defense 
The impetus for the creation of the Gaither committee came from growing 
pressures on the Eisenhower administration to reevaluate U.S. civil defense 
policies and to institute a nationwide shelter program. From January to 
June of 1956, Representative Chet Holifield (D-CA) chaired hearings be­
fore the House Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Com­
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mittee on Government Operations concerning the adequacy of U.S. civil 
defense planning. Holifield believed that the administration was placing 
too much emphasis on offensive striking power at the expense of continen­
tal and civil defense. He subjected the FCDA, headed by former Nebraska 
governor Val Peterson, to the most vigorous criticism. Holifield believed 
that the FCDA placed too much emphasis on evacuating the population 
after receiving warning of a Soviet nuclear attack rather than on provid­
ing shelters for the majority of the urban population who would be unable 
to leave. He emphasized, "The FCDA's policy of reliance on evacuation 
as the key civil defense measure is weak and ineffective and indeed dan­
gerously shortsighted."7 Instead of evacuation, Holifield stressed the im­
portance of shelters in protecting the population and deterring the Soviet 
Union.8 
In January 1957 Holifield's committee submitted legislation, H.R. 2125, 
which if passed would have greatly expanded the importance of civil de­
fense. In particular, it would have forced the federal government to assume 
control of civil defense planning whether it wanted to or not. The com­
mittee proposed the creation of a Department of Civil Defense, the devel­
opment of a national plan for civil defense, and the construction of shelters 
in predetermined target areas.9 More specifically, the legislation called for 
the construction of fallout shelters that would provide some protection to 
the entire American population of 170 million. The proposed shelter sys­
tem would cost approximately $20 billion.10 The House of Representatives 
rejected most of Holifield's legislation during the spring of 1957, but it did 
shift the burden for civil defense planning from the localities to the federal 
government. 
Despite the criticism, Peterson and his assistants from the FCDA sup­
ported many of the Holifield committee's recommendations. Although 
they had originally emphasized evacuation, the advent of more powerful 
weapons and advanced delivery systems led them to develop a policy bal­
anced between shelters and evacuation. In particular, the FCDA reeval­
uated its civil defense plans after the March 1954 Bravo nuclear test fanned 
the fears of radioactive fallout. This explosion yielded twice the expected 
power and produced fallout that covered nearly 7,000 square miles.11 After 
the deadly results of the test became known, the FCDA placed even more 
emphasis on shelters because of the "greatly increased radiation hazard 
from fall-out."12 
In December 1956 Peterson reported that the Soviet Union had the 
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capability to launch a nuclear attack against the United States using bomb­
ers and submarine-launched missiles. After the advent of the ICBM, the 
warning time of such an attack could be as little as fifteen minutes.13 Be­
cause of this potential threat, Peterson submitted an FCDA proposal in 
January 1957 to build a nationwide system of shelters that would be used 
in conjunction with preestablished evacuation plans.14 The report, which 
became known as NSC 5709, accepted the conclusions of the Net Evalua­
tion Subcommittee (NES), which argued that 80 percent of the casual­
ties in a nuclear attack would result from radioactive fallout.15 Concerned 
about the impact of this fallout and influenced by Holifield's call for shel­
ters, the FCDA concluded, "Most of the fallout casualties could be pre­
vented by adequate shelter."16 It recommended spending $32 billion over 
the following eight years to build sufficient shelters to protect the entire 
population.17 
Despite the report's dire warnings, neither Eisenhower nor his top ad­
visers were willing to spend such a large sum of money on an unproven 
method of protection. Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's assistant for national 
security affairs, argued that while shelters may have been necessary, without 
knowledge of their impact on the economy and on domestic and foreign 
opinion a massive construction program could not be immediately imple-
mented.18 Nonetheless, administration officials, alarmed by the magnitude 
of the anticipated destruction from a Soviet attack, requested further ex­
aminations of the problem. They launched new studies to examine the 
likely casualties in a nuclear exchange, the effectiveness of passive defense 
measures in preventing casualties, the capability of active defenses to de­
stroy Soviet forces before they reached their targets, and the economic con­
sequences of these defense programs.19 
The Establishment of the Gaither Committee 
Eisenhower used the NSC to examine these issues. From January to 
March 1957, the planning board discussed the FCDA's report on shelters 
and recommended that the NSC perform another study that would answer 
a series of questions, the most important being, "What is the optimum 
balance between active and passive defense measures for protection of the 
civil population?"20 On April 4, 1957, the NSC ordered four studies to 
answer the planning board's questions: 
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1. A study of different shelter programs by an interdepartmental committee 
composed of representatives from the FCDA, ODM, the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), and the Department of Defense. 
2. A study by the Science Advisory Committee of the ODM of active and 
passive defense measures for the protection of the civil population. 
3. A study by the Council of Economic Advisers of the economic costs 
of various shelter programs. 
4. A study by the Department of the Treasury of providingfinancial as­
sistance to individuals and industries to stimulate private shelter 
construction.21 
The study by the Science Advisory Committee proved the most impor­
tant, as it eventually incorporated the findings of the other three in reach­
ing its final conclusions. To perform this study, the NSC turned to the 
decision-making system it had used so successfully in the cases of Project 
Solarium and the Rillian committee. It requested that the Science Advisory 
Committee appoint a panel of experts to study U.S. active and passive de­
fense measures.22 
The Science Advisory Committee gave James Killian, one of its mem­
bers, the responsibility for selecting the project director. He recommended 
that the committee appoint Gaither, a longtime friend from their days at 
the World War II Radiation Laboratory, to oversee the study.23 Based on 
this recommendation, Eisenhower asked Gaither to serve as the director 
of the soon-to-be-created Security Resources Panel.24 Through the early 
summer, Gaither and the ODM selected individuals to serve on this panel, 
aptly called the Gaither committee. Gaither divided the committee into 
two principal groups: the steering committee and the advisory panel. After 
he was diagnosed, with arterial thrombosis, he stepped down as the com-
mittee's director in September, to be replaced by Robert Sprague and Wil­
liam Foster. Sprague and Foster directed the steering committee, which 
also included James Baxter, Robert Calkins, John Corson, James Perkins, 
Robert Prim, Hector Skifter, William Webster, Jerome Wiesner, and tech­
nical adviser Edward Oliver. The advisory panel included Gaither (after his 
illness), Admiral Robert Carney, General James Doolittle, General John 
Hull, Mervin Kelly, Ernest Lawrence, Robert Lovett, John McCloy, and 
Frank Stanton. Two other groups played important advisory roles: a sub­
committee of the Science Advisory Committee, whose members were 
James Fisk, James Killian, and Isidor Rabi, and a committee from the 
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Institute for Defense Analyses, composed of General James McCormack 
and Albert Hill. 
In addition to its permanent members, the Gaither committee recruited 
nearly seventy expert consultants from leading scientific organizations, en­
gineering firms, strategic think tanks, and business institutions to provide 
advice and make recommendations.25 These consultants provided invalu­
able background material and technical support to the committee. In fact, 
some scholars have argued that several of these advisers actually played 
much larger roles than their titles as technical consultants would indicate. 
In particular, Colonel George Lincoln and Paul Nitze seem to have had 
great influence on the final report.26 
The high caliber of this committee was without question. A sample of 
the qualifications of some of the members of the steering committee and 
advisory panel is ample evidence of the committee's expertise. Killian and 
Baxter served as the respective presidents of MIT and Williams College. 
For his research on molecular beams at the Radiation Laboratory, Rabi 
won the 1944 Nobel Prize for physics. During the last years of the Truman 
administration, Lovett and Foster acted as the secretary and the deputy 
secretary of defense, respectively. These men and the rest of the Gaither 
committee represented some of the best minds in the country. 
The Gaither committee members were the type of experts that Eisen­
hower and his NSC used to acquire policy advice. The president wanted 
the assistance of consultants who were specialists in particular fields or who 
possessed a broad understanding of U.S. national security issues. Eisen-
hower's belief that experts could provide invaluable advice dated to his 
experiences in World War II. While serving as the Army chief of staff im­
mediately after the war, he implored his key subordinates to recognize the 
essential contributions that scientists, business leaders, and other experts 
had made to the war effort. As he explained: 
The lessons of the last war are clear. The military effort required for victory 
threw upon the Army an unprecedented range of responsibilities, many of 
which were effectively discharged only through the invaluable assistance sup­
plied by our cumulative resources in the natural and social sciences and the 
talents and experience furnished by management and labor. The armed forces 
could not have won the war alone. Scientists and business men contributed 
techniques and weapons which enabled us to outwit and overwhelm the 
enemy. Their understanding of the Army's needs made possible the highest 
degree of cooperation. This pattern of integration must be translated into a 
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peacetime counterpart which will not merely familiarize the Army with the 
progress made in science and industry, but draw into our planning for na­
tional security all the civilian resources which can contribute to the defense 
of the country.27 
He concluded, "The association of military and civilians in educational 
institutions and industry will level barriers, engender mutual understand­
ing, and lead to the cultivation of friendships invaluable for future coop-
eration."28 
Background of Key Gmther Committee Members 
More than a decade later, Eisenhower took his own advice to heart when 
he ordered the establishment of the Gaither committee. Its members were 
well known and widely respected within the Eisenhower administration. 
Most had either advised the administration earlier or had published their 
views on matters related to active and passive defenses. Without exception, 
the Gaither committee members viewed the expansion of Soviet military 
capabilities with great concern. They did not question the assumption that 
if the Soviet Union acquired the capability to launch a devastating attack 
on the United States without suffering a massive counterstrike, it would 
not hesitate to do so.29 Most important, they believed that advances in 
Soviet nuclear weaponry and delivery capabilities raised the specter of a 
growing Soviet threat that had to be confronted with stronger U.S. strate­
gic retaliatory forces, expanded continental defenses, and improved civil 
defenses.30 
The Directors 
As director of the new panel, Gaither assumed a position with which he 
was quite familiar. Throughout his career, he had repeatedly served the 
government, industry, and research institutions as an adviser in a variety 
of capacities, and on several occasions he had supervised the activities of 
groups of experts. While practicing law in California during World War II, 
Gaither was asked by the Radiation Laboratory at MIT to become the as­
sociate director in charge of administration. "His job," Dwight Macdon­
ald explains, "was to coordinate the work of the scientific staff and to act 
as liaison officer between the Laboratory and the armed services."31 While 
at MIT, he became acquainted with leading scientists, engineers, and social 
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H. Rowan Gaither, Jr. Gaither served as the director of the Gaither committee until he 
was forced to resign because of illness. (Photo by Marvin Koner, Ford Foundation) 
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thinkers, including Killian, Rabi, and Hill. Gaither's activities at the Radia­
tion Laboratory earned him a reputation for efficient administration and 
leadership.32 
After the war Gaither returned to California to teach law at the Univer­
sity of California Law School.33 His tenure there was short, however, as the 
RAND Corporation asked him to assist in its transition to a nonprofit or­
ganization. RAND had been created during World War II as part of the 
Douglas Aircraft Company to perform research and development for the 
Army air forces. After the war, questions arose as to whether the military 
and a specific company should be tied so closely together. The Air Force 
and Douglas Aircraft agreed to spin off RAND as an independent, non­
profit corporation. Beginning in late 1947, Gaither joined RAND's board 
of trustees to lead it through this transition. From 1948 to his death in 
1961, with the exception of only one year, Gaither served as the chairman 
of RAND's board of trustees.34 
Gaither's leadership at RAND led to opportunities in other areas. One 
of Gaither's responsibilities was to arrange financing for RAND's opera­
tions. Through his contacts with former MIT president Karl Compton, he 
obtained a meeting with Henry Ford II to discuss a possible grant for 
RAND. Gaither's presentation so impressed Ford that the automotive heir 
not only gave RAND a $1 million grant but also asked Gaither to join the 
Ford Foundation and write a report proposing the objectives of that orga-
nization.35 Gaither promptly accepted. 
In hisfinal report for Ford, Gaither reached several conclusions that are 
relevant to his later work on the Gaither committee. He saw the Ford 
Foundation as an organization that could provide financial support for 
"studies and analyses by special committees, individuals, or research insti­
tutes" in an environment unhampered by political pressures.36 He believed 
it essential that the U.S. government avoid overly defensive or negative 
policies. He stressed, "If such a defensive attitude is allowed to control our 
planning and thinking, our national effort will be diverted unduly to ex­
pedient and temporary measures from the more important tasks ahead, and 
we may grow like the thing we fight."37 Gaither's work on this report led 
to his appointment in 1951 as the Ford Foundation's associate director and 
in 1953 as its president.38 
After Gaither fell ill in August 1957, he was unable to continue his du­
ties as the director of the committee. He was succeeded by William Foster 
and Robert Sprague, who had equally illustrious backgrounds. Foster had 
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served the Truman administration in a variety of capacities and was currently 
vice president of the Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation. Sprague, the 
president of Sprague Electric Company, had advised the Eisenhower ad­
ministration on continental defense questions on several occasions prior to 
1957. Together, they completed the task that Gaither began. 
Foster rose to prominence in the manufactured steel industry during 
World War II. Because of his position as president of the Pressed and 
Welded Steel Products Company, during the war he served on several 
government committees that were concerned with small-business manu­
facturing. After the war, Secretary of Commerce Averell Harriman asked 
President Truman to appoint Foster undersecretary of commerce. Foster 
served in that position from January 1947 to the summer of 1948. When 
Harriman was appointed ambassador-at-large to Western Europe to super­
vise the operations of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), 
he asked Foster to join him as his assistant. From this position, Foster rose 
to become the deputy administrator of the ECA in 1949 and administrator 
in 1950. While serving in the ECA, he helped integrate Greece into the 
Marshall Plan, briefed Congress on European economic needs, and after 
the start of the Korean War, negotiated loans with European countries to 
encourage their participation in the war.39 
In 1951 Truman appointed Foster deputy secretary of defense. From 
this position, Foster became acquainted with the most controversial mili­
tary issues and learned a great deal about the formulation and imple­
mentation of Defense Department policies.40 Two of his most important 
assignments during his tenure as the deputy secretary were briefing Con­
gress on the efficiency of the Defense Department's organization and 
heading a panel of experts that made a comparative study of U.S. and So­
viet military strength.41 Of particular importance to his later work on the 
Gaither committee, he became aware of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Strategic Air Command.42 
When Eisenhower took office, Foster resigned from the Defense De­
partment to become the first paid president of the Manufacturing Chem­
ists Association. In 1955 he became executive vice president of the Olin 
Mathieson Chemical Corporation.43 This company was very active in de­
veloping and maintaining ties with government agencies responsible for 
the defense of the United States.44 
Sprague maintained much closer ties to the Eisenhower administration 
than did Foster. Sprague was Eisenhower's first choice for the position of 
under secretary of the Air Force in 1953. However, Sprague was unable to 
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William Foster. William Foster served with Robert Sprague as codirector of the commit­
tee. (George C. Marshall Foundation) 
accept the appointment because he could not relinquish his stock holdings 
in his own Massachusetts electric company.45 This problem did not long 
impede his opportunities for government service.46 In October 1953 Sena­
tor Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA) requested Sprague's assistance in examin­
ing U.S. continental defenses.47 Sprague traveled to SAC headquarters and 
received a two-day briefing from General Curtis LeMay concerning the 
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Robert Sprague. Sprague served as the codirector of the Gaither committee after Gaither 
resigned. (Fabian Bachrach/the Sprague estate) 
Establishment of the Gaither Committee 55 
relationship of SAC forces to continental defense.48 He also gained access 
to numerous top-secret studies and reports from the Department of De­
fense, Army, Air Force, Navy, Atomic Energy Commission, NSC, and 
CIA.49 Finally, JCS chairman Admiral Arthur Radford briefed him on the 
ability of the Soviet Union to prevent a retaliatory strike, the impact of such 
a strike on that country, and the vulnerability of the United States to a 
surprise attack.50 
Sprague presented his report to the Senate Armed Services Committee 
in March 1954 and later also briefed the Joint Atomic Energy Committee 
and the House Armed Services Committee.51 He recommended expand­
ing early warning radar coverage, increasing the number and quality of in­
terceptor airplanes, and strengthening anti-aircraft defenses around SAC 
bases.52 He concluded that the problems of continental defense "will never 
be static" and that the United States would have "to face up to the fact 
that the threat of an air-atomic attack introduces a new factor in our way 
of life. Living with it may not be so comfortable as before, but it is a burden 
which the country can abide, still remaining free. It means doing the things 
which must be done, paying the bills which must be paid, and running the 
risks which must be run."53 
Sprague reached even more alarming conclusions three months later, 
after Soviet scientists tested a one-megaton nuclear device and the United 
States completed a series of tests on thermonuclear weapons. The tests, 
which indicated that the Soviet Union was not far behind the United States 
in nuclear weapons technology, highlighted the gradual decline of U.S. 
military power relative to the Soviet Union. Sprague believed that the 
United States was more vulnerable to an atomic attack than the Soviet 
Union. He also stressed that the initiative in a conflict would remain with 
the Kremlin leaders, and "the moral character of the Soviet rulers is such 
that the thought of wide-spread death and destruction in an atomic war is 
of no significance [to them] in deterring such a war."54 He then identified 
three possible policy alternatives. First, the United States could construct a 
defensive system capable of withstanding any possible Soviet attack. Sec­
ond, it could "strike the first blow." Third, it could "Live with the USSR 
in a state of equilibrium brought about by mutual fear of atomic attack."55 
After becoming a consultant to the NSC on continental defenses in 
June 1954, Sprague reported that the danger from a Soviet surprise attack 
had grown. He argued that since the United States had tested new ther­
monuclear weapons, the Soviet Union could not be far behind. Further­
more, these new weapons produced so much radioactive fallout that each 
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nuclear explosion was now much more dangerous. Finally, the Soviet de­
velopment of the Type 39 jet bomber signaled a potential Soviet capability 
to launch a surprise attack against the United States. Sprague concluded, 
"These three new elements of danger enormously increase the threat to 
our national survival in the event of a Soviet surprise attack against the 
continental United States."56 
Less than a year later, Sprague presented a new report to the NSC. 
While making an obvious reference to the recently completed Killian re­
port, Sprague argued that the years from 1958 to 1960 represented the 
"period of greatest danger—when Russia will have a large enough stock­
pile of multi-megaton weapons and the means for delivering them on con­
tinental U.S. targets."57 When the NSC examined this report, Eisenhower 
said he believed that Sprague may have overestimated Soviet delivery ca­
pabilities, but he did not question the great value of Sprague's report. Its 
importance "lay in making us reassess our programs . .  . for the purpose of 
seeing if we were placing proper emphasis on the right programs."58 
Committee Members and Advisers 
While Sprague worked extensively as a consultant with the Eisenhower ad­
ministration, many other Gaither committee members had served in advi­
sory roles. Several of them had developed close professional relationships 
with one another while working at the Radiation Laboratory during World 
War II. This was particularly true for Killian and Hill. Killian had served as 
vice president of MIT during the war.59 In this capacity, he worked closely 
with the Radiation Laboratory. Hill, a physics professor, directed the labo-
ratory's Division Five, dealing with transmitter components.60 After the 
war, Killian and Hill collaborated closely on many problems involving MIT 
and defense issues. 
In 1953 they coauthored an article for Atlantic magazine in which they 
argued that the United States "must achieve a stronger defense without 
weakening or subordinating our offensive power."61 They were concerned 
that if the United States continued to neglect continental defenses while 
emphasizing offensive capabilities, the Soviet Union might acquire the 
ability to attack North America.62 They identified five military priorities: 
controlling the seas, defending the continent, maintaining a nuclear coun­
terstrike capability, protecting Western Europe, and preventing small wars 
from becoming larger ones.63 They stressed that the United States needed 
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to develop a reliable early warning system, anti-aircraft and antimissile de­
fenses, and the ability to destroy enemy forces at long range.64 
As MIT's president, Killian played a pivotal role in establishing the 
Lincoln Laboratory in February 1951. By this time there was a growing 
concern within the Air Force that the Soviet Union might acquire the ca­
pability to attack the United States. Because the chief of staff of the Air 
Force, General Hoyt Vandenberg, did not believe that the Air Force itself 
could analyze U.S. air defenses effectively, he approached Killian about es­
tablishing an independent research and development organization similar 
to the Radiation Laboratory. After months of negotiations, MIT accepted 
a tri-service contract from the Army, Navy, and Air Force to establish a 
military research laboratory. With Killian's approval, Hill directed the new 
laboratory until 1955.65 Its main responsibility was to develop the Semi-
Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) air defense system.66 
In addition to its involvement with the Lincoln Laboratory, MIT pro­
vided support facilities for several studies of U.S. defense issues.67 In 1950 
MIT physics professor Jerrold Zacharias, a future Gaither committee mem­
ber, developed the concept of the summer study program when he directed 
Project Hartwell, a Navy-sponsored examination of undersea warfare. In 
1951 and 1952, Hill supervised Project Charles and Project Lincoln—two 
separate studies of U.S. air defenses. In these same years, fifteen scientists 
participated in Project Beacon Hill, a study of Air Force intelligence and 
reconnaissance capabilities.68 Together, these summer studies emphasized 
the need for "measures to reduce the vulnerability to surprise of our stra­
tegic air power, to keep the sea lanes open, to improve our military com­
munications and gathering Q{ hard intelligence, [and] to accelerate our 
ICBM programs."69 
Of these studies, Project Charles and Project Lincoln were the most 
important in shaping Killian's and Hill's views concerning continental de­
fenses. Project Charles vividly described the problems faced by the United 
States in planning air defenses. It found, "The problem of the defense of 
the United States against air attack is characterized above all by a lack of 
knowledge of what we have to defend against." The study concluded, 
"The enemy has the initiative. Our intelligence tells us essentially nothing 
about his plans; informs us only partially about his present capabilities; and 
as to his future capabilities leaves us essentially dependent on assumptions 
that he can, if he chooses, do about as well in any aspect as we expect to do 
ourselves."70 Project Lincoln addressed these problems by recommending 
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the extension of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line to provide earlier 
warning of a Soviet attack. The study also called for the development of an 
effective interceptor force and suggested that plans be devised to meet the 
threat posed by the ICBMs.71 
After their 1953 article, Killian and Hill continued their involvement in 
studies of U.S. continental defenses. Killian directed the extremely influ­
ential 1954 Technical Capabilities Panel. This group, which included many 
future Gaither committee members, perceived a potentially significant 
threat as the Soviet Union acquired advanced nuclear weapons and delivery 
capabilities. It recommended the development of an intercontinental bal­
listic missile, the reduction of SAC vulnerability, and the strengthening of 
continental defenses. More specifically, it advised that the United States 
needed to construct additional SAC bases, institute an emergency dispersal 
plan for SAC forces, and develop active defenses surrounding SAC bases.72 
As a member of the Science Advisory Committee, Killian's influence on 
Eisenhower did not stop with the panel's final report. In a meeting with 
Eisenhower in 1956, Killian and James Fisk, another member of the Sci­
ence Advisory Committee and later of the Gaither committee, reiterated 
the need for strengthening U.S. continental defenses. They argued that the 
United States had to accelerate "the development of high altitude radar, 
SAC dispersal, and quicker reaction time for SAC in case of attack."73 
Without these improvements, they feared the Soviet Union would be able 
to launch a successful attack against the United States. 
Demonstrating his confidence in Killian, Eisenhower asked him to chair 
a new committee, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intel­
ligence, that would examine the effectiveness of the CIA in performing 
its responsibilities. In addition to Killian, the committee included future 
Gaither committee members General James Doolittle and Robert Lovett, 
as well as Admiral Richard Conolly, Benjamin Fairless, General John Hull, 
Joseph Kennedy, and Edward Ryerson.74 Eisenhower gave the board broad 
discretion in its investigations so that it could determine if the "policies and 
programs pursued by the CIA and other elements of the intelligence com­
munity are sound, effective, and economically operated."75 While most of 
its activities remain classified, the committee did meet with Eisenhower five 
times and held nineteen other meetings between 1956 and 1961.76 One 
of the most important conclusions that the committee reached was: "Qual­
ity of foreign intelligence—Both National and Departmental Intelligence 
with respect to the Soviets is seriously inadequate in all fields and at all 
levels."77 
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Hill served the Eisenhower administration more indirectly than did Kil­
lian. In addition to acting as the director of the Lincoln Laboratory until 
1955, he also served as director of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group 
(WSEG) and as vice president of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). 
The JCS created WSEG in 1948 and assigned it three broad objectives: 
1. To bring scientific and technical as well as operational military expertise 
to bear in evaluating weapons systems. 
2. To employ advanced techniques of scientific analysis and operations re­
search in the process. 
3. To approach its tasks from an impartial, supra-Service perspective.78 
In this capacity, WSEG studied numerous defense issues, including an ex­
amination of continental defenses in 1955 under Hill's direction.79 While 
it did not reach any new conclusions, it enabled Hill to become acquainted 
with General LeMay and to learn about SAC.80 
In 1956 both SAC and CIA intelligence estimates indicated that the 
Soviet Union could acquire the capability to launch missiles with nuclear 
warheads from submarines.81 If the Soviets possessed this capability, they 
could have possibly launched an attack against the United States without 
warning. Accordingly, JCS chairman Admiral Radford asked Hill to lead a 
new ad hoc committee to study U.S. air defenses.82 Hill's committee iden­
tified "the goal for the defense of North America against air attack" as "the 
achievement and maintenance of a level of air defense effectiveness suffi­
cient to give a reasonable chance of defending approximately 80 percent of 
the vital target areas of the nation."83 It found that the United States was 
falling dangerously short of these capabilities. 
Hill's involvement in the IDA stemmed from his close association with 
Killian. One of Killian's overriding goals as the president of MIT was to 
foster close cooperation among scientists, academic institutions, and the 
government. In 1956 Killian worked with the Department of Defense to 
establish a university consortium to support WSEG. He organized five uni-
versities—MIT, California Institute for Technology, Case Institute, Stan­
ford, and Tulane—into the nonprofit IDA. He hoped that the IDA would 
be "a means of lending scientific prestige to the enterprise [WSEG], facili­
tating access to the scholarly research community, and promoting a work­
ing climate that would appeal to civilian research analysts."84 Hill became 
the IDA's vice president. The IDA later proved instrumental in the devel­
opment of the Gaither report. Both Hill and General James McCormack, 
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MIT's vice president for industrial relations and a former participant in 
Project Solarium, served as the IDA's advisers to the Gaither committee.85 
"The [Gaither] Committee," one scholar concludes, "called on IDA as its 
prime contractor to help support the panel participants with technical as­
sistance, research and fact-finding, managerial and administrative services, 
editorial and publication support, security, and the like."86 
As an expert on continental defense issues, Hill also studied civil de­
fense problems. In the 1950s he served on two committees concerned with 
these issues: the 1952 Project East River and the 1955 Review of Project 
East River. These committees included several future Gaither committee 
members, including General Otto Nelson and Lloyd Berkner. The 1952 
study, named after the river that flows through New York City, laid the 
foundation for most civil defense plans developed in the Eisenhower ad-
ministration.87 In its six-volume final report, the initial Project East River 
committee reached several conclusions that were of direct relevance to the 
Gaither committee. The report stressed that the United States had to im­
prove both its air defenses and civil defenses.88 It then emphasized that 
continental and civil defenses were interchangeable components in the se­
curity of the United States. An air defense system must "be devised that 
aims at destroying substantially all of the airborne attackers prior to the 
time that they reach the United States. If this is not achieved, Civil De­
fense becomes unmanageable and largely futile."89 In the area of civil de­
fense, the committee called for achieving the earliest possible warning of 
an attack, constructing shelters, and educating the public to the dangers of 
radioactive fallout.90 
In 1955 Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, FCDA Director Peterson, 
and ODM Director Arthur Fleming requested that Nelson, Berkner, and 
Hill create a group to review the findings from the 1952 report and deter­
mine whether the United States had strengthened its continental and civil 
defenses in the intervening years. Wilson, Peterson, and Fleming told the 
group, "Most of all we need the thinking of those of you who are away 
from the day to day activities of the Federal Government, but who are still 
thoroughly concerned with the basic problems."91 After their review, Nel-
son's committee concluded, "Despite the efforts made [between 1952 and 
1955], it is necessary to report that the nation's preparations and progress 
in non-military defense are still far from what they should be."92 They at­
tributed the deficiencies to rapid technological advances and the lack of 
positive leadership in developing nonmilitary defenses. Without improve­
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ments in these areas, they believed, the United States was in serious danger. 
The review committee of civilian experts was particularly influenced by 
the potential implications of the rapid advances in nuclear weapons tech­
nology. "The most important consequence of the rapid progress in making 
much more powerful and cheaper nuclear weapons and the resulting in­
creasingly serious problem of radioactive fallout," it concluded, "is that 
the potential disaster area will be larger than any city boundary and will 
frequently overlap several state boundaries.5'93 They recommended the 
strengthening of U.S. nonmilitary defenses, especially the protection of the 
civil population. They believed the best way to achieve these results was to 
create an intelligence-gathering apparatus that would provide the maxi­
mum strategic warning of a Soviet attack and to design plans for both the 
evacuation and sheltering of the civil population if such an attack was to 
94 occur.
Testimony before the 1956 Holifleld committee on civil defense echoed 
the findings of both the 1952 and 1955 Project East River committees. 
Representative Holifleld invited many experts, including Hill, Berkner, Kil­
lian, and Nelson, to come before his committee. They all emphasized the 
inadequacies of U.S. civil defense programs and the need to recognize the 
close relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities in deterring 
the Soviet Union. Hill argued that "it is impossible to defend our offensive 
strength without defending the civilian population as well."95 In evaluat­
ing the relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities, Berkner 
explained, "By remaining an easy and inviting target, we encourage an un­
compromising enemy to believe that war against us is an easy and feasible 
way to succeed in his objectives."96 In his testimony, Killian stressed, 
"While our main deterrent to war and to an attack against the United 
States is our capacity to inflict terrible damage on the enemy, this deterrent 
needs to be augmented and accompanied by the deterrent strength of an 
adequate defense against atomic attack and an adequate civil defense to 
reduce the damage of an atomic attack should it come."97 Finally, Nelson 
argued that U.S. civil defenses "could become the critical, determining 
factor that might persuade the Soviets, in even a period of great rashness 
and madness, that they should not risk an atomic war."98 
Other future Gaither committee members corroborated these findings 
in separate studies. Mervin Kelly, vice president of Bell Telephone Labora­
tories, and James Baxter, president of Williams College, participated 
in studies in 1952 and 1953 that examined U.S. air defenses. In 1952 
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Truman's secretary of defense, Robert Lovett, also a future Gaither com­
mittee member, asked Kelly to chair a panel that would study U.S. air de­
fenses." Although Kelly's committee concluded that an absolute defense 
network could not be built and that offensive capabilities had to be empha­
sized, it nevertheless called for the development of "a comprehensive plan 
for air defense," the extension of the early warning radar network "as far 
as possible from US borders," and the implementation of "a vigorous civil 
defense program." 10° 
The Kelly report prompted Eisenhower to appoint two new committees 
to study U.S. continental defenses. The first, headed by retired General 
Harold Bull, presented its report in July and provided the foundation for 
the Eisenhower administration's first policy statement concerning conti­
nental defenses—NSC 159. The Bull report reached conclusions similar to 
those of the Kelly committee.101 In evaluating the Bull committee's find­
ings, Eisenhower turned to a second committee of outside consultants, 
including Baxter, for its opinions.102 At a September 1953 NSC meeting, 
this committee supported NSC 159 but stressed the importance of con­
tinuing the administration's emphasis on reducing the budget.103 
While various experts were lamenting the inadequacies of U.S. civil and 
continental defense plans, Eisenhower was growing concerned about the 
inability of the United States to acquire accurate intelligence assessments 
of the Soviet Union. His creation of the Killian committee reveals just how 
disturbed he was about the possibility of the Soviet Union being in a posi­
tion to launch a surprise attack against the United States. His concern 
stemmed from the changing technological environment and the secrecy 
that enveloped the Soviet Union. Eisenhower attempted to identify and 
rectify some of the difficulties in intelligence gathering by asking General 
James Doolittle, a trusted adviser and World War II hero, to examine the 
effectiveness of the CIA's operations. 
Doolittle became a national hero after leading a surprise air raid on To­
kyo four months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. His expertise 
went beyond this accomplishment. Before the war he was a Rhodes scholar 
and earned a Ph.D. in aeronautical engineering from MIT. After the war, 
he became vice president of Shell Oil Company. In addition to working at 
Shell, Doolittle continued to advise the Air Force. From 1950 to 1958, he 
served on the Air Force Science Advisory Board and acted as its chairman 
from 1955 to 1958.104 While this position may not seem illustrious, it 
provided Doolittle personal access to the Air Force chief of staff. One of 
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his contemporaries recalled that "Jimmy [Doolittle] carried much more 
weight in Air Force affairs after he retired than the titles he held would 
indicate, and the reasons . . . were his reliability and his credibility."105 
It was not surprising that Eisenhower turned to Doolittle in 1954. Not 
only was Doolittle already serving on the steering committee of the Tech­
nical Capabilities Panel but he also held a philosophy that comported with 
Eisenhower's. Doolittle recognized the importance of both economic se­
curity and technological advancement. In a 1949 speech, he emphasized, 
"Economy should be the watchword in our military thinking. Waste plays 
directly into Russia's hands. Balance between the services must be achieved 
with national, not individual service, welfare in mind. The course is clear: 
The first step in avoiding war with Russia is to avoid waste and to remain 
technologically ahead of her."106 At an Air Force Science Advisory Board 
meeting during the same year, Doolittle discussed the importance of main­
taining technological superiority over the Soviet Union. He explained that 
"the only thing that is going to keep us out of war is our technological 
advantage. It is far better to keep out of war than to win a war. If we permit 
a potential enemy to get ahead of us technologically . . . that is the surest 
way to start a war."107 
When Eisenhower turned to Doolittle in 1954, he wanted to obtain 
"some indication of the over-all adequacy of our National Intelligence 
Program and the manner of its implementation." He added that "we 
should briefly review the activities of all agencies of government charged 
with the collection, interpretation and dissemination of intelligence deal­
ing with the plans, capabilities and intentions of potential enemies."108 For 
three months, Doolittle and the other committee members, William Frank, 
Morris Hadley, and William Pawley, examined U.S. intelligence opera­
tions. In their examination they had access to all available information con­
cerning U.S. intelligence activities, including covert operations.109 
Eisenhower treated the committee's report with the utmost sensitivity. 
He ordered CIA Director Allen Dulles "to show it to no one else" when 
he analyzed its recommendations and conclusions.110 The White House 
press release describing the committee's findings said little more than that 
the committee had found a few areas that needed improvement but that, 
on the whole, the CIA was in good shape.111 It is now clear that this press 
release understated the problems in U.S. intelligence operations. The 
study called for a new policy in waging the Cold War. "It is now clear," 
Doolittle's committee pronounced, 
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that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world 
domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in 
such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If 
the United States is to survive, long-standing concepts of "fair play" must 
be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counter-espionage 
services and must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by 
more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those 
used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made 
acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant 
philosophy.112 
As with his views on technology and the economy, Doolittle advocated 
intelligence policies that Eisenhower liked. The president had already fol­
lowed such policies in Iran and Guatemala. 
The Writers 
The last two Gaither committee members who must be examined in some 
detail are Paul Nitze and Colonel George Lincoln. In his memoirs, Nitze 
claims that "Abe [Lincoln] and I were mentioned as 'project members' at 
the back of the [Gaither] report, which masked the fact that we shared 
importantly in shaping the substance of thefinalversion."113 While Nitze 
may have overstated their importance, the two certainly did influence the 
final report. Their earlier writings adumbrated the recommendations and 
conclusions of the subsequent Gaither report. 
Although Paul Nitze is the more famous of the two men, his reputation 
should not overshadow Lincoln's accomplishments. Nitze himself wrote 
that Lincoln was his "most reliable mentor and advisor."114 Lincoln ac­
quired his reputation as a strategic planner while working on the staff 
of General George Marshall's Operations Division (OPD) during World 
War II. He served as chief of the OPD's Strategy and Policy Group, a role 
that "included, not only military planning, but also meshing the military 
side of international statecraft with the political side of strategy."11S As part 
of this job, Lincoln served as a member of the Joint Planning Staff.116 He 
also acted as a military adviser to Assistant Secretary of War and future 
Gaither committee member John J. McCloy on issues involving the State-
War-Navy Coordinating Committee.117 He described his work with Mc-
Cloy as trying to arrange the "official marriage of political and military 
policy of the State Department and the War Department."118 
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Colonel George Lincoln. Lincoln cowrote thefinal Gaither report with Paul Nitze. (U.S. 
Military Academy Archives) 
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After the war, Lincoln continued to serve on the OPD in the military's 
transition from wartime to peacetime status.119 Despite his prominent po­
sition and his bright future in the Army, he decided in 1947 to retire from 
active service and to teach at the United States Military Academy. When he 
announced his retirement, Eisenhower, the Army chief of staff, attempted 
to persuade Lincoln to reconsider. More than sixteen years later, Eisen­
hower recalled, "I used every pressure I could bring to bear on him to 
persuade him to stay in the Pentagon because of the high value I placed 
upon his knowledge, thoroughness and good sense."120 After reluctantly 
accepting his resignation, Eisenhower wrote Lincoln, "I attribute in very 
great part to you a noticeable growth in the soundness and clarity of mili­
tary policy pertaining to U.S. security. . .  . I personally have leaned heavily 
on your advice since my arrival here, confident that your solutions would 
be the best that hard work, outstanding intelligence, integrity and devo­
tion to duty could provide."121 
Lincoln's contributions to military planning did not end with his retire­
ment from the Army. He periodically returned to Washington to provide 
advice. In 1950 Ambassador Averell Harriman asked Lincoln to be his mili­
tary adviser on the Temporary Council Committee for NATO. The com­
mittee examined the military, political, and economic capabilities of each 
NATO country to determine a practical strategy for the defense of Western 
Europe. Harriman later recalled, "I looked to Abe [Lincoln] to help me 
reconcile every factor."122 
Lincoln's publications proved even more important. In 1954 he revised 
a compilation of essays, Economics and National Security. In this work, 
Lincoln addressed three issues of particular importance to the later Gaither 
committee. First, he outlined what he saw as the potential threat posed by 
the Soviet Union. Second, he discussed the importance of maintaining a 
high level of economic mobilization. Finally, he emphasized the signifi­
cance of technological changes to national security programs. 
Lincoln believed that the only way to coexist peacefully with the So­
viet Union was to create an armistice "made by power and preserved by 
power." He further explained that "Soviet communism is committed to 
world conquest, and we cannot rely on it changing this policy in our 
time."123 Lincoln did not expect the Soviet Union to initiate a war, but he 
believed a war could happen at any time due to miscalculation. He stressed 
that the successors to Stalin were not likely "to be tempted to rash actions 
gravely imperiling the Soviet base of communism. On the other hand 
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continual pressure and struggle are basic tenets of communism, and fail­
ure to take advantage of an opportunity for advance is a cardinal sin in 
the communism code. The movement has a discipline usually described as 
'Prussian.' It is versatile and resourceful. It is continually at war with the 
remainder of the world and uses a strategy that understands the weaknesses 
and appreciates the tactics in thefields of politics, economics, and psychol­
ogy" (24). 
Because he saw the Soviet threat as "world-wide," "total," and "of in­
definite duration," Lincoln argued that the United States had to maintain 
an economy based on preparedness and government control (25,44-45). 
Until the Soviet Union recanted its philosophy or accepted defeat in the 
Cold War, Lincoln believed that the United States had little choice but to 
prepare for war. He argued that "the choice must be made between the 
hazards of greater and lesser evils. .. . When the greater evil is the threat to 
survival, the choice should fall on the lesser evil—which is a considerable 
expenditure of resources for a sustained level of preparedness, an all-out 
effort in case of war, and adequate measures to keep the economy strong 
and healthy meanwhile" (43). He later added that if the threat of war be­
came probable, then concern over the strain of defense spending on the 
economy should become second to survival (85). 
Lincoln also addressed the relationship of science and technology to 
national security. Reminiscent of Eisenhower's memorandum to his sub­
ordinates at the end of World War II, Lincoln viewed the war as provid­
ing important precedents for sustaining cooperation between the scientific 
community and the military establishment. He believed that: 
1. Science must be integrated with military strategy in the future. 
2. Military research and development are of the same order of importance 
as industrial preparedness and manpower reserves. 
3. Timing of technological advances has become all important. The race for 
technological advantage is a major part of the race for survival in a power 
struggle. (364) 
Lincoln feared that if the Soviet Union achieved some technological break­
through before the United States, it might use that advantage to move 
against U.S. interests oppressively. 
When Lincolnfinished revising his book in 1954, the United States and 
the Soviet Union were in the midst of an accelerating technological race. 
The new thermonuclear weapons were a thousand times more powerful 
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than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The intro­
duction of intercontinental bombers and the anticipated development of 
ICBMs raised the possibility that an aggressor could win a war in the ini­
tial strike. Lincoln stressed the importance of the United States maintain­
ing its technological lead over the Soviet Union. He argued, "The time ele­
ment . . . has been magnified by modern technology in at least three ways. 
First, the race for technological advantage is decided before hostilities. Sec­
ond, the aggressor has an increasing advantage paralleling the upward slant 
of technological change. Third, and related to the preceding point, the 
surprise aggression becomes more attractive and harder to meet" (378; 
emphasis in original). 
Lincoln's work did not go unnoticed in Washington. Eisenhower re­
peatedly asked Lincoln to serve as an adviser to the administration. In 1953 
Lincoln worked on task force A of Project Solarium. In 1956 he partici­
pated in a committee that examined the psychological aspects of U.S. 
strategy for Eisenhower's adviser Nelson Rockefeller.124 In that same year, 
Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked Lincoln to 
direct the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Although Lincoln 
could not take the job, the offer reveals Eisenhower's continued interest 
and respect for the West Point professor.125 
In addition to serving on the Gaither committee in 1957, Lincoln wrote 
an influential essay that discussed U.S. capabilities to wage limited military 
operations. In this paper, he asked, "Are we of the Western World so com­
mitted to deterrent nuclear force, and so fearful of the slightest nuclear 
threat that we lack the means, or wit, or both, to deal with local and lim­
ited situations?"126 In raising this penetrating question, Lincoln was in es­
sence challenging the reliance of the Eisenhower administration on massive 
retaliation. 
Lincoln presented ten propositions to elaborate his philosophy concern­
ing the relationship among technology, politics, and war. He emphasized 
that while the United States had to prepare for a general, atomic war with 
the Soviet Union, the most likely future conflicts would be limited in na­
ture. He stressed that the United States had to maintain the capability to 
wage either general or limited wars and to be able to use either conven­
tional or nuclear weapons. The key was maintaining a level of flexibility in 
military capabilities. Lincoln believed that technological changes widened 
the political and military options available to states, yet raised the stakes of 
waging war. "The hazards arising from the opportunities and temptations 
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for rash, desperate, or just uninformed leadership," Lincoln concluded, 
"are increasing."127 
Lincoln's close friend and sometime professional collaborator, Paul 
Nitze, played an active role in government affairs during the Truman ad­
ministration. He participated in the assessment of the effects of the atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.128 He subsequently joined the State 
Department and then directed its Policy Planning Staff from 1950 to 1952. 
He was the principal author of NSC 68, calling for much larger military 
expenditures.129 
Nitze's tenure at the State Department came to an abrupt end after 
Eisenhower took office in 1953. Although Eisenhower's new defense sec­
retary, Charles Wilson, offered Nitze a new position in his department, 
he met fierce resistance from congressional Republicans, especially Senate 
Majority Leader William Knowland, who believed that Nitze was tied too 
closely to the previous administration. Secretary of State Dulles found 
Nitze's continued presence in the administration appalling and demanded 
his dismissal. Bowing to pressure, Wilson asked for and received Nitze's 
resignation. Nitze was embittered and thereafter despised Dulles.130 
Before he left the State Department, Nitze set forth his opinions con­
cerning continental defense. Although he wanted a considerable increase 
in U.S. offensive capabilities, he did not believe they alone could preserve 
U.S. security. He believed that the United States also needed to construct 
civil and continental defenses. In one of his last memoranda while still at 
the State Department, Nitze explained, "In dealing with the problem of 
continental defense it is important to recognize the inter-relationship of 
military defense, offensive striking power, and the civil defense program. 
These three elements are complementary and mutually supporting."131 
Four years later, when he helped write the Gaither report, these views re­
mained paramount. 
In 1954 Nitze became an outspoken critic of the Eisenhower admin­
istration and in particular the policies articulated by Secretary of State 
Dulles. After listening to Dulles's speech about massive retaliation to the 
Council on Foreign Relations, Nitze privately circulated a dissenting paper. 
He argued that by placing primary reliance on atomic weapons, the United 
States was guaranteeing that any future conflicts would involve the use of 
these weapons. He argued, "If we are to obtain victory, or peace with jus­
tice and without defeat, we must attain it with non-atomic means while 
deterring an atomic war."132 With this paper, Nitze began a campaign, 
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which would last until the Kennedy administration, to force the govern­
ment to recognize the importance of maintaining sufficient conventional 
forces to supplement U.S. nuclear capabilities. 
Years later, Nitze described in his memoirs how he viewed the strategic 
situation in the 1950s. He explained: 
In the event of a crisis involving a serious possibility of war with the United 
States, how might the problem be seen from the Kremlin? Being careful plan­
ners, the Soviets undoubtedly would have carefully prepared war plans for a 
variety of contingencies. One could therefore theorize with some confidence 
that Soviet plans would include a disarming first strike, if we responded with 
the remains of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) by attacking Soviet base 
structure and nuclear attack facilities, the exchange ratios would go against 
us very quickly In two, three, four, or at most five exchanges, the United 
States would be down to a woefully low level of capability while the Soviet 
Union could still be at a relatively high one. We could then be at their mercy. 
If we choose to attack their populations, we would invite almost total anni­
hilation in the United States.133 
Nitze's explanation clearly indicates his preoccupation with the Soviet 
Union's capabilities while giving little thought to its goals or intentions.134 
In an article in Foreign Affairs in 1956, Nitze expounded an alternative 
strategy to massive retaliation. He argued that Eisenhower's policies were 
inconsistent because the U.S. military did not possess the ability, beyond 
atomic weapons, to wage the war against communism.135 He explained 
that the country needed to acquire the capability to raise the stakes in a 
conflict gradually, rather than immediately resorting to massive retaliation. 
He emphasized that "it is to the interest of the West that the means em­
ployed in warfare and the area of engagement be restricted to the minimum 
level which still permits us to achieve our objectives. Our basic action policy 
must therefore be one of'graduated deterrence'" (188). By responding in 
kind to an aggressive act, Nitze believed the United States could limit the 
scope of the conflict and the area affected by the military engagements. 
But, in 1956, Nitze did not think that the United States possessed the 
necessary capabilities. 
Nitze stressed that the United States needed to expand its offensive re­
taliatory capabilities, build defenses against a surprise attack, and prepare 
to wage limited wars. Recent developments in nuclear weaponry and deliv­
ery technology particularly concerned him. "The side which has lost effec­
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tive control of the intercontinental air spaces will face a truly agonizing 
decision. It may still have the capability of destroying a few of the enemy's 
cities. But the damage it could inflict would be indecisive and out of all 
proportion to the annihilation which its own cities could expect to receive 
in return." Accordingly, he stressed, "It is important that the West main­
tain indefinitely a position of nuclear attack-defense superiority versus the 
Soviet Union and its satellites" (196). Consequently, the United States 
needed to "develop an air defense system which makes full use of the 
West's geographic advantages" (197). 
While not satisfied with either U.S. offensive retaliatory or defense capa­
bilities, Nitze felt particular concern about the Eisenhower administration's 
cuts in conventional forces. He believed U.S. commitments exceeded its 
military capabilities. He emphasized that the United States needed the 
ability to wage limited wars both with and without atomic weapons. The 
United States should be able to meet aggression initially without atomic 
weapons. It should expand hostilities only if no other alternative existed 
to rectify the situation. If it decided to use atomic weapons, it should use 
them only against military targets. Nonatomic capabilities, therefore, were 
needed to lower its dependence on atomic forces (196). These policies 
would enable the United States to institute his strategy of "graduated 
deterrence." 
Two months prior to the presentation of the Gaither report to the NSC, 
Nitze published another article that denounced the Eisenhower adminis-
tration's reliance on massive retaliation. "Secretary Dulles' massive retalia­
tion statement," Nitze wrote, "did not announce a new doctrine but a 
return to a pre-1950 doctrine [pre-NSC 68]. It is not a step forward; it 
was a step backward—a step back dictated not by new strategic considera­
tions but by domestic political and budgetary considerations. Ever since, 
the rationale of our military-political doctrine has been a shambles of in­
consistencies, inadequacies, and reappraisals."136 Nitze stressed the need 
for a full range of military capabilities that would later be included in the 
Gaither report. "I see little purpose," Nitze concluded, "in making every 
war, even a limited war, a nuclear one,"137 
Conclusions 
As he had on previous occasions, Eisenhower established a committee of 
experts in 1957 to examine a vexing national security problem. When the 
72 Chapter Two 
FCDA proposed a $32 billion shelter system in January, the president had 
to decide whether such a program would sufficiently improve the country's 
security to justify its cost. While he was satisfied with the status of U.S. 
military strength and his national security programs, he recognized that 
others were justly concerned about the consequences of a nuclear war.138 
Eisenhower believed that the Gaither committee would provide answers to 
at least one key question. Should the United States attempt to reduce the 
vulnerability of its population through an elaborate system of continental 
and civil defenses? 
The creation of the Gaither committee to address this very question 
represented Eisenhower's reliance on a decision-making system that he 
used throughout his presidency. Eisenhower wanted advice from those 
who were the most qualified. While he respected and valued the advice of 
his official advisers, he realized that they were not always experts in par­
ticular fields. He therefore turned to consultants outside the government. 
Eisenhower explained in his memoirs that the Gaither committee "had 
been formed to bring new minds and background experience to bear on 
major problems of government. It was empowered to receive information 
from government agencies and departments and to come up with an in­
dependent appraisal. With no vested interest in a particular department, 
and no federal jobs to protect, the panel was a means of obtaining indepen­
dent judgments."139 
The Gaither committee was composed of experts whom Eisenhower re­
spected and admired. They came from a variety of backgrounds. Some, 
such as Rabi, Berkner, and Hill, were specialists in the fields of nuclear 
weaponry, radar, and radiation. Others, like Sprague, Fisk, Lincoln, Nitze, 
and Doolittle, had built their reputations in studies of U.S. continental 
defense, fallout shelters, intelligence operations, and military forces. Fi­
nally, there were consultants, such as Gaither, Foster, and Killian, who were 
known for supervising and coordinating diverse groups in the development 
of advisory reports. 
These men shared many of the president's basic beliefs. Most were con­
cerned with balancing economic and military strength. Almost all of them 
viewed the rapid technological changes of the 1950s with a sense of both 
accomplishment and dread. They saw U.S. security as dependent on the 
interplay of offensive and defensive military capabilities, a strong econ­
omy, and continued close relations with its allies in Europe and around the 
world. Eisenhower believed that their advice could help him comprehend 
and make decisions concerning questions that went beyond his expertise. 
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Eisenhower's use of experts raises several historiographical issues that 
transcend the importance of the Gaither committee itself. World War II 
had transformed the relationship between scientists, engineers, and other 
experts, on the one hand, and the federal government, on the other. Before 
the war, there was little close cooperation. While experts worried about the 
possible restrictions resulting from government involvement in their work, 
political leaders questioned spending money on projects that did not guar­
antee some direct benefit to the public. World War II forced both groups 
to work together. The government needed experts to develop new tech­
nologies that would help the war effort, and the experts sought funding 
that only the federal government could provide. Whether in the develop­
ment of the atomic bomb, radar, or some other technology, this relation­
ship proved relatively congenial.140 
After the war, the quickening pace of scientific and technological ad­
vances precluded any layman from keeping abreast of all the changes. Fur­
thermore, the exorbitant costs of research forced scientists and engineers 
to look for funding from different sources. As a result, the continued co­
operation of experts and the government was only natural. Through ex­
panded funding for research and development, the federal government 
maintained a pool of experts to call upon when it needed assistance in mak­
ing decisions concerning highly technical issues. On the other hand, with 
the available funding scientists and engineers were in a position to perform 
research that they could not have afforded on their own.141 
The Gaither committee represents one example of the federal govern­
ment utilizing experts during the early Cold War to acquire scientific and 
technical advice. Before World War II, this type of committee would have 
been unnecessary. However, given the expansion of knowledge during and 
after the war, political leaders needed some means to understand the com­
plicated technological and scientific problems they faced. To acquire assis­
tance in these areas, Eisenhower readily cultivated a close relationship of 
the federal government with business, the academic community, and re­
search institutions. Yet he never reconciled his growing reliance on experts 
who obtained their influential positions outside of normal democratic pro­
cesses with his emphasis on the importance of the individual to the Ameri­
can system of government. Although surely inadvertently, Eisenhower 
introduced an advisory system that at times impeded the citizen's ability to 
supervise and influence the decision making of the government. 
By the end of his administration, Eisenhower recognized the transfor­
mation that had occurred in decision making since 1945, and he lamented 
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the possible repercussions. In his now famous farewell address, he warned 
the American people: 
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms in­
dustry is new in the American experience.. .. 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-indus-
trial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists 
and will persist. 
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties 
or democratic process.. . . 
The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employ­
ment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is 
gravely to be regarded. 
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, 
we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy 
could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.142 
Despite these warnings, it was Eisenhower who expanded the role of 
experts in presidential decision making and left a precedent for their use 
in future administrations. As Gregg Herken persuasively concludes, "The 
culminating irony of Eisenhower's presidency was the fact that he himself 
had done more than anyone else to raise the role of experts and expertise 
to prominence in the government."143 
1957: A Year of Turmoil 
1 he question of civil defense was only one of 
many problems that Eisenhower faced in 1957. Although the year began 
with Eisenhower's popularity at its height, he soon faced a sequence of 
serious problems. Legislatively, he was at loggerheads with a Democratic 
Congress. Politically, new civil rights legislation and the confrontation in 
Little Rock, Arkansas, polarized the nation. Economically, the country 
slowly slipped into a recession. Technologically and militarily, the Soviet 
Union's launch of Sputnik and the continued disappointments in U.S. 
space programs engendered soul-searching about the superiority of Ameri­
can science and the military security of the United States.1 
It was in this atmosphere that Eisenhower received and evaluated the 
Gaither committee's final report. Although only the president's struggles 
with Congress over the FY 1958 defense budget and the controversy over 
Sputnik were directly related to the issues examined by the Gaither com­
mittee, the magnitude of all of the problems endured by Eisenhower lim­
ited his ability to evaluate the report. Without doubt, the Soviet launch of 
Sputnik alone would have caused headaches for Eisenhower, but when that 
development combined with other problems, he faced the most difficult 
period of his presidency. 
Politics of the Defense Budget and & New Recession 
Iwan Morgan argues that when Eisenhower entered office in 1953 he be­
lieved that "the nation faced economic ruin unlessfiscal responsibility was 
quickly re-established as the guiding principle of budgetary policy."3 By 
the end of 1956 Eisenhower thought that he was restoringfiscal prudence. 
He had lowered annual defense spending from $43.8 billion in FY 1953 to 
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$35.5 billion in FY 1956 and had produced budget surpluses of $3.2 bil­
lion and $4.1 billion for FY 1956 and FY 1957, respectively.3 These figures 
were in sharp contrast to the $5.3 billion deficit Eisenhower inherited in 
the FY 1954 budget.4 
Despite his success in limiting government spending, in January 1957 
Eisenhower presented Congress with the largest peacetime budget in U.S. 
history—$73.3 billion for FY 1958. Although he expressed concern that 
further increases in spending could lead to higher taxes and greater infla­
tion, he believed that this budget reflected a careful analysis of the domestic 
needs and international responsibilities of the United States. In particular, 
Eisenhower recognized that as long as the United States and the Soviet 
Union remained locked in the Cold War, there were limits to how much 
overall spending could be cut. In this budget, he requested $43.3 billion 
for major national security programs. The president regretted the need for 
such high spending levels, but he felt "the size of the national budget 
largely reflected the size of the national danger."5 
Even with the increases in the budget, Eisenhower expected Congress 
to increase the defense budget and believed he would have to fight to hold 
the line on defense spending.6 He was surprised when the Democrats "in­
explicably became economy-minded."7 Public opinion seemed to be de­
manding budget cuts and Democrats wanted to get on the bandwagon.8 
Even worse for the president, many conservative Republicans, including 
Senators William Knowland, Styles Bridges, and Barry Goldwater, advo­
cated a smaller role for the federal government, limited involvement of the 
United States in international organizations, and more aggressive policies 
against communism. They did not criticize Eisenhower's defense policies, 
but they concluded that he was spending too much on social programs and 
foreign aid.9 
The Democrats welcomed thefissures in the Republican Party as an op­
portunity to gain political support for their programs.10 Led by Senate Ma­
jority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) and Speaker of the House Sam 
Rayburn (D-TX), the Democrats argued that the budget could be reduced 
without cutting existing domestic programs. In particular, they saw the 
budgets for the Defense Department and the Mutual Security Adminis­
tration as good areas to find savings. With bipartisan support, Congress 
passed a defense budget in July that reduced Army spending from $8,465 
to $7,265 billion, Navy spending from $10,487 to $9,866 billion, and Air 
Force spending from $16,471 to $15,930 billion.11 With an additional 
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$1.7 billion in cuts from the rest of the budget, including $1 billion from 
the Mutual Security program, Congress was able to reduce the president's 
spending plans by nearly $4.0 billion.12 
The spring 1957 budget crisis represented a new problem for Eisen­
hower and his advisers. In his first term, he had to protect the economy 
against demands for additional spending. In 1957 he found himself de­
fending the military budget against the calls for more cuts. He sent a letter 
to Speaker of the House Rayburn requesting that Congress reconsider its 
reductions: "I most solemnly advise the House that in these times a cut of 
any appreciable consequence in current expenditures for national security 
and related programs would endanger our country and the peace of the 
world."13 He added that "a multibillion-dollar reduction in 1958 expen­
ditures can be accomplished only at the expense of the national safety and 
interest."14 His request went unheeded. 
As debate over the FY 1958 budget came to a close, economic indica­
tors revealed the economy was slipping into a recession.15 William Mc-
Chesney Martin, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, believed the 
economic problems were tied to inflation and raised the discount rate from 
3 to Zlh percent. Instead of stimulating the economy, the increase stymied 
economic growth.16 In late 1957 and early 1958, exports declined pre­
cipitously, industrial production fell 14 percent, corporate profits declined 
25 percent, and unemployment rose to 7.5 percent. It was only in May 
1958 that the economy began to recover.17 
Eisenhower reacted to the new economic situation with his usual cau­
tion. Other than reducing the discount rate to 3 percent in November 
1957 and releasing $177 million for the housing industry in December, 
Eisenhower and his advisers did little to combat the recession.18 In particu­
lar, he resisted calls for a tax cut and emergency public works programs. 
He explained to his former CEA chairman, Arthur Burns, "I trust that I 
am not getting stubborn in my attitude about logical federal action in this 
business slump, but I am bound to say that I cannot help but feel that 
precipitate, and therefore largely unwise, action would be the worst thing 
that we could now do." He then stressed that "my honest conviction is 
that the greatest service we can now do for our country is to oppose wild-
eyed schemes of every kind. I am against vast and unwise public works 
programs . .  . as well as the slash-bang kinds of tax-cutting from which the 
proponents want nothing so much as immediate political advantage."19 
While Eisenhower held true to his principles to limit the role of the federal 
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government in the economy and to avoid deficit spending, his popularity 
and effectiveness suffered another blow.20 
Civil Rights and Preserving the American Constitutional System 
Eisenhower's struggles in 1957 were not limited to his disagreements with 
Congress over the budget and the economic recession. He also faced major 
civil rights controversies. While these problems did not directly impact his 
handling of the Gaither committee or other defense questions, they pro­
vided additional distractions that hampered the president's decision mak­
ing and established doubts about his ability to lead the nation. For the first 
time since Reconstruction, Congress passed civil rights legislation, and 
the president used military force to support the integration of southern 
schools.21 While these civil rights issues illuminated Eisenhower's desire to 
limit the role of the federal government yet guarantee individual rights, 
they raised concerns about how the United States would be seen around 
the world. Eisenhower decried how the country's racial problems contin­
ued "to feed the mill of Soviet propagandists who by word and picture 
were telling the world of the 'racial terror' in the United States."22 
In 1957 Eisenhower asked Congress to pass a civil rights act that pro­
tected the voting rights of black Americans.23 Eisenhower's call for civil 
rights legislation met a fairly positive response. Congress produced a bill 
that contained most of the provisions Eisenhower requested. While the 
president was not completely satisfied with the bill, he decided that mini­
mal civil rights legislation was better than none at all.24 
Almost immediately after signing the bill, Eisenhower faced a new and 
potentially violent crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas. Despite the Supreme 
Court's decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, most schools in 
the South remained segregated in 1957.25 The court's ruling in 1955 that 
it was the responsibility of the states and localities to integrate schools 
"with all deliberate speed" allowed the southern states to establish a slow 
pace for desegregation.26 In Little Rock, the school board implemented 
an eight-year plan in May 1955 to integrate schools gradually, and on sev­
eral occasions courts ruled that the plan represented a legitimate means of 
achieving the objective of integration. With its emphasis on slow and incre­
mental change, this plan represented what Eisenhower saw as an appropri­
ate, noninflammatory way to educate the population. 
As the 1957 school year began, Central High School in Little Rock was 
earmarked to be integrated under the local school board's plan. In an act 
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of open resistance, Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus ordered the National 
Guard to prevent the attendance of black students. He argued that their 
presence could provoke violence. Eisenhower faced a delicate crisis: a state 
governor was blatantly challenging the Supreme Court's right to judicial 
review and the federal government's authority to enforce the laws of the 
land.27 The stalemate between Faubus and the federal government contin­
ued until September 20, when Faubus ordered the National Guard to with­
draw. Although the crisis seemed over, an important question remained. 
Without the National Guard present, would anybody try to stop the black 
students from attending school on Monday, September 23? On that day 
nine black students entered the high school relatively uneventfully. How­
ever, as the day progressed a mob grew outside. By midday the police asked 
that the black students be sent home for their own safety.28 
The mob violence forced Eisenhower's hand. He believed that the fed­
eral government had the responsibility to preserve public order and to en­
force laws when the states could not or would not do so. The president 
called the occurrences in Little Rock "disgraceful" and explained that he 
would "use the full power of the United States including whatever force 
may be necessary to prevent any obstruction of the law and to carry out the 
orders of the Federal Court."29 He authorized the dispatch of troops from 
the Army's 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock to restore peace and 
guarantee respect for the law.30 
While he was obviously worried about the domestic impact of his poli­
cies, Eisenhower was also concerned about the influence of the civil rights 
issue on U.S. foreign policy. In an address to the American people he 
lamented: 
At a time when we face grave situations abroad because of the hatred that 
Communism bears toward a system of government based on human rights, 
it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige 
and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the world. 
Our enemies are gloating over this incident and using it everywhere to 
misrepresent our whole nation. We are portrayed as a violator of those stan­
dards of conduct which the peoples of the world united to proclaim in the 
Charter of the United Nations.31 
Another Pearl Harbor 
Within weeks after the federal government's intervention'in Little Rock, 
the Soviet Union shocked the world by launching Sputnik. The potential 
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implications of the Soviet rocket capability had a profound impact on the 
Gaither committee and on how its findings would be received by Eisen­
hower, Congress, and the country at large. Sputnik raised questions about 
Eisenhower's ability to lead the nation, the U.S. military position vis-a-vis 
the Soviet Union, and the status of the United States among the world's 
scientific and technical elite.32 David Beckler, a Gaither committee mem­
ber, argued, "Although the satellite is not a military weapon, it tends to be 
identified in the minds of the world with the impressive military and tech­
nological strength of the USSR. In a military sense it underscores Soviet 
long-range missile claims. In a technological sense it shows the Soviets to 
have impressive technological sophistication and resources."33 
Americans, who had become convinced of their scientific superiority, 
were amazed that the Russians could beat the world's most technologically 
advanced country to outer space. The implications of the launch ofSputnik 
were frightening. If the Soviet Union could send a satellite into space, why 
could it not launch a nuclear-tipped missile across the oceans? Newsweek 
concluded that Sputnik represented a "defeat in three fields: In pure sci­
ence, in practical know-how, and in psychological Cold War."34 Life ar­
gued, "Let us not pretend that Sputnik is anything but a defeat."35 Public 
opinion polls revealed that 49 percent of the American people believed that 
the Soviet Union was "ahead of the United States in the development of 
missiles and long distance rockets."36 
Senators and House members reached similar conclusions. Compari­
sons to the attack on Pearl Harbor were widespread. In special hearings to 
address the adequacy of U.S. missile programs, Senator Lyndon Johnson 
claimed, "We meet today in the atmosphere of another Pearl Harbor."37 
Charles Donnelly, a legislative assistant, explained that "there were few in 
January [1957] who foresaw that, before the end of the year, the United 
States would suffer a Pearl Harbor in the Cold War and be striving to repair 
its damaged prestige just as desperately as, in 1942, it was trying to recon­
stitute its battered naval strength."38 
While the media, public, and Congress were stunned by Sputnik, Eisen­
hower exhibited little concern.39 The president's initial reaction was to de­
termine how and why the Soviet Union was able to achieve this capability 
first and what the possible implications were. The consensus of his advisers 
was that the Soviet Union had deliberately linked its missile and space 
programs to launch a satellite as quickly as possible. Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Donald Quarks told Eisenhower, "There is considerable intelli­
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gence to indicate that the Russian satellite work has been closely integrated 
with and has drawn heavily on their ballistic missile developments."40 In 
contrast, the United States had followed a policy of developing a satellite 
capability separate from its military's missile programs. 
Eisenhower decided that three facts should guide his administration's 
explanations to the American public concerning the Soviet achievement: 
a. The U.S. determined to make the Satellite a scientific project and to 
keep itfree from military weaponry to the greatest extent possible. 
b. No pressure or priority was exerted by the U.S. on timing, so long as 
the satellite would be orbited during the IGY [International Geophysi­
cal Year] 1957-1958. 
c. The U.S. Satellite program was intended to meet scientific requirements 
with a view toward permitting all scientists to share in information 
which the U.S. might eventually acquire.41 
Eisenhower emphasized that Sputnik posed no significant military 
threat to the United States. He recognized that launching a satellite into 
space was much less difficult than hitting a target thousands of miles away 
with an ICBM. By stressing these principles he hoped to address the con­
cerns raised by his advisers about the implications of Sputnik. Quarks be­
lieved that "two main Cold War points are involved: (1) the impact on 
public imagination of the first successful invasion and conquest of outer 
space, and (2) the inferences, if any, that can be drawn about the status 
of their [the Soviet Union's] development of military rocketry."42 Eisen­
hower calculated that his military prestige and popularity would reassure 
the nation and hoped he would not have to initiate new and expensive 
military projects. He could not have been more wrong. 
Before his first press conference after the Soviet launch, Eisenhower ex­
plained that his goal was "to allay histeria [sic] and alarm," while not belit­
tling the Russian accomplishment.43 In a two-page statement released on 
October 9, he described the development of the U.S. satellite program and 
defended its progress. He mentioned the Soviet achievement only once, 
congratulating the "Soviet scientists upon putting a satellite into orbit."44 
In answering questions at the press conference, Eisenhower asserted that 
the United States was not in a race with the Soviet Union. He emphasized 
that the U.S. satellite program would still be directed toward scientific, not 
military, goals and would continue on its current pace toward a launch in 
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December. He tried to reassure the country that Sputnik did not pose a 
security risk.45 
Over the next few months, Eisenhower continued his attempts to calm 
fears. He argued that the planned launch of a satellite using the Vanguard 
missile in December was an opportunity to prove that the United States 
possessed capabilities similar to the Soviet Union's. But on December 6 
Vanguard exploded on takeoff "as if the gates of Hell had opened up."46 
The implications seemed clear. The United States was far behind the Soviet 
Union in missile capabilities.47 
The president failed in his attempts to persuade Americans that Sputnik 
did not represent a significant threat. Even he began to question his re­
sponse. He told a group of legislators that he "had been trying to play 
down the situation, but perhaps had been guilty of understatement in 
regard to the strength of the Nation's defenses despite Sputnik."48 In a 
recent study of the impact of Sputnik on the United States, Robert Divine 
reaches the same conclusion: "Eisenhower, for all his prudence and re­
straint, failed to meet one of the crucial tests of presidential leadership: 
convincing the American people that all was well in the world. His inability 
to understand the profound uneasiness and sense of impending doom was 
a political failure of the first order."49 
Challenges to the New Look 
The launch of Sputnik brought to the forefront possible deficiencies in 
Eisenhower's New Look military strategy. Since 1953, critics had ques­
tioned whether the strategy could effectively meet U.S. commitments and 
objectives: Did the New Look strategy guarantee that nuclear weapons 
would be used in any future conflict? Did it rely too heavily on nuclear 
weapons at the expense of conventional forces? Was it based on an accurate 
analysis of the targets to be attacked in the Soviet Union and its satellites 
in the event of hostilities? Did the strategy place too much emphasis on 
offensive weapons while leaving the country vulnerable to attack? While 
these questions had circulated since 1953, they now became more relevant. 
Although many criticisms were leveled at the New Look, no statement 
received more attention than Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's ad­
dress to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954. In this 
speech he introduced the doctrine of massive retaliation, which became 
synonymous with the New Look. Dulles argued, "Local defenses must be 
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reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A poten­
tial aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions 
that suit him."50 He then emphasized that "the way to deter aggression is 
for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at 
places and with means of its own choosing."51 
Dulles's speech raised considerable controversy both inside and outside 
the government. For those who were already skeptical about the New 
Look, Dulles's emphasis on "massive retaliatory power" seemed to indi­
cate that any future conflict, big or small, would be resolved through the 
use of nuclear weapons. This belief raised at least two major concerns. First, 
the reliance on nuclear weapons would produce extraordinary casualties in 
any future conflicts. Second, by emphasizing the importance of nuclear 
weapons, the administration seemed to be subordinating the role of con­
ventional forces. While Dulles may have overstated the importance of nu­
clear weapons to the New Look, Eisenhower had no intention of sacrific­
ing the nation's ability to wage a variety of different types of conflicts.52 
"We had never proposed to strip ourselves naked of all military capabili­
ties except the nuclear weapon," he remonstrated during a National Secu­
rity Council discussion in June 1954. "It was ridiculous to imagine any­
thing of this sort."53 But, despite the president's insistence that the New 
Look did not mean exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons, critics remained 
unconvinced. 
By the time of Sputnik, debate raged over the adequacy of Eisenhower's 
New Look strategy. Some critics believed that by relying so heavily on nu­
clear weapons, the United States was restricting its options in future con­
flicts. Others argued that the emphasis on nuclear weapons was correct, 
but that the administration had cut the budget too much to maintain 
a viable nuclear deterrent force. Still others claimed that the New Look 
strategy was too ambiguous and did not provide adequate guidance for 
military planning. The debates over these strategic questions were height­
ened by military service rivalries and the bureaucratic conflicts that plagued 
the implementation of the president's policies. 
Eisenhower constantly reminded his military advisers that they repre­
sented the nation, not a particular military branch. From his own experi­
ences as the Army's chief of staff and as an adviser to the JCS, he was well 
aware of the potential for conflicting interests. In fact, he called himself "a 
fanatic" on the need for cooperation among the military services.54 During 
his presidency, Eisenhower reiterated on several occasions "the need for 
84 Chapter Three 
each Chief to subordinate his position as a champion of a particular Service 
to his position as one of the overall national military advisers."55 In one 
particularly frustrating moment, Eisenhower exclaimed, "Everyone in the 
Defense establishment should nail hisflag to the staff of the United States 
of America, and think in terms of the whole."56 
Eisenhower was concerned that comments from military officials were 
producing the impression that the administration was not united behind 
its national security policies.57 At least one subcommittee of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee reached this very conclusion. Senator Stuart 
Symington (D-MO), a former secretary of the Air Force who chaired the 
Air Power Subcommittee, delivered a scathing indictment of Eisenhower's 
policies at the beginning of 1957. The subcommittee concluded, "Finan­
cial considerations have often been placed ahead of defense requirements, 
to the serious damage of our air-power strength relative to that of Russia; 
and hence to our national security."58 Although Eisenhower obviously dis­
agreed with these conclusions, what bothered him most was that they were 
reached because of the advocacy by many military officials of greater spend­
ing for their particular military branch. 
Critics also raised questions about the selection of Soviet targets to 
strike in the event of a war.59 In his seminal essay on the influence of tar­
geting on nuclear strategy, David Rosenberg criticizes Eisenhower for fail­
ing to limit the growth of the United States nuclear arsenal. Rosenberg 
argues that the president's inability to resolve the disputes between the 
military branches over strategy and targeting led to the growth of a nu­
clear arsenal well beyond what the United States needed.60 He concludes, 
"Eisenhower never took action to cut back the production of weapons des­
ignated for the strategic air offensive, despite his growing conviction that 
the nation already had more than adequate striking power."61 
One of the main debates that Rosenberg analyzes concerned the types 
of targets that the United States should attempt to destroy if war occurred 
with the Soviet Union. In 1950 the JCS adopted targeting guidelines that 
provided the foundation for U.S. nuclear war planning for the entire de­
cade. The chiefs of staff assigned first priority to destroying the Soviet 
Union's capability to deliver atomic bombs, second priority to retarding So­
viet military advances, and third priority to destroying Soviet war-making 
capacity. Code-named BRAVO, ROMEO, and DELTA, respectively, these 
plans led to a continually increasing target list and, in conjunction, an ex­
panding nuclear weapons stockpile.62 
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Targeting debates revolved around how the New Look strategy should 
be implemented. There were clear divisions between the positions of the 
Army and Navy and that of the Air Force.63 The Air Force recommended 
attacking BRAVO or counterforce targets—the Soviet air-missile nuclear 
forces—first. After destroying these, it would then focus on other targets. 
The Army and the Navy, on the other hand, stressed that it would be vir­
tually impossible to destroy the enemy's entire offensive nuclear capability 
even under the best conditions; therefore, they argued, priorities should 
be established to recognize the limited number of targets that could and / 
or needed to be hit. Army and Navy representatives recommended giving 
equal emphasis to counterforce and countercity (DELTA) targets.64 By de­
veloping a more limited yet more defined target list, they hoped to create 
a nuclear strategy that was not dependent on the availability of the entire 
U.S. nuclear striking force.65 
The debates also revolved around the timing of military strikes. Al­
though it is clear that Eisenhower considered and rejected plans to launch 
a preventive war against the Soviet Union in 1953 and 1954, the possibility 
of preemption remained part of U.S. policy throughout the 1950s.66 Pre­
emption meant that if the United States discovered preparations for a So­
viet attack, it would launch a military strike to prevent or preempt it. The 
Air Force's emphasis on counterforce strategy reflected this belief.67 
The preemptive strategy can clearly be seen in the thinking of Air Force 
General Curtis LeMay, commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) 
from 1948 to 1957. In December 1949, he told Air Force Chief of Staff 
Hoyt Vandenberg: 
It would appear economical and logical to adopt the objective of completely 
avoiding [an] enemy attack against our strategic force by destroying his 
atomic force before it can attack ours. Assuming that as a democracy we are 
not prepared to wage a preventive war, this course of action poses two most 
difficult requirements: 
(1) An intelligence system which can locate the vulnerable elements of the 
Soviet striking force and forewarn us when [an] attack by that force is immi­
nent, and 
(2) Agreement at [the] top governmental level that when such informa­
tion is received the Strategic Air Command will be directed to attack.68 
He reiterated this strategy in a lecture at the National War College in 1954. 
He argued, "We [SAC] think the best chance of preventing attacks on this 
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country is to get those airplanes on the ground before they take off, rather 
than depending on the Air Defense Command to shoot them down after 
they got [sic] here."69 
LeMay's views are important because they shed light on a debate that 
was raging among Air Force commanders and because he was an influential 
witness before the Gaither committee. At their annual conference in 1957, 
Air Force commanders discussed a recently completed report emphasizing 
that the basis of a successful strategy in a future war was "to select and 
destroy a target system, the destruction of which is possible in the event of 
initiation of war by the U.S. or after Soviet surprise attack."70 As indi­
cated, one strategic option envisioned the United States initiating a war 
with the Soviet Union. On at least two other occasions, the commanders 
discussed preventive and preemptive wars. While they did not recommend 
either strategy, it is clear from their discussions that as late as 1957 they 
had not ruled out such actions.71 
As important as the debates were about targeting and preemption, they 
paled in comparison to questions concerning the capability of the United 
States to wage limited military operations.72 In 1957 two of the decade's 
most influential books on nuclear strategy were published—Robert Os-
good's Limited War and Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy. Numerous articles appeared at the same time emphasizing the need 
to abandon or reduce the Eisenhower administration's reliance on strate­
gic nuclear weapons.73 Eisenhower generally did not follow the debates of 
civilian strategists closely, and he reportedly questioned, "What the hell do 
they know about it [nuclear strategy]?"74 Nevertheless, he was aware of 
their arguments and even passed a brief of Kissinger's book to Secretary 
of State Dulles.75 
The various limited war strategies owe much to the writings of British 
Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, the former director of British Naval 
Intelligence.76 In January 1956 Buzzard argued that "all our fighting 
should be limited (in weapons, targets, area, and time) to the minimum 
force necessary to deter and repel aggression, prevent any unnecessary ex­
tension of the conflict, and permit a return to negotiation at the earliest 
opportunity—without seeking total victory or unconditional surrender."77 
He explained that this strategy, "by providing an intermediate deterrent, 
guards against these dangers [limited wars], and gives more latitude for our 
diplomacy, without reducing our deterrent against all-out attack."78 
In 1957 Buzzard elaborated on these ideas in an unpublished paper that 
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circulated among members of the Gaither committee. He argued that "the 
key to achieving this essential balance of power is to establish a firm dis­
tinction between local tactical atomic war and total global war."79 He ex­
plained, "If only we would firmly and publicly establish that tactical atomic 
war was a strictly limited affair and need not spread to total war, it would 
of course, take a large step towards counterbalancing the inherently supe­
rior Communist conventional strength, and thus restoring the tactical bal­
ance of power" (6; emphasis in original). He further expounded on why a 
limited war capability added to U.S. deterrent power. He stressed, "It is 
sometimes forgotten that a deterrent has two elements—severity and cer­
tainty of application, and—particularly, with the Russians—it is more 
important for our deterrent to be reasonably severe and certain of being 
applied than for it to be disastrous in its consequences and quite uncertain 
of being applied" (6; emphasis in original). He concluded that for a limited 
war strategy to be successful, the belligerents must have agreed before the 
outbreak of a conflict to limit war aims, the boundaries of the conflict, the 
types of weapons to be used, and the number of legitimate targets (8-9). 
Kissinger adopted many of Buzzard's arguments in his study of nuclear 
weapons.80 He explained, "In a limited war the problem is to apply gradu­
ated amounts of destruction for limited objectives and also to permit the 
necessary breathing spaces for political contacts."81 He stressed, "The pur­
pose of limited war is to inflict losses or to pose risks for the enemy out of 
proportion to the objectives under dispute. The more moderate the objec­
tive, the less violent the war is likely to be."82 He further added that "the 
result of a limited war cannot depend on military considerations alone; it 
reflects an ability to harmonize political and military objectives."83 By lay­
ing out a clear explanation of U.S. intentions and providing an alternative 
to all-out war, Kissinger and Buzzard believed that they were outlining a 
strategy that allowed greater flexibility. 
Osgood reached similar conclusions. He argued, "Only by carefully 
limiting the dimensions of warfare can nations minimize the risk of war 
becoming an intolerable disaster."84 He then explained that for a limited 
war strategy to succeed, there had to be agreed-upon limits in political 
objectives, geographical areas of conflict, weapons, and targets (237-59). 
Of particular importance were his arguments concerning the establishment 
of political objectives and the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Osgood con­
tended that it was necessary that "the government establish concrete, fea­
sible objectives, sufficiently well defined yet flexible enough to provide a 
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rational guide for the conduct of military operations, and that it commu­
nicate the general import of these objectives . .  . to the enemy" (239). He 
also explained that by limiting weapons that might be used in a conflict, a 
country was not forsaking the use of tactical nuclear armaments. Osgood 
concluded that "if the American government were to adapt tactical nuclear 
weapons to a well-conceived strategy of limited-war, based upon a policy 
of graduated deterrence, then it should not be difficult to erase this stigma 
[that tactical nuclear bombs were substantially different from conventional 
explosives] by publicizing the facts in a sober and candid fashion" (257). 
The ideas of Buzzard, Kissinger, and Osgood triggered an intense de­
bate by other limited war strategists concerning nuclear strategy in 1957. 
Officials within the Eisenhower administration pondered the need for ac­
quiring more diversified military capabilities in order to achieve greater 
policyflexibility. Robert Cutler told Eisenhower that the question of lim­
ited war was receiving widespread attention in the NSC's planning board 
meetings. He advised the president "that continuing attention should also 
be given to the U.S. capabilities to deal with hostilities short of general 
war."85 He finally suggested that "some way be found to elevate in the 
highest councils the need for such continuing attention, without calling 
for increased financial expenditures" (emphasis in original).86 
Within the State Department, the Policy Planning Staff also discussed a 
paper that called for the development of an alternative policy to massive 
retaliation. It concluded, "Unless there is a national doctrine for limited 
war and a definition of means by which limited war will not expand into 
global holocaust, the United States stands in danger of starting a chain of 
events which might lead to national disaster."87 It rationalized that with 
the development of increasingly more powerful nuclear weapons, the pos­
sibility of victory in a general war becomes unlikely. The paper recom­
mended limiting objectives and the types of weapons, and relying on 
indigenous forces to wage wars.88 In a not-so-veiled critique of the admin-
istration's policies, the paper concluded, "A philosophy for limited war im­
plies cool-headed policy and self-restraint in the choice of objectives and 
the tactics to achieve those limited ends."89 
Even John Foster Dulles, the author of the phrase "massive retaliation," 
left room for modifying his own strategy. In an October 1957 article in 
Foreign Affairs, he explained that it may "be feasible to place less reliance 
upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend 
countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military 
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invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt."90 If such a policy 
were adopted, "would-be aggressors will be unable to count on a success­
ful conventional aggression, but must themselves weigh the consequences 
of invoking nuclear war."91 While these comments do not indicate the 
abandonment of the massive retaliation doctrine, they do indicate that 
key officials in the Eisenhower administration were beginning to question 
whether the United States possessed adequate military capabilities to wage 
limited military operations. 
The discussions concerning limited war capabilities were most relevant 
to the military branches. Of the three, the Army was the most persistent 
advocate of a limited war strategy. In defending their positions, Army 
leaders stressed that most wars throughout history had been fought for 
limited objectives and that the advent of multimegaton nuclear weapons 
would increase the incentive to keep them that way. Both Generals Mat­
thew Ridgeway and Maxwell Taylor resigned from the JCS in 1955 and 
1959, respectively, because of what they saw as the administration's lack 
of commitment to the Army's needs.92 They did not necessarily advocate 
the abandonment of massive retaliation, but they sought a better balance 
among the military branches so that the Army could meet its commitments 
in all types of military conflicts. 
While the Army was the most consistent advocate of a limited war 
strategy, both the Air Force and the Navy seriously considered it as well. In 
December 1957 the Air Force Science Advisory Board held a conference 
on limited war.93 Although it was not designed to reach specific conclu­
sions, the conference did provide an opportunity for open discussions of 
both the advantages and disadvantages of a variety of limited war strategies. 
In January 1958 the Navy completed a report that concluded, "Military 
superiority in unlimited war no longer connotes an ability to 'win'—no-
body wins a suicide pact. Thus all-out war is obsolete as an instrument of 
national policy" (emphasis in original).94 While both the Air Force and the 
Navy had their own reasons for embracing a strategy that provided greater 
flexibility, their efforts to incorporate limited military operations into their 
plans reflected the influence of limited war arguments. 
Conclusions 
The dramatic events and debates of 1957 transformed the setting in which 
the Gaither committee's findings were going to be assessed. The crises 
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over the budget, the debacle in Little Rock, and the start of an economic 
recession damaged Eisenhower's reputation and hamstrung his attempts to 
govern the nation. Furthermore, Sputnik raised concerns about the Soviet 
Union's ability to attack the United States and expanded debates about 
Eisenhower's national security policies. After all of these crises, Eisenhower 
could no longer rely on his own reputation to reassure the nation. 
By the time the Gaither committee delivered its report in November 
1957, conditions had markedly changed from its inception the previous 
May. When the committee was created, Eisenhower still hoped that his 
budget would be passed with few modifications; he saw a victory on the 
horizon in the passage of the first civil rights legislation since Reconstruc­
tion; and he viewed U.S. military strength with pride. He could not know 
that the future would not be nearly so bright. When the Gaither committee 
presented its conclusions and recommendations, the nation was prepared 
to believe its dire outlook. Six months earlier that would not have hap­
pened, but in this case, timing meant everything. 
The Activities and 
Conclusions of the 
Gaither Committee 
When Eisenhower ordered the establishment of 
the Gaither committee in May 1957, he conceived of a group that would 
analyze two important, yet limited, national security issues: active and pas­
sive defense. He believed that by making improvements in these areas the 
United States might be able to strengthen its deterrent power against the 
Soviet Union. This strategy of deterrence formed the basis of Eisenhower's 
national security policies.1 He assumed that if the United States maintained 
sufficient military power to strike the Soviet Union under even the worst 
circumstances, the Kremlin would be unwilling to initiate war and risk an­
nihilation. The president's press secretary, James Hagerty, summarized the 
administration's position in 1955. The strategy of deterrence, he said, was 
based on "blunting the threat of attack by establishing an adequate conti­
nental defense and building up our guided missiles here at home, and sec­
ondly, to emphasize the retaliatory concept of warfare by putting more 
money into the air and developing a better early warning system."2 Two 
key parts of this strategy, continental defense and early warning, fell into 
the areas of active and passive defense that Eisenhower asked the Gaither 
committee to study. 
After listening to countless briefings, studying numerous reports, and 
examining the most secret intelligence estimates, the committee reached 
some troubling conclusions. It found the United States facing an adversary 
that was expanding its military power at an alarming rate and that sought 
world domination. It argued that the United States had to make significant 
changes and additions to its active and passive defenses. It also recom­
mended that the United States expand its offensive retaliatory capabilities 
in order to present a greater deterrent to the Soviet Union. The programs 
that the committee proposed would cost $44 billion over five years. The 
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final Gaither report challenged the effectiveness of the Eisenhower admin-
istration's national security policies and forced its advisers to confront some 
very complicated issues. 
Parameters and Organizational Structure of the Gaither Committee 
As the summer of 1957 began, Gaither had the unenviable task of organiz­
ing the study that he had been appointed to lead. He had to work with 
Eisenhower's assistant for national security affairs, Robert Cutler, and the 
director of the ODM, Gordon Gray, to determine exactly what the com­
mittee would study. He also had to identify and recruit potential commit­
tee members. Finally, he had to carefully organize the new advisers so that 
the committee could present a final report to the president by the begin­
ning of November. 
Some government officials who knew about the proposed study were 
concerned that the Gaither committee's analysis would expand beyond 
what the NSC initially requested. Gaither met with Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Donald Quarles on June 19 to discuss the parameters of the pro­
posed study.3 Quarles worried that if the Gaither committee made recom­
mendations like those of the Killian panel, the Defense Department would 
have difficulty implementing them. In the early summer of 1957, the De­
fense Department was just beginning to deal with the adverse effects of 
congressional cuts on "the operational readiness dates of the early warning 
system, the Continental Air Defense System, and the dispersal of the Stra­
tegic Air Forces."4 Requests for additional programs would only have ex­
acerbated this dilemma. 
Eisenhower gave Cutler and Gray the responsibility for formulating the 
guidelines of the Gaither committee study. After Quarles expressed his 
concerns, Cutler reassured him that the president's intention was not to 
obtain a thorough revaluation of U.S. national security programs. Rather, 
Eisenhower wanted broad advice "derived from wide experience" and care­
ful study.5 Cutler told Quarles, "The broad-brush study which is sought 
from the [Gaither] Committee relates to whether it is advisable for the U.S. 
Government in future years to embark on a greatly enhanced program of 
passive defense (shelters) or whether monies that would be devoted to that 
purpose had better be used instead for active defense, accepting whatever 
risk may be entailed." Cutler then added, "The last thing the President 
wants to come out of this study is a series of detailed recommendations for 
changing our defense programs."6 
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Gordon Gray. Eisenhower swears in Gray as director of the Office of Defense Mobiliza­
tion in March 1957. Gray helped establish the guidelines for the Gaither committee. 
(National Park Service/Dwight D. Eisenhower Library) 
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Robert Cutler. Eisenhower swears in Cutler as U.S. director of the Inter-American Bank 
in 1960. Cutler served as Eisenhower's assistant for national security affairs in 1957 
and helped establish the guidelines for the Gaither committee. (National Park Service/ 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library) 
At a meeting on June 27 , 1957, Cutler presented instructions to 
Gaither and a few other committee members that emphasized the impor­
tance of performing a broad overview of U.S. active and passive defense 
measures, but one that did not offer specific guidelines for the president to 
follow.7 Cutler elaborated: 
In arriving at its broad opinion with respect to protection of the civil popu­
lation against nuclear attack, the Panel should take into account (a) the 
degree of protection afforded by passive defense programs now in being and 
programmed for the future, (b) the degree to which such protection would 
be afforded by existing and programmed active defenses, and (c) the benefits 
and risks to our military and non-military defenses which would be entailed, 
and the economic and political considerations which would be involved, in 
any decision to undertake a significant shift of emphasis with regard to either 
active or passive defenses. The end result of the study should be to suggest 
which of the various active and passive defense measures are likely to be most 
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effective, in relation to their costs, in protecting the civil population (empha­
sis in original).8 
In late July or early August, Gaither and William Foster approached 
Cutler to expand the parameters of the study.9 Cutler readily consented 
because he believed that a larger view of U.S. national security programs 
would facilitate the development of the most accurate opinions. In his 
memoirs, he recalled this exchange. "Its leaders, Rowan Gaither and Wil­
liam Foster," Cutler wrote, "asked permission to extend its [the Gaither 
committee's] inquiries into the overall U.S. defense programs, as having an 
obvious relation to what the national economy might be called upon to 
bear. The request seeming reasonable, I gave my assent without foreseeing 
the result."10 
The request to expand the scope of the study may have stemmed from 
a meeting between members of the committee and Eisenhower on July 16. 
The president reportedly asked the panel, "If you make the assumption 
that there is going to be a nuclear war, what should I do?"11 By offering 
credibility to a Soviet action that he did not expect, Eisenhower may have 
inadvertently given the committee the wrong premise from which to work. 
Instead of developing opinions based on the belief that the Soviet Union 
might attack but probably would not, it assumed that there would be a 
nuclear war. Foster, in fact, believed that Eisenhower "thought it was time 
for a fresh assessment of the balance of this country in relation to Russia 
in science, education, foreign trade, domestic economy, national morale, 
military strength and world friends."12 
As the committee and the president's assistants attempted to sort out 
the study's parameters, Gaither, with the help of the ODM, continued to 
select advisers.13 By the end of July, he had created a steering committee 
and an advisory panel as well as obtained the services of the Institute for 
Defense Analyses.14 He organized four subcommittees: Evaluation Quan­
titative Assessments, Active Defense, Sodal-Economic-Political, and Pas­
sive Defense. These subcommittees were co-chaired by Robert Prim and 
Stan Lawwill, Jerome Wiesner and Hector Skifter, John Corson and Rob­
ert Calkins, and William Webster and James Perkins, respectively.15 Each 
subcommittee examined specific issues and developed conclusions that the 
steering committee and advisory panel used in making their final analysis. 
While the specific activities of the subcommittees remain unclear, their 
main concerns can be ascertained. The Active Defense subcommittee 
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focused on the effectiveness of various defense programs against aircraft 
and missiles, as well as the relationship between defensive programs and 
offensive retaliatory capabilities.16 The Passive Defense subcommittee ex­
amined the feasibility of constructing fallout shelters, the importance of 
strategic warning, and the necessity of stockpiling essential materials.17 The 
Social-Economic-Political subcommittee studied the cost of current and 
proposed defense programs and the economic threat posed by the Soviet 
Union.18 The final group, the Evaluation Quantitative Assessments sub­
committee, provided quantitative assistance to the other three subcom­
mittees by evaluating major war-gaming studies and analyzing the cost 
effectiveness of specific active and passive defenses.19 
The exact number of meetings that the Gaither committee and its advi­
sory groups held is unknown. However, from the available record it is clear 
that the committee and its subcommittees met frequently.20 Early in its 
study, the committee discussed some of the major national security issues 
facing the country and addressed some specific questions. Economically, 
the committee members wanted to know the costs of current and proposed 
programs for active and passive defense and their impact on the economy. 
Socially, they planned to examine how the country could be made more 
aware of the dangers posed by a nuclear attack and how the government 
could continue to operate after a war. In the area of foreign policy, they 
were concerned with the reaction of U.S. allies and potential enemies to 
any changes in its defense programs.21 
In its discussion of military issues, the committee had more pointed 
questions. Was the policy of massive retaliation still plausible in the wake of 
technological changes? Was a disarming attack plausible only as part of a 
preventive war? Were current limited war plans still adequate? What were 
Soviet intentions in relation to missile development? Would continuing 
current policies lead to the United States becoming a second-rate power 
within a decade?22 
The committee evidently reached some tentative answers to these ques­
tions fairly quickly. It concluded that if a war occurred, the United States 
needed to focus on the destruction of military and civilian targets rather 
than on disarming the Soviet military. A new limited war strategy was nec­
essary to replace the current reliance on general nuclear war. The govern­
ment needed to initiate a ballistic missile defense system, possibly using a 
"Manhattan-type" program. U.S. missile programs should be dispersed as 
much as possible. U.S. security programs should be developed based on 
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Soviet actions and programs rather than on fixed budget ceilings. The 
development of new weapon systems should be constantly monitored to 
avoid overlap. Finally, the United States must be better prepared to meet 
"the racing change of the times."23 
Briefings Received by the Gaither Committee 
Despite entering the study with some preconceived beliefs, the Gaither 
committee still vigorously pursued its assigned task of evaluating U.S. ac­
tive and passive defenses. While performing its examinations, it had access 
to voluminous sources that detailed U.S. offensive and defensive capa­
bilities. The committee received briefings from the Defense Department, 
the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC, the CIA, the AEC, the 
FCDA, the ODM, and the NSC representative on internal security.24 In 
addition to these briefings, the committee had access to both CIA and 
Air Force intelligence estimates, to special studies performed by the agen­
cies mentioned above, and to studies by private organizations like the 
RAND Corporation and the National Academy of Sciences.25 The com­
mittee members also questioned the nation's top military leaders and in­
spected its key defense installations.26 
The Gaither committee's subcommittees and their various staff groups 
met frequently to discuss the key issues concerning U.S. capabilities for 
resisting a Soviet attack. The content of these meetings remains a mystery. 
With only a few exceptions, the notes are either classified, lost, or incom-
plete.27 However, an analysis of the briefings that have become available, 
along with the known views of some of the participants, provides a reveal­
ing picture of the advice that the Gaither committee received. 
The Gaither committee met some initial resistance from within the mili­
tary establishment in its attempts to acquire information, but ultimately 
received the assistance it requested.28 The JCS denied the committee's re­
quest for eight briefings but agreed to provide three. The first covered all 
aspects of the Soviet threat, the second identified U.S. continental defense 
capabilities, and the third reviewed U.S. retaliatory capabilities.29 
The Air Force initially provided the committee "the 50-cent tour for 
visiting firemen" of SAC headquarters.30 Later, however, General Thomas 
Power, the new SAC commander after General LeMay was promoted to 
vice chief of staff of the Air Force, presented a much more detailed brief­
ing. The committee received presentations on SAC intelligence activities, 
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reconnaissance operations, alert procedures, and tactics for penetrating 
enemy territory.31 During a three-and-a-half-hour question-and-answer 
period at the conclusion of the day, General Power described SAC's most 
secret intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities and answered "questions 
with great precision and competence and, as requested, philosophized with 
clear forethought and understanding about deterrence, Soviet future ca­
pabilities and intentions, and so on."32 
On another occasion, General LeMay "was completely candid in an­
swering questions, and regained for the Air Force the respect of the panel 
leaders."33 While notes and memoranda from this briefing are unavailable, 
an examination of LeMay's statements around the same time provides an 
idea of what advice he gave the committee.34 In 1956 he argued that the 
Soviet Union was "bent upon dominating the world by imposing upon 
nations and peoples everywhere a way of life radically and irreconcilably 
opposed to all of the things we believe in."35 He then explained that the 
outcome of the next war would be determined in the first few days of the 
conflict. He stressed that the only way to prevent a Soviet attack was to 
make its leaders realize that they would face a devastating counterstrike.36 
In remarks before the Air Force Science Advisory Board in May 1957, 
LeMay discussed several issues relevant to the Gaither committee. He 
enunciated that a strategy of deterrence would be successful only if the 
enemy was positive that it could not successfully attack the United States. 
He emphasized that "unless our forces are clearly capable of winning un­
der operational handicaps of bad weather and no more than tactical warn­
ing, and despite any action the enemy may take against them, our forces 
are not a genuine deterrent. By ''winning is meant achieving a condition 
wherein the enemy cannot impose his will on us, but we can impose our 
will on him" (emphasis in original).37 He then described how "the most 
important contribution of air defense systems is provision of warning to 
enable the air offensive forces to get underway before they are destroyed at 
base."3S He stressed that while the United States currently maintained the 
capability to strike the Soviet Union, he feared that if SAC did not improve 
its ability to penetrate Soviet defenses by 1962, then he "could not be 
confident of winning the Air Power Battle."39 
Fred Kaplan argues that in LeMay's briefings to the Gaither committee, 
the Air Force vice chief of staff was even more explicit in his plans for de­
feating the Soviet Union. On one of the committee's visits to SAC head­
quarters, it witnessed a surprise alert drill. When SAC bombers were unable 
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to take off in less time than six hours, Robert Sprague questioned why 
LeMay was not upset. The general responded that the United States flew 
intelligence missions over the Soviet Union every day and would know 
about any attack well in advance, and his bombers would have more than 
six hours to get off the ground. He then argued that if attack plans were 
discovered, the United States would not hesitate to launch a preemptive 
strike.40 
On September 17 Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas White 
briefed the Gaither committee. He made three key arguments. He ex­
plained that the United States was facing an evolving and growing military 
threat from Soviet bomber and missile capabilities. He argued that the 
country's military had to be designed primarily to counter this growing 
threat from the air. Finally, he explained, "Today, more than ever before, 
defense is in large part, even primarily, a product of offensive capability. 
The two are tightly joined and each defies decision in isolation from the 
other. This stems from both military and economic considerations."41 He 
concluded by arguing that while the Air Force could operate effectively on 
a $20 billion budget in 1958, there would have to be significant increases 
in the future.42 
Each of the other military branches also briefed the committee. How­
ever, the only briefing of which there is a complete record is the one given 
by Commandant of the Marine Corps Lt. General Randolph Pate in late 
September 1957. In his presentation, he focused on two issues that were 
significant to the committee: the role of tactical nuclear weapons in war­
fare and the growing relevance of limited war capabilities. He stressed that 
the Marines "must possess these characteristics: READINESS, VERSA­
TILITY, FLEXIBILITY, [and] OFFENSIVE POWER" (emphasis in origi-
nal).43 He lamented that the Marine Corps' ability to accomplish its tasks 
had "already been appreciably lowered by personnel losses" (10). 
In his explanation of why the Marines remained essential to U.S. mili­
tary efforts, Pate differentiated between general and limited war. He ar­
gued that after the initial atomic exchange in a general war, the Marines 
and other mobile forces would "most likely be the ultimately decisive ele­
ment in insuring defeat of the enemy" (8). He also explained that he had 
"become increasingly convinced that the deterrent forces of each side are 
such that the mutual holocaust of an all-out, unlimited nuclear war sud­
denly starting is unlikely. This being the case, I believe that wars of limited 
forces and scope are much more likely" (11). Accordingly, the United 
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States had to be prepared to wage limited military operations. He then 
stressed that the military's only amphibious force, the Marines, could use 
tactical nuclear weapons to help achieve their objectives. "We found," he 
claimed, "that atomic weapons are not just to be feared. By the exploita­
tion of these weapons, the amphibious force can compress days of prelimi­
nary bombardment into a few minutes of time" (4). 
According to Paul Nitze and George Lincoln, the Gaither committee's 
various meetings raised two categories of questions about limited wars. 
Thefirst category dealt with the political questions surrounding such wars: 
Where were these wars most likely to occur? What level of support would 
the United States receive from the people and the governments in the areas 
of the conflict? And what should U.S. objectives be in view of its overall 
world strategy? The second category involved the military implications of 
limited wars: What forces, both U.S. and indigenous, were available? What 
types of weapons should be used? And what targets should be attacked?44 
From the briefings, Nitze and Lincoln concluded that the Air Force be­
lieved that U.S. capabilities to wage limited wars were restricted by the 
forces and weapons available to the enemy. If the adversary possessed com­
parable capabilities, it would be difficult to keep the conflict limited and 
still achieve a successful resolution of the conflict. But if SAC maintained 
its superiority, the Air Force argued, it would deter limited as well as gen­
eral wars because it did not think an adversary would risk annihilation (2). 
The Navy, on the other hand, questioned the efficacy of nuclear weapons 
in limited wars, fearing that they would lead to the escalation of a conflict 
into a general war (5). The Army insisted that the key to a successful lim­
ited war strategy was maintainingflexibility to respond in a variety of ways. 
Thisflexibility would include the use of tactical nuclear weapons "if their 
use is to our military advantage" (5). 
The Army's views on limited war can be elaborated further by examin­
ing presentations delivered by Army Vice Chief of Staff General Lyman 
Lemnitzer in 1957. He made similar presentations to the Army Policy 
Council in September and to the Air Force Science Advisory Board Con­
ference on Limited War in December.45 Lemnitzer criticized the doctrine 
of massive retaliation. He contended, "Those who talk of a war for sur­
vival or who insist that we must first fight and win the air battle, or who 
assert that the capacity to retaliate massively is the vital element in any war 
strategy are being tyrannized by their own doctrine. . . . This doctrine im­
plies that every modern war must inevitably be a total war."46 Lemnitzer 
elaborated: 
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The decisive limitation in limited war is that the war must be fought for a 
limited objective. . . . The only rational course is to act on the assumption 
that wars can be limited and develop a strategy which will at the same time 
enable us to deal with limited wars and to minimize the risk of an all-out war. 
If we proceed on the assumption that total war is not inevitable, and if we 
develop a doctrine for limited war, then we should be able to employ armed 
forces as required to support national security policies, and still avert an all-
out conflict.47 
The Army and Air Force also argued that the nation's missile defenses 
needed to be improved. The Soviet announcement in August 1957 that it 
had successfully tested an ICBM raised considerable concern about the 
vulnerability of the United States. Representing the Air Force position, 
General E. E. Partridge, the commander of the Continental Air Defense 
Command, argued, "It is apparent that, in the ballistic missile field, the 
Soviets are developing a serious threat to our survival. To counter this 
threat, the United States must take positive and immediate action with the 
state-of-the-art to attain a defensive capability."48 Army Chief of Staff Gen­
eral Maxwell Taylor also emphasized that "development of the anti-ICBM 
system should be accelerated to the extent of a national priority equal to 
the national priority accorded the development of the ICBM."49 
One of the last military questions examined by the Gaither committee 
was the Navy's role in U.S. military strategy. In the areas under study by 
the committee, the most important ones involving the Navy were the Po­
laris submarine-launched missile system and antisubmarine capabilities. At 
an all-day meeting in August, the Navy briefed the committee on the threat 
posed by Soviet submarines and potential defense measures against them. 
Furthermore, it explained to the committee how Navy offensive capabili­
ties, in particular the Polaris system, could add to the country's retaliatory 
striking power.50 
The briefings received by the Gaither committee were not limited to 
presentations by the military. On at least two occasions the State Depart-
ment's Policy Planning Staff met with the committee to discuss U.S. na­
tional security policies. As with the military briefings, one of the most 
important topics was limited war capabilities. Possibly influenced by Sec­
retary of State Dulles's apparent shift away from the massive retaliation 
doctrine, a PPS study argued that "unless there is a national doctrine for 
limited war and a definition of means by which limited war will not expand 
into global holocaust, the United States stands in danger of starting a chain 
of events which might lead to national disaster."51 The report concluded, 
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"A philosophy for limited war implies cool-headed policy and self-restraint 
in the choice of objectives and the tactics to achieve those limited ends."52 
Studies and Reports Examined by the Gaither Committee 
When Cutler discussed the parameters of the study with Gaither in June, 
he told the committee chairman that the panel would have access to any 
information pertinent to its study, including Air Force, SAC, and CIA es­
timates of the Soviet Union's military capabilities.53 In addition, it could 
examine the reports produced by the NSC's Net Evaluation Subcommit­
tee (NES), which had been charged to consolidate the various intelligence 
estimates of the Soviet Union's capability to damage the United States. 
Finally, it would have the authority to acquire any other government or 
nongovernment study that would assist in its examination. 
While no complete record exists that details the specific sources of intel­
ligence that the Gaither committee used in making their evaluations, the 
evidence indicates that the committee eventually gained access to every 
report or study it requested.54 A review of the declassified national intelli­
gence estimates between 1955 and 1957 reveals certain common conclu­
sions. The Soviet Union was unlikely to initiate a nuclear war in the near 
future.55 While it was not likely to start a war, the Soviet Union's strategic 
capabilities were increasing at an alarming rate and represented a significant 
potential threat if used against the United States.56 Although the institu­
tion of a nationwide fallout shelter program would initially cause some 
confusion and alarm throughout the world, it would eventually be seen as 
an understandable defensive program.57 These three broad trends can be 
seen in the Gaither report. While a Soviet attack was not expected, it could 
not be ruled out; therefore, the United States needed to prepare for all 
possible Soviet actions. 
The National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) suggested that the Krem­
lin sought world domination but would not jeopardize the security of 
the communist regime itself in pursuit of this goal.58 NIE 11-4-54 re­
ported, "The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that during the period 
of this estimate [to mid-1959] the non-Communist world will possess such 
strength in major components of military power that general war would 
involve not only the certainty of widespread destruction within the USSR 
but the possibility of the destruction of the Soviet system itself."59 An es­
timate in 1956 reached a similar conclusion: "The Soviet leaders probably 
recognize that the US nuclear-air capability remains superior to that of the 
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USSR, and have probably concluded that at present the USSR, even if it 
launched a surprise attack, would receive unacceptable damage in a nuclear 
exchange with the US."60 Another NIE predicted that the Soviet Union 
would avoid actions that would "gravely risk general war," but would 
"probably regard itself as progressively achieving greater freedom of ma­
neuver in local situations."61 These estimates were consistent in predicting 
that the Soviets would not attack, but they never questioned the assump­
tion that the Soviet Union sought world domination. If a general war was 
to occur, it would most likely result from miscalculation, not deliberate 
actions. 
In their attempts to predict whether the United States would be able to 
detect a Soviet attack, the NIEs presented somewhat contradictory esti­
mates. Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 11-8-54 examined 
the probable warning that the United States would receive in the event of 
Soviet aggression. It argued that such an offensive would be preceded by 
heightened political tensions that should provide fifteen to thirty days 
of warning.62 But NIE 11-6-55 concluded that if the Soviet Union could 
keep political tensions low, it might strike the United States with "a high 
degree of surprise."63 
The NIEs consistently predicted military capabilities based on estimates 
of maximum Soviet production levels. NIE 11-4-57 concluded that while 
the Soviet Union was not producing as many bombers as earlier predicted, 
it still maintained a long-range bomber force of 1,500 airplanes.64 Another 
estimate asserted that the Soviet Union would have 10 ICBMs in 1958, 
100 in 1959, and 500 in 1960. By comparison, it reported that the United 
States planned to have only 10 ICBMs in 1959, 30 in 1960, and 50 in 
1961. Even if IRBMs were included, the picture was not much brighter. 
By 1961 the United States planned to have only 120 IRBMs and 3 nuclear 
submarines carrying 16 Polaris missiles each.65 
The last NIE of significance to the Gaither committee, SNIE 100-5-57, 
examined the possible world reaction to a U.S. fallout shelter program. It 
concluded that among allied countries, such a program would initially pro­
duce doubts about U.S. commitments and strategies, but that most coun­
tries "would probably come to recognize that the shelter program, taken 
by itself, was a defensive measure and did not necessarily indicate any basic 
change in US foreign policy or substantially affect the likelihood of general 
war." 66 It stressed that the Soviet Union would attempt to exploit the pro­
gram by arguing that it was one more piece of evidence that the United 
States was preparing for war. However, it emphasized that the Soviets 
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would probably not believe that the program represented any significant 
shift in U.S. strategies.67 
In addition to the NIEs, the Gaither committee relied on SAC and Air 
Force intelligence estimates. The Air Force and SAC consistently devel­
oped estimates of Soviet bomber and missile strengths that were higher 
than those of the CIA and the other military branches. Sherman Kent, the 
director of the Office of National Estimates, recalled that in determining 
the Soviet Union's emphasis on long-range bomber production, the Air 
Force argued "that the Soviets would continue to give a high priority to 
the Bison [long-range bomber] Force and enlarge it very considerably." 68 
At Senate hearings in 1956, General LeMay asserted that between 1958 
and 1960 the Soviet Union "will have a greater striking power [in long-
range bombers] than we will have . . . under our present plans and pro­
grams." 69 The Gaither committee had to decide whether the Soviet Union 
was producing bombers at maximum levels, as SAC argued, or at the more 
moderate levels estimated by NIE 11-4-57. 
The Gaither committee also relied heavily on the intelligence assess­
ments developed by the NES. Under the guidelines contained in NSC 
5511, the NES was established to develop "integrated evaluations of the 
net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct 
injury upon the continental U.S. and key U.S. installations overseas, and to 
provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter those 
net capabilities."70 Composed of the chairmen of the JCS, the AEC (start­
ing in 1956), the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the In­
terdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, and the directors of the 
ODM, FCDA, and CIA, the NES integrated the intelligence estimates of 
the various military and government agencies to produce annual reports 
for the president.71 
By the time the Gaither committee completed its final report, the NES 
had already presented assessments to the NSC in 1955 and 1956. The 
1955 analysis focused on the consequences of a Soviet attack on the United 
States. It war-gamed two potential attack scenarios. Plan A involved an 
attack in which the United States received no warning prior to the launch. 
Plan C assumed that the United States would obtain sufficient strategic 
warning of an impending attack to place its military and civil defenses on 
full alert.72 In analyzing both plans, the NES had access to the best esti­
mates of Soviet military capabilities through 1958.73 Under both scenarios, 
the NES concluded that approximately 65 percent of the American popu­
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lation would need some form of medical attention after the attack, and that 
for at least six months the economy would be practically inoperable.74 The 
only significant difference between the two plans was that Plan C would 
allow the United States the initiative to launch a preemptive strike if it dis­
covered Soviet preparations for an attack. In either a preemptive or retali­
atory strike, the subcommittee concluded that the United States would 
inflict even worse damage on the Soviet Union.75 
The NES performed its 1956 evaluation using the same two scenarios 
as in its first study. In this report, the NES concluded that if the United 
States did not maintain an adequate alert status for its nuclear retaliatory 
forces, a Soviet nuclear attack in 1959 would kill or injure more than 50 
percent of the civil population and lead to the Soviet Union's emergence 
as the world's greatest power. It stressed that regardless of U.S. nuclear 
capabilities, a Soviet nuclear attack would, in the age of the ballistic missile, 
cause massive damage if adequate civil defense plans were not introduced.76 
Although the Gaither committee had access to NIEs, the NES evalua­
tions, and top-secret briefings, it does not appear that it examined intelli­
gence gathered by the U-2. At least three members of the committee— 
James Killian, Herbert York, and Paul Nitze—claim that they did not see 
any of the U-2 intelligence at the time of the study.77 York, who analyzed 
Soviet military capabilities for the committee and later had access to the 
U-2 data, explained, "At that time I knew much of the intelligence we had 
concerning the status of Soviet developments and deployments, but I knew 
little about how we got it."78 While it appears that the committee did not 
have access to the U-2 intelligence, at least some of its individual members 
did know about the overflights. Richard Bissell, a consultant to the com­
mittee, ran the U-2 program for the CIA, and Killian had participated in 
the establishment of the U-2 program in 1954.79 
A significant issue raised by the Gaither committee's apparent inability 
to examine the U-2 photographs is whether that information would have 
altered its ultimate conclusions. While it is impossible to know with cer­
tainty, the answer is probably no. This conclusion can be reached for two 
reasons. First, when the committee met, the U-2 program was only a year 
old. While it produced excellent intelligence, there were limits to what the 
few overflights that had already occurred could reveal. Second, while the 
CIA used the U-2 to prove what military capabilities the Soviet Union ac­
tually possessed, it was also attempting to show what the Soviets did not 
have. When no ICBMs were photographed, it seemed to show that they 
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did not exist. However, with the relatively limited coverage provided by 
the U-2, it could also be argued that the Soviet missiles simply had not 
been seen. Between January 1959 and June 1960, only 13.6 percent of 
Soviet territory considered suitable for maintaining ICBM forces had been 
photographed by the U-2.80 
Government Reports Examined by the Gaither Committee 
Even without the U-2 photographs, the Gaither committee still had access 
to a full range of information. Beyond the briefings, intelligence estimates, 
and the NES evaluations, the committee was able to examine reports pro­
duced by government agencies. In August 1956 the Air Force presented 
its own views on SAC vulnerability to the NSC. In a briefing, General R. C. 
Lindsay identified four major weaknesses in SAC's capabilities. There were 
an insufficient number of air bases to provide effective dispersal of SAC's 
long-range and medium-range bombers. There were gaps in radar cover­
age, especially at high and low altitudes, that could be exploited by the 
Soviet Union in a surprise attack. Since at best only 11 percent of SAC 
forces could take off given fifteen minutes' warning, this was a significant 
vulnerability.81 SAC's communications and control systems remained un­
derdeveloped and relatively unprotected from a nuclear blast. U.S. nuclear 
weapons were stockpiled at only forty-five locations, and more than 50 per­
cent of the weapons were at thirteen sites.82 
The Air Force made several recommendations to remedy these prob­
lems. It argued that the government should construct additional air bases 
to facilitate a wider dispersal of SAC forces and should study the possibility 
of using civilian airfields in wartime. It also recommended allotting addi­
tional funding to fill the gaps in coverage at high and low altitudes by 
building additional radar sites. It requested money to accelerate its imple­
mentation of an alert force program. It asked for additional funding to 
construct more efficient and secure communication lines. Finally, it advo­
cated further study of how to reduce the vulnerability of the nuclear weap­
ons stockpiles.83 
The JCS followed this Air Force study with the creation of an ad hoc 
committee to study U.S. air defenses.84 The impetus for this study origi­
nated from both SAC and CIA estimates that indicated the Soviet Union 
might possess the capability to launch ballistic missiles from submarines.85 
In November 1956 the JCS appointed Albert Hill, a future member of the 
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Gaither committee, to chair a panel, which included General Carl Spaatz, 
General Thomas Handy, and Admiral John Ballentine, to study U.S. air 
defense needs.86 This committee, which completed its report in June 1957, 
argued, "The goal for the defense of North America against air attack 
should be the achievement and maintenance of a level of air defense effec­
tiveness sufficient to give a reasonable chance of defending approximately 
80 percent of the vital target areas of the nation."87 Although the report 
remains classified, analyses of Soviet strategies from the time period indi­
cate that if the Soviet Union launched an attack, its military forces would 
concentrate first on U.S. retaliatory capabilities and then political, indus­
trial, and economic centers.88 The committee concluded that most target 
areas were very vulnerable. 
The other study that the Gaither committee explicitly requested was the 
Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan, 1956-1966. Its assumptions 
about the Soviet Union's ultimate goal and objectives in a general war are 
illuminating. "It is accepted," the report stressed, "that the ultimate na­
tional aim of the Soviet Union is world domination."89 It then argued that 
if a general war developed between the two superpowers, the Soviet objec­
tives would be: 
a) to secure the Soviet Union against a retaliatory attack, by both offensive 
and defensive operations against any force capable of significantly threat­
ening its security. 
b) To gain control of Eurasia, and to gain control of or neutralize the 
United Kingdom and the island chains of the Far East. 
c) To neutralize North America's war-making capacity to the extent neces­
sary to success in a. and b. 
d) If possible, without prejudice to a., b., or c , to reduce North America's 
economic and social structure to the point where North America could 
not, for many years, constitute a threat to the expanded Soviet Empire.90 
According to the report, the most important U.S. requirement was devel­
oping the necessary defenses to prevent a successful Soviet attack. 
The Gaither committee also had access to government studies from 
nonmilitary agencies. Most important, numerous NSC studies provided 
invaluable information related to the committee's tasks. Of obvious impor­
tance was the final report of the Killian committee. Not only did this group 
address some of the same issues as the Gaither committee, but it also was 
composed of some of the same people. Six additional studies undertaken 
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either by the NSC itself or by groups under its direction were very signifi­
cant: NSC 5606, an FCDA study, Part 5 of NSC 5720, a report by a special 
committee on shelters, and economic analyses of shelter programs per­
formed by both the CEA and the Treasury Department. 
In 1956 the NSC issued its first full report on continental defense in 
nearly two years—NSC 5606. Heavily influenced by Robert Sprague, the 
report concluded, "The strength of the United States which must be main­
tained is an integrated complex of offensive and defensive elements. Each 
of these elements has its proper role in deterring an attack [by the Soviet 
Union] and in the defense of the United States should an attack occur."91 
Additionally, the report contended, "The deterrent effect of U.S. power 
will be dangerously lessened if Soviet production of multimegaton weap­
ons and an adequate delivery capability is achieved before the United States 
develops an adequate warning and defense system and significantly reduces 
the vulnerability of its retaliatory nuclear power."92 It therefore recom­
mended achieving maximum tactical warning, defending against both air 
vehicles and ballistic missiles, expanding the passive defenses of the coun-
try's retaliatory capability, and implementing new civil defense programs. 
NSC 5606 proposed a gradual increase in spending on these measures 
from $3.8 billion in 1956 to $11.5 billion in I960.93 
Later in 1956, the findings of an FCDA panel added weight to the rec­
ommendations of NSC 5606.94 After studying the effects of a nuclear at­
tack on the United States, the panel delivered a set of alarming conclusions 
to the president and the NSC. The panel analyzed the consequences of an 
all-out Soviet attack that struck at least half of the metropolitan centers in 
the United States. Such an attack, it predicted, would cause 50 million 
American casualties, including between 30 and 35 million deaths.95 It ar­
gued, "In the event of a massive nuclear attack on the United States, of the 
proportions assumed without drastically improved preparation of the people, 
support of the National Government and of the war effort would be in jeop­
ardy, and national disintegration might well result" (emphasis in origi-
nal).96 To avoid such devastation, the panel advocated stockpiling essential 
food and medical supplies, developing plans for recovery after an attack, 
rehearsing carefully developed evacuation plans, and building shelters for 
those unable to leave a target area.97 
Part 5 of NSC 5720, the NSC's assessment of the status of U.S. national 
security programs in 1957, reached similar conclusions. Produced by the 
FCDA, this report did not predict a Soviet attack but concluded that "the 
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USSR has the capability of attacking any target within the United States or 
its possessions."98 Soviet intentions were not important to the FCDA un­
less the possibility of an attack could be eliminated. Since U.S. military 
plans were based on what the Soviet Union might do, the FCDA operated 
under similar assumptions. It concluded that if the Soviet Union attacked 
in 1957, current evacuation plans and shelter space would be inadequate. 
It stressed, "Most of the radiation casualties resulting from [a Soviet] at­
tack (and these would have numbered in the millions) could be attributed 
to insufficient protection from fallout, plus inadequate radiological defense 
programs."99 
Although the preceding studies were significant, the reports devel­
oped by three groups that were created simultaneously with the Gaither 
committee were even more important. As with many of the other studies 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the reports developed by the special com­
mittee on shelters, the CEA, and the Treasury Department remain re­
stricted. However, recently declassified memoranda do contain important 
summaries of the assumptions used by these groups in reaching their con­
clusions. The special committee studied the effectiveness of different shel­
ter systems in limiting the casualties from a Soviet attack. The CEA and 
Treasury Department then analyzed the economic implications of imple­
menting these programs. 
After developing possible Soviet targeting strategies, the special com­
mittee examined the effectiveness of eight different shelter programs, rang­
ing from fallout shelters to protect a limited part of the population to 
combinations of blast and fallout shelters to shield the entire population.100 
Thefirst three programs represented partial shelter plans costing from $5.1 
to $16.5 billion, while the lastfive provided at least complete national pro­
tection from fallout and ranged in costs from $24.5 to $70.0 billion. Each 
program would be implemented over an eight-year period beginning in 
FY 1958 and concluding in FY 1965.101 The committee calculated that if 
the United States did not build any new shelters, casualties resulting from 
a Soviet attack would range between 67 million and 116 million, depend­
ing on the strike pattern.102 Each successive shelter program would reduce 
the number of casualties. However, the most significant improvements in 
survival rates would occur between the most expensive partial shelter plan 
($16.5 billion) and the least expensive complete shelter program ($24.5 
billion). After this point, the potential return on the shelter investment 
diminished.103 
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After the special committee finished its examination, the CEA and Trea­
sury Department analyzed the economic implications of the shelter pro­
grams. The CEA examined four of the eight shelter plans—the $10.1, 
$24.5, $49.4, and $70.0 billion programs.104 It calculated that if the U.S. 
Gross National Product (GNP) grew $16 billion annually, federal revenue 
increased $3 billion annually, and federal expenditures were held to a 1 per­
cent increase, then the economy would produce a $30 billion surplus be­
tween FY 1959 and FY 1962. These assumptions, however, depended on 
the country avoiding a recession, maintaining current tax levels, and keep-
Ing spending in check. The CEA concluded that while thefirst three shelter 
plans could be accommodated by the federal economy, only the $10.1 bil­
lion program was really manageable. It argued that the programs costing 
beyond $10.1 billion would have an inflationary impact and would strain 
steel, cement, and labor supplies.105 
Treasury Department officials examined ways to finance a shelter pro­
gram. They studied the possibility of providing tax incentives to industry 
and civilians to encourage the construction of private shelters. They also 
calculated possible ways to raise federal revenues to pay for shelters. They 
concluded that tax incentives would primarily aid the wealthy while pro­
viding only limited additional shelter space, and that increasing federal ex­
penditures would measurably increase tax liabilities.106 Accordingly, the 
Treasury Department opposed the construction of any shelters because of 
the potential drain on federal revenues. More pointedly, it argued that even 
if the United States could finance a shelter program without raising the 
current level of expenditures, it would still oppose such a venture because 
the country "would have to forego tax reductions to release funds for the 
activity and investment necessary for sustained economic growth through 
private initiative."107 
Reports by Nongovernment Organizations and Experts 
The Gaither committee's study groups supplemented these government 
estimates, studies, and briefings with books and reports produced by civil­
ian experts. The study groups turned to the works of leading experts to 
analyze the best possible national security programs. On issues concerning 
SAC vulnerability, active defense measures, and military preparedness, re­
ports by the RAND Corporation, Stanford Research Institute, Rockefeller 
Foundation, and Johns Hopkins University significantly influenced the 
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committee's conclusions. The studies examined by the committee con­
cerning passive defense measures are too extensive to list, but a sampling 
of the organizations that produced them should be sufficiently revealing: 
the Stanford Research Institute, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Re­
search, the National Academy of Sciences, and Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity.108 Finally, the works of Henry Kissinger and Anthony Buzzard influ­
enced the Gaither committee's assessment of U.S. military strategies. 
The RAND Corporation played a particularly influential role in helping 
the Gaither committee develop its conclusions. The committee received 
briefings from several RAND experts, including Albert Wohlstetter, Spur­
geon Keeny, and Herman Kahn.109 In addition, the committee had access 
to several RAND studies of SAC vulnerability and weaknesses in U.S. air 
defenses. In particular, "Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases" (R-266) 
and "Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s" 
(R-290) laid the bases for the Gaither committee's conclusions that U.S. 
strategic retaliatory forces were vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack. 
In their monumental study of U.S. air bases, Wohlstetter and his col­
leagues at RAND examined four different alternatives for selecting SAC 
base locations and analyzed which of them provided the optimum balance 
between offering security from an enemy attack and maintaining the ca­
pability to reach enemy targets effectively. The first alternative represented 
the U.S. strategy in the early 1950s of placing SAC forces at overseas bases 
to allow the quickest access to enemy targets. The second alternative pro­
posed maintaining SAC forces overseas but at bases further from the front 
lines. The third alternative was to locate SAC forces in the United States 
and depend on aerial refueling to reach enemy targets. The last alternative 
called for basing SAC forces in the United States while relying on overseas 
bases as ground-fueling staging areas.110 It concluded that U.S. retalia­
tory forces were currently vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack because 
SAC overseas bases were located within range of Soviet aircraft and were 
poorly designed to withstand attacks.111 It stressed that the best base sys­
tem would be the fourth alternative because it reduced the vulnerability of 
SAC forces without adding the cost of aerial refueling.112 
Another RAND study that examined measures to protect U.S. strate­
gic power proved equally influential. It evaluated the vulnerability of the 
United States to a surprise Soviet attack and discovered that with relatively 
limited forces, the Soviet Union could cause mass destruction. It asserted 
that a surprise Soviet attack involving as few as 150 heavy bombers and 
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150 ICBMs could devastate the ability of SAC to launch a counterattack. 
To meet this potential threat, the report recommended dispersing exist­
ing forces, hardening SAC bases, constructing active defenses around SAC 
bases, and developing better early warning capabilities.113 
Two other groups involving some Gaither committee members per­
formed studies in 1957. The Army contracted with the Operations 
Research Office (ORO) at Johns Hopkins University to study U.S. air de­
fenses. At the same time, the Rockefeller Foundation established several 
panels to examine U.S. domestic and foreign security. One panel, includ­
ing Gaither committee members Colonel George Lincoln, James Fisk, and 
General James McCormack, studied the military aspect of international se­
curity. Both groups completed their reports by January 1958. 
According to Ellis Johnson, the director of the Johns Hopkins study, 
the objective of the ORO study was to find weaknesses in U.S. air defenses 
and determine ways to eliminate them. The study concluded that "the U.S. 
is falling behind the Soviets in military power."114 Furthermore, it stressed 
that the country "absolutely must face up to the fact that the price for 
moral leadership is that we must spend much more than the Soviet on ther­
monuclear attack and defense systems since we will be attacked if we are so 
weak as to invite attack, and the U.S. will be that weak unless we are sure 
of having enough SAC left, after the surprise Soviet attack, to clobber them 
in return" (emphasis in original).115 To meet the Soviet threat, it recom­
mended increasing annual defense spending by $15 billion for an indefinite 
period.116 
The Rockefeller Foundation acquired the assistance of more than 150 
experts, who worked on seven different panels, to study U.S. domestic and 
foreign security in the late 1950s.117 Panel II, which examined the military 
aspects of international security, performed a study similar to the Gaither 
committee's. The panel concluded, "Mankind . .  . is faced by two somber 
threats: the Communist thrust to seek world domination that seeks to ex­
ploit all dissatisfactions and to magnify all tensions; and the new weapons 
technology capable of obliterating civilization" (97). Furthermore, while 
it stated that the United States would be able to meet any Soviet attack 
during the next two years with "a crushing reply," it was concerned about 
the period beyond that time frame (108). It lamented, "In looking at the 
strategic equation for all-out war there is reason for serious concern. Our 
retaliatory power is imperiled by Soviet advances in the missilefield and by 
the inadequate dispersal and protection of our Strategic Air Command. 
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Our active defense designed against manned planes will have to be rede­
signed for the missile age. Our civil defense program and that of our allies 
is completely inadequate" (111). 
To remedy the deficiencies that it saw in U.S. military programs, it rec­
ommended spending an additional $3 billion annually on defense pro­
grams (152). It specifically recommended modernizing the Air Force with 
new aircraft; developing ICBM and IREM capabilities; reducing SAC vul­
nerability by improving warning, reaction times, and base structures; ex­
panding the military's capability to wage limited military operations; and 
constructing fallout shelters (150-51). In its argument for improving 
U.S. civil defenses, the report claimed that "it is long overdue. It does not 
make sense for the free world to engage in a major military effort without 
at the same time protecting its most important resource: its civilian popu­
lation" (141). 
The Gaither committee also examined some special reports created by 
its own advisers. In particular, Foster and Sprague reviewed budget studies 
that indicated that the United States could afford to spend more on de­
fense programs. Two consultants, in a study that Sprague called "thought­
ful" and Foster labeled "Good!," concluded that a larger defense budget 
was economically feasible without an increase in inflation or higher taxes.118 
The consultants examined four possible defense budgets for FY1960 rang­
ing from $44 to $75 billion.119 They concluded that the United States 
could maintain a $54 billion annual defense budget without serious detri­
ment to the economy. Furthermore, if the country was willing to accept 
tax rates at the same level as during the Korean War, it could afford to spend 
$64 billion annually for defense programs.120 
Evidently influenced by this report and his own beliefs, Paul Nitze pro­
posed that the Gaither committee view its report as a unique opportunity 
to offer an alternative national security strategy to the president's policies. 
"It seems to me," Nitze wrote, "that a group such as this . . . can take a 
different view. It can discuss whether the resources being provided are ade­
quate, whether the allocations within those resources are as wise as pos­
sible, and whether one line of strategic development or another would 
appear to be most to the common interest."121 Nitze argued that the 
United States should increase its defense spending from $38 to $48 billion 
by 1960. It should reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons by increasing 
conventional forces, dispersing SAC, improving continental defense warn­
ing and missile systems, and beginning a shelter program for the civil 
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population. Finally, the president should encourage European powers to 
increase their own conventional forces and make nuclear weapons available 
to them.122 
The last items that the Gaither committee examined were the writings 
of civilian strategists. Lincoln, who himself had been active in publishing 
his views on strategy, sent a memorandum to other committee members 
that contained excerpts from Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and For­
eign Policy.123 The passages that Lincoln cited reveal a fundamental critique 
of Eisenhower's national security strategy. Kissinger argued, "The purpose 
of our capability for all-out war will be to deter Soviet aggression against 
us by developing a retaliatory force of a size which can inflict an unaccept­
able amount of damage on the enemy, no matter what level of destruction 
he may accomplish by a surprise attack."124 In addition, he emphasized 
that the United States needed to develop a capability to wage a limited war 
in Europe. Kissinger stressed that if the United States did not develop this 
capability, "In every crisis it will force us either to resort to a suicidal nu­
clear war which would not save Europe from being overrun or to violate 
our solemn pledge [to defend Europe]."125 He concluded that while it was 
understandable that some government officials wanted to maintain defense 
spending at current levels, it was also foolish.126 
Views of Gaither Committee Members in the Late 1950s 
One last way that the reasons underlying the Gaither committee's conclu­
sions can be explored is to examine the reports and testimony produced by 
some of its members in the late 1950s. Many of the committee members 
studied specific problems for the Defense Department and testified before 
congressional committees. Sprague and Jerome Wiesner publicly discussed 
the Soviet threat and capabilities, Doolittle and Mervin Kelly testified to 
weaknesses in U.S. air defenses. Nitze and Lincoln wrote a report empha­
sizing the need for increased conventional forces to wage limited war. Fisk 
and James Corson analyzed the weaknesses in U.S. military defense orga­
nizations. James Baxter, David Beckler, and Foster stressed the need for 
fallout shelters. Finally, Albert Hill criticized the Eisenhower administra-
tion's emphasis on a balanced budget at the risk of national security. 
Wiesner told a national television audience in June 1958 that "the So­
viets have managed to make a considerably more effective air defense sys­
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tern than we have; I think it is perfectly obvious to everyone that they are 
ahead of us in the missile field. I believe that their limited war capability 
both in quantity and quality is superior to ours, and their submarine fleet 
is certainly a much larger one than we have at the present time.'5127 In the 
same broadcast, Sprague argued that "in the near future, we are vulnerable 
to a surprise air nuclear attack on our continental bases of our Strategic Air 
Command, and if such an attack were successful, this would neutralize our 
ability to massively retaliate, which, in turn, would destroy our national 
policy of deterrence, and in the long future—and I am thinking possibly 
from 1970 on—our people face the possible danger of total annihilation 
in a nuclear war."128 
Doolittle and Kelly served together on the Air Force Science Advisory 
Board and maintained close ties to that military branch. Kelly told Senator 
Lyndon Johnson's preparedness subcommittee, "When we look at where 
we stand in the missile field in relation to our competition, it is shattering 
and very worrisome."129 At the Air Force's annual conference, in Novem­
ber 1957, Doolittle told his fellow officers that the Air Force needed to 
request a defense budget in excess of $38 billion and emphasize air defense 
more.130 He testified before the Johnson subcommittee that the goal of the 
Soviet Union "is world communization and world domination."131 He 
stressed the importance of increasing the number of aircraft, developing 
and accelerating missile programs, dispersing SAC forces to hardened 
bases, and improving SAC alert status.132 He did not believe that the Soviet 
Union was currently stronger than the United States, but argued that 
"Russia's Rate of Progress is more rapid than ours, and, unless we continue 
to forge ahead at full speed, she will soon overtake us."133 
In December 1957 Nitze and Lincoln co-wrote a report on U.S. limited 
war capabilities. They stressed that the United States needed to give greater 
attention to waging limited wars. They argued, "It is conceivable that a 
general war can be avoided for the indefinite future. It is almost incon­
ceivable that limited military operations can be deterred indefinitely in all 
the various areas where United States interests are presently committed."134 
They questioned whether the United States could fulfill its declaratory pol­
icy, that is, its various commitments around the world. "At some point," 
they declared, "there must be a connection between this psychological de­
terrent and the actual military situation."135 Assessing the military capa­
bilities that the United States needed to maintain, they emphasized that 
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conventional military capabilities should be augmented because of the 
dangers of escalation produced by nuclear weapons. "If the enemy is pre­
sumed to have nuclear weapons," they wrote, "serious questions arise as 
to the military advantage if any which we would obtain through initiating 
their use."136 
One area of particular concern to the Gaither committee was the slow 
and ponderous pace of the Defense Department in developing new strate­
gies and incorporating new scientific and technological advances into mili­
tary plans. Both Corson and Fisk argued that there were serious problems 
in the organization of the defense establishment. Corson stressed that the 
United States faced a critical danger within two years "from an aggressively 
posed and rapidly developing enemy."137 He concluded, "To maintain su­
periority for conducting military operations, there is a vital need for creat­
ing organizational machinery that will expediate [sic] the translation of 
technological concepts into weapons systems that can be produced prior 
to conflicts."138 Fisk argued, "The Russians appear to have matched the 
United States in many significant areas of science and military technol­
ogy and are surprising the United States in others."139 He concluded that 
the United States needed to emphasize research and development much 
140 more.
Baxter, Beckler, and Foster complained that U.S. leaders failed to rec­
ognize the importance of protecting the civilian population in the case of 
nuclear war. Baxter argued that the construction of fallout shelters would 
enhance the credibility of the massive retaliation doctrine by making the 
use of nuclear weapons less threatening to the population.141 Beckler 
stressed that "unless the shelter program is developed on a government-
wide basis in the context of our over-all national policies and programs, it 
may not get the attention and support it merits as an essential protective 
measure for national survival during the uncertain days of nuclear parity in 
the years ahead."142 Foster provided a different rationale for building shel­
ters, arguing that it "is known that shelters would provide a tremendous 
extra burden not on us, but on Russian strategy. Shelters would mean that 
any Soviet missile or bomber attack would have to be almost doubled to 
paralyze the United States beyond recovery. Thus, a shelter program is not 
a many billion dollar gamble against the day that the Soviet Union might 
attack. Rather, it is as much a positive deterrent as are our missile and Stra­
tegic Air Command bombers" (emphasis in original).143 
More than any other Gaither committee member, Albert Hill captured 
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the committee's skeptical mood concerning Eisenhower's emphasis on 
maintaining a balanced budget. When the committee met in the fall, Hill 
sent Sprague a poem he had written describing his view of the president's 
policies. In the poem, entitled "Ode to Eternity," he wrote: 
I'd rather be bombed than be bankrupt, 
I'd rather be dead than be broke. 
Tis better by far to remain as we are. 
I'm a solvent if moribund bloke.144 
The Reports of the Gaither Committee's Subcommittees 
The Gaither committee's top-secret discussions intensified between Au­
gust and November.145 One committee member recalled, "It was like look­
ing into the abyss and seeing Hell at the bottom."146 Foster recalled the 
sensitivity of the committee's work: "Documents taken from our office at 
night had to be carried by security officers. And when sessions were held at 
my home, guards were stationed at the house for protection of the docu-
ments."147 The committee had to process the information in these docu­
ments and then write a coherent and persuasive final report. Before this 
could occur, the committee had to analyze the reports of the four sub­
committees that had been created to study specific problems. The final 
conclusions of these groups were compiled into three volumes: Active De­
fense and SAC Vulnerability; Passive Defense; and Economic, Social, and 
Political.148 
The subcommittees examining U.S. active defenses and SAC vulner­
ability concluded that U.S. air defenses were inadequate to meet the Soviet 
threat. They argued, "At the present time the ability of either military or 
civilian activities to utilize warning is essentially zero."149 They feared that 
the Soviet Union could possibly launch an attack without strategic warn­
ing. Even worse, with the deficiencies they found in both high- and low-
altitude radar coverage, they believed the United States might not even 
have tactical warning of a Soviet attack.150 
One of the major problems faced by the Gaither committee in assessing 
the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union was the lack of actual 
information from within the Communist bloc.151 Herman York described 
how he and Jerome Wiesner calculated Soviet ICBM strength for the com­
mittee. He explained that they knew the Soviet Union had been working 
on missiles for a long time and had conducted successful tests. They also 
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possessed information on the Soviet Union's manufacturing capabilities. 
York then stressed, "In the absence of any contrary indications, we as­
sumed the worst. I recall Jerome Wiesner and I estimating that they could 
produce 1000's of ICBM's in the next few years and urging that the 
Gaither Committee base its conclusions and recommendations on that 
fact."152 Using this type of information, the subcommittees had the Soviet 
Union launching 1,800 ICBMs against the United States in a hypotheti­
cal attack: 125 at SAC bases, 675 at U.S. ICBM bases, and 1,000 at civil­
ian targets.153 Nitze recalled, "We calculated that ninety percent of our 
bomber force could be knocked out on the ground by a surprise Soviet 
bomber attack, let alone an attack by Soviet ICBMs."154 
The subcommittees lamented that "there is only meager intelligence 
directly concerning their [Soviet] ICBM and IRBM programs. The esti­
mates of Soviet capabilities . .  . are based almost entirely on the U.S. ICBM 
and IRBM capabilities, and on inferences from Soviet achievements in re­
lated fields."155 Given the paucity of estimates based on concrete intelli­
gence, analysts tended to credit the Soviet Union with capabilities based 
on the maximum that Soviet industry could produce. They admitted, 
"Since there is recent evidence that the Soviet technical and economic ca­
pabilities have been underestimated in the past, the threat described in this 
report may reflect an unconscious corrective bias tending toward overesti-
mation."15<s They argued that the United States needed to harden SAC air 
bases against the pressures produced by a nuclear blast and to construct 
active defenses against both bombers and missiles.157 They emphasized that 
"[a]n all-out crash program must begin immediately in order that these 
defense capabilities can be achieved."158 
The Passive Defense subcommittee created three subgroups to study 
the effectiveness of passive defenses in protecting industry, ensuring the 
safety of civilians, and reducing SAC vulnerability.159 The subcommittee 
examined current FCDA plans for evacuation and for shelters designed to 
protect the civilian population and military equipment in the event of an 
attack. It argued that "evacuation is no longer an acceptable alternative for 
shelter to protect the civil population."160 The committee members con­
cluded that shelters would "forcibly augment our deterrent power in two 
ways: first, by discouraging the enemy from attempting an attack on what 
might otherwise seem to be a temporarily unprepared target; second, by 
reinforcing his belief in our readiness to use, if necessary, our strategic re­
taliatory power."161 
After examining different types of shelters, the subcommittee con­
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eluded that a nationwide fallout shelter program costing $25 billion over 
six years should be initiated, while die effectiveness of blast shelters should 
be studied further.162 It recommended that shelters be constructed no 
more than a mile apart or in locations that the average person could reach 
in ten minutes.163 However, it emphasized that there is "a common aspect 
of all [shelter] programs: none offers absolute protection, and even with a 
prohibitively expensive program we must anticipate heavy casualties if we 
are attacked."164 
The final volume of reports contained background information on the 
Soviet Union's economic potential, on the ability of the United States to 
pay for the proposed programs, and on how the recommendations should 
be implemented.165 The subcommittees found that while the Soviet GNP 
amounted to only 40 percent of the U.S. GNP, the Kremlin devoted nearly 
the same funding to the military. More important, the committee members 
stated that while U.S. defense spending was expected to remain constant 
at approximately $38 billion annually in the future, the Soviet Union was 
expected to increase its expenditures. Based on these calculations, they 
concluded: 
If the Soviet threat is measured in terms of annual expenditures for defense 
and investment purpose, relative to our own, it is formidable indeed. Soviet 
economic strength has already been sufficient to build an impressive military 
capability. It is reinforced by a political structure that permits (or forces) 
single-minded concentration of economic resources on military objectives 
and promises to be sufficient to build a military capability substantially greater 
than our own before 1970, in the absence of increased effort on our part. 
In addition, increasing Soviet economic strength makes possible a continu­
ing politico-economic offensive to extend Soviet influence throughout the 
world.166 
Writing and Presentation of the Gaither Report 
Using the findings of the four subcommittees and the other evidence dis­
cussed earlier in this chapter, the steering committee spent most of late 
October devising its own conclusions and writing a final report. Most of its 
members were requested to write brief summaries of the specific issues that 
they had been involved with during the study.167 The committee then as­
signed Sprague and Baxter the unenviable task of drafting this report. Al­
most immediately, Sprague deferred much of the writing to Baxter, who 
had won a Pulitzer Prize in history for his 1946 study, Science against Time. 
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Realizing the gravity of the task of distilling hundreds of pages of research 
into a short report, Baxter asked Lincoln and Nitze to assist him.168 Nitze 
and Lincoln quickly assumed primary responsibility for writing the final 
report. Nitze later recalled that "Abe [Col. Lincoln] and I were mentioned 
as 'project members' at the back of the report, which masked the fact that 
we shared importantly in shaping the substance of the final version."169 
As Nitze and Lincoln composed the final report, the advisory panel pre­
sented a summary of its conclusions and recommendations to Eisenhower. 
Gaither spoke for the committee and identified six major conclusions. The 
currently planned active defense system was inadequate. The programmed 
passive defenses did not provide sufficient protection for the civilian popu­
lation. SAC was vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack. By 1959 U.S. vul­
nerability would increase with the advent of ICBMs. The risks to the 
country would continue to grow until there was a workable arms control 
agreement. Finally, Gaither stressed, "The long-run peril to the U.S. civil 
population demands prompt and effective measures for increasing our ba­
sic and inherent strengths and for melding the will and resources of the free 
world."170 
After identifying these conclusions, Gaither discussed the rationale for 
the committee's findings: 
The employment of this Russian military power must be deterred and con­
tained by the United States and its allies until an enforceable worldwide arms 
limitation plan is achieved. In this interim of unpredictable duration our se­
curity must rest primarily upon the full effectiveness of deterrents and, if de­
terrents fail, upon our capability to survive as a nation and to retaliate with 
swift decisiveness. Any weakness in deterrents and any important gap in our 
defenses if deterrents fail, imperil the U.S. civil population and national sur­
vival. A sober appraisal of the threat and of U.S. and allied strengths has, as 
we have indicated, brought us to the conclusion that today and in the decade 
ahead our deterrents are inadequate and that the U.S. civil population might 
be exposed to casualties of fifty percent or more of our total population—a 
catastrophe which defies imagination and which almost certainly would bring 
national disintegration. (4-5) 
Gaither proposed that the United States protect and augment its stra­
tegic offensive striking power, reorganize the defense establishment, coor­
dinate the free world's procurement and use of vital resources, educate the 
public to the dangers of a Soviet attack, and strengthen passive defenses 
(5-8)  . On this last point, Gaither explained, "A 'fall-out shelter program' 
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may in our final deliberations be recommended as the only feasible pro­
tection for millions of people who will be increasingly exposed to the haz­
ards of radiation. We frankly confess surprise that a fallout shelter program 
may be recommended. Our initial skepticism is yielding to the analysis of 
the megatonnage which will elude the best defensive systems now predict­
able" (7). 
On November 7, the Gaither committee presented its complete report 
to the NSC. Five committee members participated in describing specific 
parts of the report. Sprague introduced the committee's task and discussed 
the timetable on which the committee based its conclusions. Wiesner ad­
dressed the need for expanding active defenses. William Webster made a 
presentation on shelters. Robert Calkins gave a briefing on the costs and 
feasibility of the committee's recommendations. Finally, Foster summa­
rized the proposed changes in defense organization and offered some con­
cluding remarks.171 
The committee members wasted little time defining the Soviet threat in 
thefinal report. Instead, the committee accepted the basic American Cold 
War attitude that the Soviet Union sought world domination. It stated, 
"We have found no evidence in Russian foreign and military policy since 
1945 to refute the conclusion that the USSR intentions are expansionist, 
and that her great efforts to build military power go beyond any concepts 
of Soviet defense."172 The threat as the committee members envisioned it 
encompassed both economic and military factors. 
Although it recognized the current economic superiority of the United 
States, the committee viewed this advantage as fleeting. It argued that 
while the United States was economically much superior to the Soviet 
Union, this difference was shrinking at a rapid rate. When coupled with the 
Soviet Union's emphasis on military spending rather than on producing 
consumer goods, the decline of U.S. economic strength in comparison to 
the Soviet Union seemed even more stark. The Gaither report emphasized 
that while the two adversaries presently spent almost equal amounts on 
defense, current trends in spending indicated that the Soviet Union would 
surpass the United States in defense spending by the 1960s. It concluded: 
"This extraordinary concentration of the Soviet economy on military 
power and heavy industry makes . .  . available economic resources sufficient 
to finance both the rapid expansion of their impressive military capability 
and their politico-economic offensive by which, through diplomacy, pro­
paganda and subversion, they seek to extend the Soviet orbit" (4). 
The committee found the Soviet military threat closely paralleling the 
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economic one. After examining recent military and technological devel­
opments, the committee presented a picture of an ever-strengthening 
Communist menace. It stressed that the Soviet development of atomic 
weapons, long-range aircraft, both ICBMs and IRBMs, a huge submarine 
force, an extensive air defense system, and an army composed of 175 divi­
sions posed a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Together 
with the economic threat, the Soviet Union's growing military strength 
challenged the supremacy of U.S. world power (4-5). 
The committee issued three "broad-brush" opinions. First, the active 
defense systems currently in place and those planned for the future offered 
little defense against a determined Soviet attack. Second, the passive de­
fense measures designed to protect the civilian population provided little 
or no protection from the effects of a nuclear blast and/or radioactive fall­
out. Finally, because of the low levels of both active and passive defenses, 
the security of the United States rested primarily on SAC. The committee 
warned, "The current vulnerability of SAC to surprise attack during a pe­
riod of lessened world tension (i.e. a time when SAC is not on a SAC 'alert' 
status), and the threat posed to SAC by the prospects of an early Russian 
ICBM capability, call for prompt remedial action" (5). 
The committee made several recommendations to help strengthen U.S. 
continental and civilian defenses. The highest priority was to reduce SAC 
vulnerability and to increase the strategic retaliatory capability of U.S. nu­
clear forces. SAC forces, the committee argued, should be able to react 
with a warning of between seven and twenty-two minutes. Additional air 
bases needed to be constructed to augment the dispersal of strategic forces. 
Active defenses surrounding SAC bases should be strengthened through 
the use of Nike-Hercules or Talos surface-to-air missiles. Additionally, the 
committee emphasized the need to accelerate and expand the introduction 
of both ICBMs and IRBMs into U.S. strategic retaliatory forces. It rec­
ommended expanding the number of planned IRBMs and ICBMs from 60 
to 240 and from 80 to 600, respectively. Finally, it stressed that the United 
States needed to improve the ability of its military forces to wage limited 
operations that fell short of general war (6-7). 
In addition, the committee advocated programs of slightly less priority. 
The committee made its recommendations based on the belief that "pro­
tection of the civil population is a national problem requiring a national 
remedy" (10). It estimated that if the Soviet Union launched a nuclear 
attack, the American civil population would suffer between 70 and 150 
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Nike-Hercules Missile. The Gaither committee recommended install­
ing Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles for defense around Strategic 
Air Command bases. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library) 
ion casualties (between 35 and 75 percent of the estimated 1965 popu-
)n) (18-20). It questioned the capability of the United States to ac-
*e sufficient warning of a Soviet attack to initiate civil defense plans and 
lotify the population if an attack was indeed underway (7-8). It con-
led that the implementation of a $25 billion program of fallout shelters 
civil defense planning "would symbolize our will to survive, and our 
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Talos guided missile. The Gaither committee viewed the deployment of the Talos 
surface-to-air missile around U.S. military bases as essential for protecting the country's 
retaliatory capabilities. (National Archives) 
understanding of our responsibilities in the nuclear age" (22; emphasis in 
original). 
The committee also made recommendations in other areas. It stressed 
the need to improve the organization of the Defense Department so that 
it could effectively incorporate scientific and technological advances into 
its programs. It emphasized the importance of obtaining a greater under­
standing of Soviet intentions through hard intelligence. Finally, it argued 
that any changes in U.S. policies to reduce its vulnerability needed to be 
integrated with a broader foreign policy that would insure that allied coun­
tries would not see it as "a retreat to 'Fortress America' "(11) . 
The committee calculated that these recommendations would cost ap­
proximately $44 billion spread over five years (FY 1959-FY 1963). The 
active defense measures, including the reduction of SAC vulnerability, the 
construction of missile defense systems, and the expansion of U.S. military 
capabilities, would cost $19 billion, while the measures to protect the ci­
vilian population with improved radar and fallout shelters would cost $25 
billion (22). The committee concluded that the United States could afford 
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these programs although they "would necessitate . .  . an increase in taxes, 
a somewhat larger federal debt, substantial economies in other government 
expenditures, and curbs on inflation" (12). 
The committee stressed the importance of implementing these recom­
mendations immediately or risk losing the military advantage to the Soviet 
Union. It argued that during the next two years, 1958 and 1959, the 
United States would be in a position to launch a decisive attack on the 
Soviet Union if necessary, while at the same time, it would remain able to 
negotiate from a position of strength. Beyond this period, the committee 
expressed grave concerns about the future of the United States. "The next 
two years," the committee emphasized, "seem to be critical. If we fail to 
act at once, the risk in our opinion will be unacceptable" (14).173 
After the presentation to the NSC, Sprague and Foster were granted 
one more opportunity to express the committee's concerns to the presi­
dent. At this invitation-only meeting, Sprague presented information that 
he believed was even too sensitive for the NSC.174 He wanted to warn the 
president about the vulnerability of SAC.175 He believed that one of the 
best ways to minimize the vulnerability was to obtain better intelligence of 
Soviet intentions and capabilities. He argued that the acquisition of stra­
tegic warning and hard intelligence of a planned Soviet attack "would be 
extraordinarily important to the United States and permit it to take an ag­
gressive reaction, rather than just a retaliatory reaction."176 While it is un­
clear what Sprague exactly meant by "aggressive reaction," at least three 
members of the Gaither committee thought that the United States should 
launch a preventive war.177 
Conclusions 
Why did the Gaither committee reach the conclusions that it did? The evi­
dence points to two primary reasons. First, when Eisenhower established 
the committee, he was asking for assistance from people who had already 
developed opinions about Soviet intentions and U.S. and Soviet military 
capabilities. As noted in earlier chapters, many of the committee members 
had previously examined topics such as active and passive defense and SAC 
vulnerability. In addition, most of them had been associated with organi­
zations or specific policies that influenced their thinking. When taking into 
consideration Sprague's recommendations for more spending on conti­
nental defense, Killian and Hill's advocacy for improved early warning ra­
dar, Doolittle and Kelly's support for reducing SAC's vulnerability, and 
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Berkner and Nelson's arguments concerning civil defense, the conclusions 
the committee reached should not have been a surprise. The committee 
members entered this study with backgrounds that were bound to influ­
ence the way they interpreted the available evidence. 
A second reason for their conclusions is that the evidence they collected 
and used to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. active and passive defenses 
seemed to confirm their preconceived beliefs. Some of the most impor­
tant information that the committee used were the intelligence estimates 
produced by the CIA and military services. The NIEs revealed a growing 
apprehension of the Soviet threat and an emphasis on increasing Soviet 
capabilities. While they did not predict a Soviet attack, they did not rule 
out that possibility. Furthermore, as the two superpowers approached nu­
clear parity, the NIEs predicted that the Soviets would probably become 
more assertive on the periphery, increasing the risk of a war arising from 
miscalculation. 
One of the fundamental problems that helped skew U.S. intelligence 
estimates was the lack of careful analysis of Soviet intentions. U.S. officials 
and analysts assumed that the Soviet Union sought world domination and 
would use military force, if necessary, to achieve it. As shown earlier, Doo­
little echoed this theme when he testified that the Soviet goal was "world 
communization and world domination." The Gaither committee never 
carefully considered why the Soviet Union would want to dominate the 
world or assume the risks it would have to take to do so.178 In his analysis 
of the influence of perception on policymakers, Robert Jervis provides an 
apt comparison to the mindset of the Gaither committee. He argues that 
"all too often statesmen assume that their opposite numbers see the world 
as they see it, fail to devote sufficient resources to determining whether this 
is actually true, and have much more confidence in their beliefs about the 
other's perceptions than the evidence warrants."179 
By assuming Soviet hostile intentions, policymakers and intelligence 
analysts heightened the importance and the difficulty of analyzing Soviet 
capabilities and U.S. vulnerabilities. As the Gaither committee members 
attempted to estimate Soviet strategic capabilities, they were hampered by 
Soviet leaders' exaggerations of their country's military capabilities and by 
the lack of concrete intelligence. Two leading scholars of Soviet propa­
ganda in the late 1950s and early 1960s claim, "For four years [1957­
1961], Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders gave every indication in their 
public statements that they were indeed in a hurry to capitalize on their 
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initial advantage and that they were bent on acquiring a large force of first-
generation ICBM's."18 0 During its deliberations, the Gaither committee 
also had to contemplate threatening statements from within the Soviet 
Union. One week after the launch of Sputnik, Khrushchev claimed, "We 
now have all the rockets we need: long-range rockets, intermediate-range 
rockets and short-range rockets."381 Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air 
Force Air Marshall K. A. Vershinin was even more threatening: 
The calculation that America's remoteness will safeguard it from military 
blows in case of another world war is no longer tenable. Great distances will 
no longer play a decisive role in the age of reactor technology and atomic 
energy. What was inaccessible before has now become quite accessible. The 
modern means of air attack which have tremendous speeds and can operate 
over vast distances, are capable of striking at any point of the globe. The 
means of conveyance for hydrogen bombs, the most formidable weapons, 
make it possible to bring them instantly to the remotest areas of any conti­
nent of the world by intercontinental ballistic missiles.. . . 
It stands to reason that should the adversary make use of these weapons, 
the Soviet Union would suffer losses. But these losses would be smaller than 
those of the countries with a greater density of population and greater con­
centration of industries. 
This applies, above all, to the west European countries and to the United 
States of America.... Many of the major cities of the United States and some 
Western countries may, in the event of war, be attacked by rockets and bomb­
ers as well as by submarines.182 
Compounding the difficulties created by Soviet bombast, intelligence 
analysts who estimated Soviet capabilities had to rely on the few photo­
graphs provided by the U-2 or other spy planes, electronic intercepts from 
along Soviet borders, interviews with political refugees, Soviet announce­
ments and published statements, observations of Soviet military parades, 
and extrapolations of manufacturing capabilities. Needless to say, their 
conclusions were speculative. As Herbert York recalled, in calculating esti­
mates of the number of ICBMs the Soviet Union would build, he assumed 
it would produce the greatest number of missiles possible. Having accepted 
Soviet hostile intentions, the Gaither committee believed that the Russians 
would increase their military capabilities to maximum levels. 
Once the committee determined that the Soviet Union posed a threat 
and concluded that it was producing weapons at maximum levels, it had to 
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decide where the United States was vulnerable and how the country should 
respond. Based on the committee's assumptions and the information it ex­
amined, several of its recommendations were obvious. Many of its mem­
bers had already concluded that if SAC was made less vulnerable through 
dispersal and by reducing reaction times, it would pose a much greater 
deterrent to the Soviet Union. Others had realized that shelters could re­
duce the vulnerability of the civilian population. These conclusions were 
confirmed in their analyses of other studies. Whether produced by some 
government agency, by the RAND Corporation, or by some other orga­
nization, the reports examined by the Gaither committee presented a 
consistent conclusion—the vulnerability of the United States could be re­
duced by a combination of active and passive defenses. 
A final factor that must be considered in explaining why the Gaither 
committee reached the conclusions that it did are the debates concern­
ing various military strategies. The committee advocated increasing U.S. 
nuclear striking power, building active and passive defenses, constructing 
a nationwide shelter system, and expanding the military's capabilities for 
limited military operations. This last recommendation was of particular 
importance to the strategic debates of 1957. Many strategists, including 
Nitze and Lincoln, had published their views on limited war. Kissinger's 
study of nuclear weapons and U.S. foreign policy was particularly influen­
tial. The Gaither committee's recommendation to augment U.S. limited 
war capabilities reveals the influence of these arguments. 
The Influence of the Gaither 
Report on the Eisenhower 
Administration in 1958 
Four decades after the meeting of the Gaither 
committee, mystery still surrounds how Eisenhower and his advisers actu­
ally reacted to the November report. Did the president simply reject the 
report as a product of war-mongering extremists? Did he have access to 
intelligence information that undermined the basis of the committee's 
conclusions? Was he so blinded by his devotion to a balanced budget and 
controlling inflation that he failed to see an actual Soviet threat? Was his 
willingness to accept only some of the committee's conclusions and rec­
ommendations a product of an astute understanding of U.S. economic, 
military, and political power, or was it simple fortune? 
The Gaither committee's findings raised some significant issues. Its as­
sessment of Soviet military capabilities posed serious questions for U.S. se­
curity. If the committee's conclusions were accurate, the president faced a 
real dilemma. He based his approach to government on carefully balancing 
the nation's many needs and responsibilities. He once told a friend that 
"the critical problem of our time is to find and stay on the path that marks 
the way of logic between conflicting arguments advanced by extremists on 
both sides of almost every economic, political and international problem 
that arises."* Now, however, the Gaither committee was making recom­
mendations that would fundamentally alter the balance on which Eisen-
hower's policies were based. To accept such consequences, the president 
had to be convinced that the United States was really at risk. 
One of Eisenhower's most pressing concerns in contemplating how to 
handle the committee's findings was to determine what impact the propos­
als would have on the economy. He feared that increasing defense spend­
ing to the levels proposed by the committee would create budget deficits 
and inflation. If either of these economic problems developed, Eisenhower 
believed, the federal government would have to regiment the economy 
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through such policies as higher taxes, price controls, and rationing. At all 
costs, he wanted to avoid these infringements on individual rights. 
Eisenhower turned to the NSC and other government agencies to ad­
dress the many issues raised by the Gaither report. Paul Nitze identified 
some of them when he recalled four questions that perplexed the commit­
tee and remained to be answered by the president himself and his closest 
aides: 
1. "What is it we [the United States] should be attempting to deter by our 
nuclear offensive and defensive armament under conditions which seem 
likely to arise in the foreseeable future?"2 
2. "In the years ahead is it to our interest that there be more or less empha­
sis upon nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy?"3 
3. "Should we prepare primarily for a strategy of disarming the U.S.S.R in 
a strike which precedes the receipt of an attack by the U.S.S.R., or 
should we prepare primarily for a strategy of deterrence through having 
a capability to do unacceptable damage to the Russians through a retali­
atory blow—even though we had been struck first?"4 
4. "How much emphasis should be given to quick reaction capabilities and 
how much to delayed reaction capabilities?"5 
Eisenhower and his advisers spent most of the first half of 1958 attempt­
ing to answer these questions. Between January and July, the committee's 
recommendations remained at the forefront of the Eisenhower administra-
tion's deliberations concerning national security issues. The first three NSC 
meetings of 1958 dealt primarily with the Gaither committee and the com­
ments made by the various government agencies concerning specific rec­
ommendations. Beyond these meetings, the NSC over the next six months 
periodically examined issues raised by the committee. In particular, the ad­
ministration evaluated ways to limit SAC vulnerability; accelerate ballistic 
missile capabilities, including ICBMs, IRBMs, and the Polaris system; im­
prove limited military operations capabilities; reorganize the defense es­
tablishment; improve continental defenses; and implement various shelter 
strategies. It can be argued that the Gaither committee did not present any 
revolutionary new ideas or programs, but "it certainly helped, and pushed 
and prodded" many of them.6 
The National Mood and Initial Reactions to the Gaither Report 
By the time the NSC received the Gaither report on November 7, 1957, 
Eisenhower was already under intense pressure to modify his national se­
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curity programs. The launch of Sputnik and the Soviet announcement of a 
successful ICBM test had raised considerable public concern about U.S. 
military strength.7 Previously, Eisenhower had been able to quell criticisms 
of his defense policies by reminding the American people of his widespread 
experience and knowledge in these fields. After October 1957, things were 
different. Eisenhower's status as a war hero and popular president was no 
longer sufficient to allay the people's doubts about weaknesses in U.S. se­
curity. In late October, Aviation Week argued that Eisenhower and his ad­
visers "have been and still are embarked on a fiscal policy that is shaking 
the military, scientific and industrial foundations of our national defense 
system so badly that only emergency action with the utmost speed will 
prevent a major deterioration of our atomic airpower strength in relation 
to the Soviets in the immediate future."8 The following week the publica­
tion claimed, "In the face of this overwhelming mass of evidence on the 
growth of Soviet military strength from new technological weapons, our 
own national leadership has been executing a policy aimed at reducing our 
own atomic-airpower strength in being, artificially retarding the pace of 
our military technological development and thoroughly discouraging the 
best efforts of both military and scientific leaders concerned with this vital 
program."9 
Similar concerns were shown by the general population. A public opin­
ion poll in late November 1957 found only 26 percent of Americans satis­
fied with U.S. defense policies and 53 percent advocating that they be 
reexamined.10 After the embarrassing failure of the Vanguard rocket in De­
cember, the national mood grew more somber. U.S. News & World Report 
claimed that the "U.S., today, is far behind Soviet Russia in the big race 
for superrockets." n A week later, it reported a growing awareness and fear 
of nuclear war. "These new fears about war," it stated, "seemed more 
immediate and personal than war fears in the past. When past wars threat­
ened, people worried about whether their sons might be called into ser­
vice. . . . Now, all at once, war became a personal thing for everyone— 
something that could hit you, yourself, right in your home." u 
Nevil Shute captured the mood of disillusionment and despair in 1957 
in his best-selling novel On the Beach, which vividly portrays the conse­
quences of nuclear proliferation and radioactive fallout. Shute traces how 
survivors of a nuclear war that has destroyed the Northern Hemisphere 
cope with the knowledge that the radiation released in the conflict will kill 
them within six months. As the characters attempt to deal with their im­
pending deaths, they struggle to understand how the world could come to 
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an end this way. Shute moralizes through the character of Peter Holmes, 
"Some kinds of silliness just can't be stopped. . .  . I mean, if a couple of 
hundred million people all decide that their national honour requires them 
to drop cobalt bombs upon their neighbor, well, there's not much that you 
or I can do about it."1 3 
The Soviet Union did nothing to discourage such fears. During Eisen-
hower's second term, he faced a Soviet disinformation campaign designed 
to raise Soviet military and technological prestige while undermining U.S. 
strength.14 In November 1957, Khrushchev gave two seemingly threaten­
ing interviews. He argued, "If war is not averted, the Americans will ex­
perience the most devastating war ever known to mankind. It will rage not 
only in Europe and Asia, but, with not less fury, in the United States."15 A 
little over a week later, he bragged, "The fact that the Soviet Union was 
the first to launch an artificial earth satellite, which within a month was 
followed by another, says a lot. If necessary, tomorrow we can launch 10, 
20 satellites. All that is required for this is to replace the warhead of an 
intercontinental ballistic rocket with the necessary instruments. There is a 
satellite for you."16 
In December, Newsweek interviewed senators and members of the House 
from both parties about the feelings of their constituents and found, "The 
American people have been severely shaken by the sputnik era and are los­
ing confidence in their leadership." The interviews indicated these com­
mon feelings: "a crisis in national confidence produced by the conviction 
that the Soviet Union was now the world leader in science and tech­
nology"; "an aching need for bold leadership—and a shaken faith in the 
soldier-statesman whom they had twice elected as the man best qualified 
to deal with national security"; and "a readiness to make the sacrifices nec­
essary to 'catch up . ' " 1  7 In an analysis of public opinion in the aftermath of 
Sputnik, one scholar concludes: 
In general, American opinion in the post-Sputnik era may be characterized 
(a) as being aware of foreign and defense problems and attributing substantial 
importance to them; (b) as being aware of American vulnerability in the pres­
ent military situation; (c) as having been shocked, in the short run, by the 
Soviet demonstration of scientific and technological prowess, and as having 
lost confidence in the conduct of American foreign policy in the immediate 
post-Sputnik period; and (d) as having substantially recovered from this loss 
of confidence and accepted the Administration interpretation of the relative 
positions of the United States and the U.S.S.R.18 
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Eisenhower was quite dismayed by such fears. He did not understand 
why Americans could not recognize the continued superiority of U.S. mili­
tary strength. Although he was quite concerned about Soviet technological 
achievements and increasing Soviet military strength, he disagreed with 
those who criticized his policies. He believed that current and planned 
U.S. defense programs would continue to deter the Soviet Union and pro­
vide adequate military forces to handle any limited war situations. After 
Gaither's presentation on November 4, Eisenhower explained that "he 
thought our strategic forces are stronger than the group may have indi­
cated." He then stressed, "With regard to the ICBM, here is one case in 
which a central position is not an advantage to the Soviets. The free world 
holds the periphery and can pose a threat from a multiple of points."19 
On the same day the Gaither committee presented its report to the 
NSC, Eisenhower began a campaign to reassure the American people of 
the country's continued military strength and technological excellence. In 
a series of public appearances, he attempted to address Americans' con­
cerns and discuss what the United States was going to do to improve its 
strategic position. Many of his comments reflected his initial assessments 
of the Gaither committee's conclusions. He told a national television au­
dience that advances in science and technology would enhance, rather than 
undermine, national security. In particular, he explained that technological 
advancements would improve U.S. defenses.20 
On November 13, Eisenhower delivered a widely publicized speech in 
Oklahoma City. He identified four tasks for U.S. military forces: possessing 
sufficient retaliatory strength to deter the Soviet Union, insuring flexibility 
in military capabilities in order to meet any form of aggression with an 
effective response, maintaining continental defenses in a high state of readi­
ness, and retaining reserve strength to handle any emergency situations.21 
To fulfill these tasks, he said that a high level of citizen participation would 
be necessary, as well as a willingness to bear any additional financial bur­
dens. He concluded by detailing U.S. plans: 
To continue, over the years just ahead, to maintain the Strategic Air Com­
mand in a state of maximum safety, strength, and alert, as new kinds of threats 
develop, will entail additional costs. This means accelerating the dispersal of 
Strategic Air Command to additional bases. . . . We have been providing 
facilities for response to emergency alarm. This, too, should be speeded 
u p . . .  . To achieve maximum possible warning of any future attack, we must 
carry on additional improvements throughout our warning line that are 
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now scientifically feasible. . . . Another need is to develop an active defense 
missile system against missiles. . . . To increase retaliatory power, we shall be 
adding long-range missiles.22 
While the president attempted to encourage the American people, the 
NSC asked various government agencies to make initial comments about 
the Gaither committee's findings. It requested that the Defense Depart­
ment evaluate the feasibility of the committee's recommendations related 
to the military. It asked the State Department to examine how the imple­
mentation of the committee's conclusions would affect U.S. allies. It or­
dered the Bureau of Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), 
and the Treasury Department to assess the impact of the committee's rec­
ommendations on the nation's economy. It asked the CIA to examine ways 
to improve intelligence and to acquire strategic warning of a Soviet attack. 
Finally, it requested that the FCDA, in collaboration with other agencies, 
study the committee's shelter recommendations.23 
Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy assigned the JCS responsibility for 
developing the military's response to the Gaither committee's findings. 
The JCS completed its report in early December and reached several sig­
nificant conclusions. It opposed the extension of the DEW line south of 
Midway because there was little likelihood that the Soviet Union would 
attack from that direction.24 It directed that the protection of SAC bases 
be augmented.25 It recommended dispersing SAC's forces to a greater 
number of airfields.26 It stressed that "an anti-ICBM is an urgent require-
ment."27 Finally, it argued that "a reasonably effective air defense system 
against all types of aircraft: and missiles, including ballistic missiles, can be 
achieved."28 
The JCS made three other recommendations. First, it agreed with the 
Gaither committee that the country's limited military operations capabili­
ties needed to be reevaluated in relation to all U.S. military objectives and 
in terms of the Soviet threat and the resources available during the period 
under consideration.29 In addition, the JCS accepted that a fallout shelter 
program was "the only feasible means of providing shelter protection that 
can be undertaken on a nation-wide scale at the present time."30 Finally, 
it supported the construction of hardened ICBM launch sites as soon as 
feasible.31 
Defense Secretary McElroy presented similar recommendations to the 
NSC in December. He addressed four issues: improving SAC reaction 
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times, protecting SAC bases, accelerating the development of IRBMs and 
ICBMs, and strengthening the country's capabilities to wage limited mili­
tary operations. He explained that during 1958 and 1959, defense officials 
were primarily concerned with the threat from enemy bombers. In the 
years that followed, they saw the main threat emanating from missiles. He 
recommended that by January 1958 SAC should be able to launch 157 
bombers with 30 to 120 minutes' warning. By July 1959, he expected SAC 
to get 515 planes off the ground with the same warning.32 After the intro­
duction of ICBMs, with the expected reduction of warning time to fewer 
than 15 minutes, McElroy requested that SAC be able to launch 240 
bombers in July 1960 and 465 by July 1961 with 15 minutes' notice.33 As 
far as reducing SAC's vulnerability, the defense secretary ordered the con­
struction of Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile sites around SAC bases. 
He advised protecting 4 of 31 SAC bases by January 1958, 16 of 44 bases 
by July 1959, and 29 of 52 bases by July I960.34 While recommending 
these air defenses, he viewed the construction of shelters for SAC bombers 
as impractical.35 
While the Gaither committee had recommended augmenting the num­
ber of U.S. IRBMs from 60 to 240 and ICBMs from 80 to 600 by 
1963, the Defense Department requested increases on a smaller scale. 
Defense officials believed that the first IRBMs and ICBMs would quickly 
become obsolete, and more money should be spent on developing second-
generation missiles; therefore, the Defense Department initially recom­
mended the construction of only 120 IRBMs (60 Thor and 60 Jupiter 
missiles) and 130 ICBMs (90 Adas and 40 Titan missiles).36 The commit­
tee also advised increasing U.S. capabilities to wage limited military op­
erations. McElroy agreed that "action should be taken to augment the 
capabilities and increase the readiness of U.S. and allied forces which are 
organized and equipped to combat local aggression and to increase the 
mobility andflexibility of these forces."37 
The NSC asked the State Department to analyze the possible impact of 
the implementation of the committee's recommendations on U.S. allies. 
There was concern that if the United States constructed fallout shelters, 
U.S. allies might perceive such an action as a move toward isolationism. 
The State Department argued that if the Eisenhower administration de­
cided to build shelters, it needed to offer assurances to its allies that it 
would remain committed to them. The State Department stressed, 
"If not carefully integrated into our foreign policies, any substantial new 
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programs to reduce the vulnerability of the United States might be widely 
misinterpreted as a fundamental change in U.S. policy which could have 
most serious effects on U.S. relations with our allies and the uncommitted 
nations."38 
The three agencies dealing with the economic implications of the 
Gaither committee's recommendations—the Bureau of Budget, the CEA, 
and the Treasury Department—expressed serious doubts about some of 
the committee's economic assumptions. The Budget Bureau asserted that 
the Gaither committee had made two key mistakes in calculating the 
economic implications of its programs, namely, overestimating the future 
growth of the federal budget and underestimating nondefense expenses.39 
The CEA emphasized that the committee had exaggerated federal reve­
nues and underrated the inflationary impact of its recommendations.40 The 
Treasury Department concluded that the committee had failed to recog­
nize the economic costs and consequences of its recommendations. Trea­
sury officials were particularly concerned that the implementation of the 
Gaither committee's programs would result in an overly regulated econ­
omy and would lead to demands from the American people for the imme­
diate construction of shelters.41 
The last two agencies to present their evaluations of the Gaither com-
mittee's conclusions were the CIA and the FCDA. The CIA agreed with 
the committee that the United States needed to strengthen its intelligence-
gathering capabilities.42 The FCDA supported the committee's recommen­
dations for assigning the shelter program the highest priority.43 
As the various government agencies examined the Gaither committee's 
recommendations, Eisenhower was completing his proposed FY 1959 
budget. Before Sputnik, the administration was trying to limit defense 
spending so that it could meet the budget guidelines produced by Con­
gress earlier in the summer.44 After October 4, priorities changed. Amid 
the uproar and shock created by the Russian achievement, people ques­
tioned how the Soviet Union could have made such a technological ad­
vancement before the United States and wondered what the president 
would do about it.45 Administration officials now deemed that the current 
proposals for the FY 1959 budget were inadequate. 
At a meeting between Eisenhower and his military advisers on Novem­
ber 11, the president explained that the country had to raise the pay of its 
military personnel and accelerate the alert and dispersal of SAC. Further­
more, he added, "We must keep up our 15 carriers, and we must build 
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submarines."46 Considering his earlier views, his pronouncement about 
defense spending was surprising. He "stressed that there is nothing sacro­
sanct about the $38 billion figure [for defense spending]. . . . He felt we 
could do what needs to be done for approximately $39 billion or $39.5 
billion."47 
At two other meetings during the next few weeks, Eisenhower articu­
lated why the additional appropriations were needed and how the decisions 
about them should be made. He explained that he wanted to approach 
proposals for increased expenditures for national security programs "not 
on the basis of'can we do it in response to the public outcry,' but 'should 
we do it.' "4 8 To obtain the right balance in his proposals, Eisenhower un­
derstood the importance of both meeting military requirements and build­
ing the confidence of the people. He described in December how he was 
"really giving a lot of thought to what is the [defense budget] figure that 
will create confidence. He thought that a feeling of greater confidence in 
the security sphere might go over into economic confidence as well, and 
thus help the economic picture." Eisenhower added that "he thought two-
thirds of the supplementary funds are more to stabilize public opinion than 
to meet a real need for acceleration."49 
Eisenhower did not rush to judgment or try to make immediate deci­
sions in response to either Sputnik or the Gaither report. He wanted his 
advisers to analyze carefully what changes and additions needed to be made 
in his administration's national security policies. By the third week in No­
vember, Eisenhower received preliminary figures for additions of $2.14 
billion to the planned $37.66 billion defense budget for FY 1959. The 
increases would cover pay raises for military personnel, improvements in 
SAC alert and dispersal, enhanced ICBM detection, accelerated IRBM and 
ICBM programs, increased research and development, new satellite and 
outer space programs, improvements in antisubmarine warfare, and the re­
organization of the Army's divisions along Pentomic lines.50 
Discussions involving the president came to a temporary halt when he 
suffered a mild stroke on November 25. After convalescing in Denver, 
Colorado, however, Eisenhower was able to resume most of his activities 
by early December. When he returned to the White House, he had to de­
cide what additional increases needed to be made to the FY 1958 defense 
budget, since the additional appropriations in the FY 1959 budget would 
not go into place until July 1958. McElroy proposed and Eisenhower 
agreed to seek an additional $1.26 billion for the FY 1958 defense budget 
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to accelerate and/or augment the Polaris missile system, SAC dispersal, 
missile detection, and the development of IRBMs and ICBMs.51 While 
reactions to Sputnik could have accounted for some of these increases, the 
specific recommendations indicate the influence of the Gaither commit-
tee's conclusions. Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's assistant for national secu­
rity affairs, explained, "Many of the measures assigned the highest relative 
value by the [Gaither] panel have been included in the Defense Depart­
ment program for FY 1959 and the augmentations for FY 1958."52 
Leak of the Gaither Export 
On November 23, the White House released a statement that identified 
the members of the Gaither committee's steering and advisory panels and 
announced that the committee had performed a secret study for the ad-
ministration.53 The statement did not describe the activities of the com­
mittee or the contents of its report. Not surprisingly, information about 
the committee began to filter out after the announcement, and requests 
for access to the report bombarded the White House.54 Noted New York 
Times columnist Arthur Krock hypothesized about the contents of the re­
port after hearing a speech that committee member William Foster deliv­
ered in early December at West Point. "We," Foster proclaimed, "must get 
away from the strange dichotomy with which we have traditionally viewed 
force, refusing to consider it except as a last resort, then approaching it in 
a crusading manner with a 'punish-the-bandit' view which has been preva­
lent in our recent conflicts."55 In his analysis, Krock wrote, "This [speech] 
strongly implies that the [Gaither] report to the N.S.C. gave the most 
powerful support thus far in the United States to the military policy of 
striking an enemy before an assault he obviously is about to make on this 
country."56 
In addition to its specific recommendations, the Gaither committee ad­
vised the president and the NSC that the administration needed to raise 
public awareness about the steps the nation had to take to meet the Soviet 
challenge. In late November, Foster met with Eisenhower about this pro­
posal, and the president "seemed anxious to mobilize public opinion."57 
They decided that Foster should arrange "an off the record unpartisan dis­
cussion of national security matters."58 From this discussion, the White 
House hoped to gain support for both its mutual security and defense re­
organization programs.59 
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Sparked by Eisenhower's apparent interest, Foster invited more than 
twenty national leaders to his home to discuss the challenges facing the 
nation.60 Along with Foster, the other Gaither committee members pres­
ent included Paul Nitze, Colonel George Lincoln, and Frank Stanton. 
Other guests at dinner were Roswell Gilpatric, Laurence Rockefeller, Elmo 
Roper, John Cowles, Thomas Dewey, Frank Lindsay, Eric Johnson, Hugh 
Calkins, Bradley Gaylord, Harold Boeschenstein, George McGhee, and 
Vice President Richard Nixon.61 The group's actual discussions were not 
recorded. However, one reporter described the meeting as an attempt by 
Eisenhower to organize "a group of leading Americans who feel that the 
country requires a special, abrupt and continuous alarm bell on the danger 
from the Soviet Union."62 
On December 20, any remaining secrecy concerning the Gaither com-
mittee's conclusions disintegrated in a front-page story in the Washing­
ton Post. The headlines read: "NATO VOTES MISSILE BASES, PEACE 
TRY; SECRET REPORT SEES U.S. IN GRAVE PERIL." In the ensuing 
article, reporter Chalmer Roberts disclosed the committee's most impor­
tantfindings. He wrote: 
The still top-secret Gaither Report portrays a United States in the gravest 
danger in its history. 
It pictures the nation moving in frightening course to the status of a 
second-class power. 
It shows an America exposed to an almost immediate threat from the 
missile-bristling Soviet Union. 
Itfinds America's long-term prospect one of cataclysmic peril in the face 
of rocketing Soviet military might and of a powerful, growing Soviet econ­
omy and technology which will bring new political propaganda and psycho­
logical assaults on freedom all around the globe.63 
Roberta's article intensified requests that the report be released. George 
Reedy, a key legal assistant of Senator Lyndon Johnson on the Senate pre­
paredness subcommittee, recalled that "one of the big struggles was to get 
hold of a copy of the Gaither Report."64 During the subcommittee's hear­
ings between November 1957 and January 1958, Johnson stated he had 
held between ten and fifteen conversations with administration officials 
about releasing the report.65 Senator Stuart Symington, an outspoken critic 
of Eisenhower's policies, claimed that he had also taken part in about fif­
teen conversations with administration officials on the same issue.66 
140 Chapter Five 
There remains much confusion as to the origin of the leaks of informa­
tion from the Gaither report. At least eighty-five copies of the report were 
distributed, and most of those involved with the committee had access to 
it.67 Several committee members lobbied for the release of the report or at 
least a sanitized description of its contents.68 Newsweek reported that Rob-
erts's article was based on more than twenty interviews.69 Killian recalled 
that Roberts had received a general draft of the report that Jerome Wiesner 
developed in fuller detail.70 
Public knowledge of the report made the administration's evaluations 
more difficult. Eisenhower and his advisers had great freedom in assessing 
the report's worth as an internal document. However, to the public, which 
was still reeling from the shock of Sputnik, the report took on another 
significance: it seemed to symbolize U.S. weaknesses. Eisenhower had no 
assurances that the release of a sanitized version of the report would alle­
viate fears, but by refusing to do so, he was creating the impression that he 
had something to hide.71 
Through most of January 1958, the administration remained split over 
whether to release some version of the report. The debate within the ad­
ministration focused on whether the release of the report would quell na­
tional fears or whether it would multiply demands for more information 
about other presidential advisory panels. Secretary of State Dulles, Vice 
President Nixon, and, at times, Eisenhower himself favored the release of 
a sanitized version.72 Dulles reported that Nixon's "feelings are becoming 
strong that in order to kill it [the Gaither report] we should put something 
out."73 This position, however, was balanced by Robert Cutler's adamant 
disapproval. Cutler explained, "There is no way in which to release to the 
American people information vital to the national security without it be­
coming available to those dedicated to destroying the American people."74 
Eisenhower's final decision to withhold the report may have stemmed 
from the opposition to its release expressed by key Gaither committee 
members. In early January, Killian asked Gaither whether he would "be 
willing to prepare and release the substance of the recommendations con­
tained in your Panel's report, without revealing information that I might 
consider must remain secret for the protection of the nation?"75 Gaither 
responded that after discussing the request with Robert Sprague and James 
Perkins, he was opposed to the release of either the final report itself or 
a sanitized version. He argued that the former "would be a dangerous 
precedent for the invasion of executive privilege for receiving private ad­
vice," while the latter "would be ineffective and dangerously mislead­
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Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles meet in 
January 1958 as the administration evaluates the Gaither report. (National Park Service/ 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library) 
ing."76 Echoing some of the same concerns, Eisenhower decided to deny 
all requests for the report. He told Senator Lyndon Johnson: 
Throughout history the President has withheld information whenever he 
found that what was sought was confidential or that its disclosure would jeop­
ardize the nation's safety or the proper functioning of our Government. 
I mention this consideration because of my conviction, which I am sure 
you share, that in such a matter as this we must be careful to maintain the 
proper separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative Branches 
of the Government.. . . 
Only by preserving the confidential nature of such advice is it possible to 
assemble such groups or for the President to avail himself of such advice.77 
Handling of the Gaither Committee Recommendations in 1958 
At the same time that the president and his advisers wrestled with whether 
to release the Gaither report, Eisenhower presented his annual message to 
the Congress. He vividly described the threat posed by the Soviet Union: 
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The threat to our safety, and to the hope of the peaceful world, can be 
simply stated. It is communist imperialism. This threat is not something 
imagined by critics of the Soviets. Soviet spokesmen, from the beginning, 
have publicly and frequently declared their aim to expand their power, one 
way or another, throughout the world. 
The threat has become increasingly serious as this expansionist aim has 
been reinforced by an advancing industrial, military, and scientific estab­
lishment. 
But what makes the Soviet threat unique in history is its all-inclusiveness. 
Every human activity is pressed into service as a weapon of expansion. Trade, 
economic development, military power, arts, science, education, the whole 
world of ideas—all are harnessed to this same chariot of expansion. 
The Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war.78 
Eisenhower then identified eight specific areas that needed immediate 
attention. The U.S. military establishment required reorganization to fa­
cilitate more effective decision making and operations. The United States 
had to improve its military capabilities, especially in acquiring warning 
of a Soviet attack and in protecting and increasing retaliatory forces. The 
United States needed to continue its mutual aid programs. The United 
States had to expand trade. Congress needed to pass legislation to allow 
the freer exchange of scientific and technical information between the 
United States and its allies. The country needed to increase spending for 
education and research. The people had to be willing to accept additional 
burdens and sacrifices. Finally, the United States had to seek the peaceful 
exchange of information throughout the world.79 
Less than a week later, the president presented to Congress his proposed 
FY 1959 budget and a request for supplementary funding for FY 1958. 
Eisenhower asked for an increase of approximately $1.3 billion in the cur­
rent FY 1958 defense budget and an additional increase of $2.5 billion in 
the FY 1959 defense budget.80 He explained that the increases did not 
reflect any substantial weaknesses in current U.S. military strength but 
would help the United States meet the challenges created by new scientific 
and technological advances. He argued, "Our defenses are strong today, 
both as a deterrent to war and for use as a crushing response to any attack. 
Now our concern is for the future."81 
Congress acted quickly. On January 23, the House of Representatives 
voted unanimously to supplement the current FY 1958 budget by $1.26 
billion. Congress allotted $218.6 million for SAC alert and dispersal plans, 
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$329 million for a ballistic missile detection system, $333.4 million for the 
acceleration of both IRBM and ICBM programs, $350 million for aug­
menting and accelerating the Polaris missile system, and $29 million for 
the SAGE air defense system.82 The House stated that its purpose was "to 
accelerate and expand certain high priority programs in the interest of 
shortening the time by which our military capabilities will have been ad­
vanced so as to more arrestingly deter war and more swiftly and devastat­
ingly respond to any attack. In short, it is to buy time."83 
As the president and Congress implemented initial changes in U.S. 
national security programs in January, the NSC began to deliberate the 
Gaither committee's conclusions more fully. At the first NSC meeting of 
the new year, Deputy Defense Secretary Quarks presented his depart-
ment's recommendations concerning the Gaither committee's proposals 
to expand U.S. ballistic missile capabilities. He presented a startling com­
parison of estimated U.S. and Soviet missile strength. He asserted that 
based on the best available intelligence estimates, the Soviet Union would 
have 10 ICBMs in 1958, 100 in 1959, and 500 by 1960. By compari­
son, he said the United States planned to have 10 ICBMs in 1959, 30 
in 1960, and 50 in 1961. Even the addition of IRBMs did not make the 
picture much brighter. By 1961 the United States planned to have 120 
IRBMs located in Europe and 3 nuclear submarines carrying 16 Polaris 
missiles each.84 
Quarles reported that the Defense Department currently planned to 
have 130 ICBMs operational by the end of FY 1963 as opposed to the 600 
recommended by the Gaither committee. He explained that the United 
States could potentially build 600, but the Defense Department ques­
tioned the practicality of committing so much money to first-generation 
missiles. "The problem," Quarles revealed, "was not the construction of 
the missiles, but building bases for them."85 He argued that the selection, 
construction, and hardening of the bases would be very time-consuming 
and expensive. The Defense Department, moreover, was hesitant to make 
such a large commitment to first-generation missiles, which would soon be 
obsolete.86 
In February, the Air Force began recommending an increase in the 
number of ICBMs to levels resembling those advocated by the Gaither 
committee. It recommended the construction of a 600-ICBM force by 
FY 1964.87 The Navy also made requests concerning the Polaris missile 
submarines that were similar to those made in the Gaither report. It 
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recommended accelerating the number of Polaris submarines to 3 in 1961, 
13 in 1962, 25 in 1963, and 37 in 1964. By late February, it advised ex­
pediting the number of submarines from 1 in 1960 to 39 in 1964.88 
In March 1958, the JCS asked for additional funding for other pro­
grams. It requested $400 million for the Polaris missile system, $100 mil­
lion for developing solid-propellant IRBMs and ICBMs, and $100 million 
for the Titan ICBM.89 Later, in the same month, the JCS recommended 
increasing the number of IRBM squadrons to 16 (240 missiles), just as the 
Gaither committee had requested.90 The JCS based its decisions in part on 
a Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) study of U.S. offensive and 
defensive capabilities that proposed hardening Atlas bases, acquiring more 
Titan missiles, and augmenting the number of Polaris submarines.91 
In April, the NSC discussed the question of expanding the number of 
IRBMs. Secretary of Defense McElroy decided to request 12 squadrons 
(180 missiles). Eisenhower questioned why the country needed to expand 
its IRBM force beyond 120 missiles. He feared that they would become 
obsolete quickly and have to be scrapped.92 Deputy Secretary Quarles told 
the president that the proposal for 12 squadrons had been selected as 
a compromise between the Gaither committee's recommendation of 16 
squadrons (240 missiles) and the original Defense Department proposal 
of 8 squadrons (120 missiles). Quarles insisted that 180 missiles were the 
minimum needed to meet the proposed NATO deployment of IRBMs.93 
Although the recommendation did not meet his desire to limit spending, 
Eisenhower reluctantly agreed to the request.94 
At the same time that administration officials were examining ballistic 
missile capabilities, they were also discussing how to reduce SAC vulner­
ability. The Gaither committee recommended five specific ways to reduce 
the vulnerability of U.S. retaliatory forces: increasing alert capabilities, dis­
persing SAC forces, obtaining greater warning, hardening SAC bases, and 
building anti-aircraft and antimissile defenses. In his memoirs, Eisenhower 
explained that of all the committee's recommendations, he "was person­
ally interested most in the measures to put more SAC bombers on an alert 
status and to disperse our SAC bases."95 With the exception of harden­
ing SAC bases, the Eisenhower administration adopted these recommen­
dations, at least in part.96 
SAC worked under two scenarios in developing plans to reduce its re­
action times. Under the first, the presumed Soviet attack would involve 
bombers that would be detected at least 30 minutes prior to reaching their 
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targets. Until 1960, SAC expected any Soviet attack to provide this amount 
of warning. After 1960, SAC planned for the second scenario, in which the 
Soviet first strike would involve ballistic missiles. Under such an attack, 
SAC forces would receive less than 15 minutes5 warning. One scholar aptly 
concludes, "It would be difficult to overstate the impact that this time 
reduction [after the introduction of the ICBM] had on the analysis of 
national security and on U.S. society."97 At the end of January, SAC pro­
posed the achievement of the following reaction times: by mid-19 59, 515 
bombers should be on 30-minute alert; by mid-1960, 321 should be on 
15-minute alert; and by mid-1961, 465 should be on 15-minute alert.98 
In March, SAC again accelerated the implementation of 15-minute alert 
status. It proposed having 158 aircraft on 15-minute alert by mid-1958, 
355 by mid-1959, 425 by mid-1960, and 480 by mid-1961.99 Of these 
aircraft, SAC expected to have 85 B-52 bombers on 15-minute alert in 
1959, 140 in 1960, and 165 in 1961.10° SAC made substantial progress in 
achieving its goals. In October 1958, SAC commander Thomas Power an­
nounced, "Since initiating our alert force operations in October 1957, 
SAC has steadily progressed towards so posturing the force that one-third 
of the bombers can be launched within 15 minutes."101 By May 1960, he 
could disclose the fulfillment of this goal.102 
Tied closely to the reduction of reaction times was the Gaither com-
mittee's recommendation to disperse SAC forces to a larger number of 
airfields. The committee was concerned that U.S. nuclear retaliatory capa­
bilities would be concentrated at a limited number of vulnerable airfields. 
It recommended the construction of additional SAC bases and possibly 
using non-SAC and/or commercial airfields as alternatives. In February 
1958, Defense Secretary McElroy announced that the supplementary ap­
propriations for FY 1958 and the funding contained in the FY 1959 bud­
get would "provide for completion of the dispersal of the heavy bomber 
wings and of a substantial number of the medium bomber wings."103 He 
told Senator Johnson's subcommittee that by 1960 all 33 B-52 squadrons 
would be located at their own bases.104 As far as using non-SAC or com­
mercial bases, both SAC and the JCS opposed the idea as unnecessary.105 
While reducing the reaction time of SAC forces and dispersing SAC 
squadrons to more airfields won widespread support within the adminis­
tration and in military circles, hardening SAC bases did not. The Gaither 
committee recommended building blast shelters to protect SAC aircraft, 
equipment, and personnel. The JCS and Defense Department concluded, 
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"Any program to harden other than the SAC numbered Air Force com­
mand control centers does not appear to be warranted at this time."106 
They explained that while hardening might protect personnel and planes, 
it would not prevent the destruction of the runways or reduce the dangers 
posed by radiation.107 
In addition to the issues of alert, dispersal, and hardening, the Gaither 
committee made two other recommendations designed to reduce the vul­
nerability of SAC and to protect the continental United States. It advo­
cated acquiring early warning of an attack and constructing active defenses 
against both aircraft and missiles. In October 1957, the JCS had identified 
major areas of weakness in U.S. defenses. It found that the United States 
would receive little warning of an attack carried out above 50,000 feet or 
below 2,000 feet, or launched by submarines.108 It concluded that up to 
twenty-two SAC installations would receive no warning of a Soviet attack 
launched from submarines. Furthermore, even if the attack occurred at be­
tween 2,000 and 50,000 feet, some SAC bases would still receive little or 
no warning.109 
In February 1958, the NSC issued NSC 5802, which described U.S. 
objectives and programs for continental defense. While it emphasized the 
need for an effective nuclear retaliatory capability, it also stressed, "The 
United States should continue to improve, and to maintain at a high state 
of readiness, an effective, integrated system of air surveillance, weapons, 
and control elements, providing defense in depth capable of detecting, 
identifying, engaging, and destroying enemy aircraft or missiles approach­
ing over the North American Continent before they reach vital targets." n  o 
To achieve these objectives, the United States had to be able to detect a 
Soviet attack and possess the defensive capabilities to thwart the enemy's 
ability to reach its targets. 
There were two types of detection that the United States could hope to 
achieve, the first being strategic warning that the Soviet Union was plan­
ning an attack. This type of warning was difficult to obtain since it de­
pended on determining specific Soviet intentions prior to an attack. If 
strategic warning could not be achieved, the next best alternative was tac­
tical warning: detecting the attack as soon as possible after it was initiated. 
The Gaither committee recommended improving U.S. capabilities in both 
areas, but it emphasized acquiring tactical warning since obtaining strate­
gic warning was much more difficult. 
The Soviet Union possessed, or would in the near future, the capability 
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to launch an attack against the United States using airplanes, ICBMs, and 
submarine-launched missiles. Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles argued in 
January 1958 that while obtaining tactical warning was a desirable goal, it 
would be very expensive and could never provide 100 percent protection.111 
Nevertheless, Secretary McElroy approved spending $427 million to ex­
pand radar coverage of likely Soviet attack routes; the JCS recommended 
spending over $1 billion to acquire more anti-ICBM capabilities; and the 
Air Force began awarding contracts to companies that would study and 
implement an early warning system.112 
After evaluating the Gaither committee's proposals for air defense weap­
ons systems, the JCS decided to "provide for NIKE and/or HAWK pro­
tection at 55 SAC (41 bomber, 9 refueling and 5 missile) bases, with 
incidental protection afforded 15 (8 bomber, 6 refueling and 2 missile) 
additional SAC bases for a total of 70 projected bases, by end FY1961."113 
Furthermore, it recommended "vigorous research" on the development 
of defenses against ICBMs.114 It also emphasized that the "operational 
availability of BMEWS [Ballistic Missile Early Warning System] for ICBM 
should be actively pursued."115 
Like the Gaither committee, the JCS and Defense Department were 
very concerned with advances in submarines capable of launching missiles. 
One joint committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives cap­
tured this fear when it argued, "The day is rapidly nearing when the Soviet 
Union can possess, first a few, and then a large fleet of intermediate-range 
ballistic missile-launching nuclear-propelled submarines. . . . Our existing 
and presently planned defensive system could not stop such a missile at­
tack. Therein lies the peril."116 Secretary McElroy echoed this view when 
he testified before the Johnson subcommittee that "the Navy did not re­
quest a [aircraft] carrier in the Fiscal '59 budget, electing instead to put 
the bulk of these funds against additional modern antisubmarine warfare 
readiness."117 
The concern over the submarine threat led to an increase in the FY 1959 
budget of $262 million more than had been requested prior to the Gaither 
committee report.118 An even more telling indication of the fear generated 
by submarines was a JCS plan for dealing with them. The JCS argued that 
"the most practical solution [to the submarine threat] lies in establishing 
control over the launching submarine prior to the launching of its mis­
siles. In peacetime, this control includes detection, tracking, identification, 
hold-down tactics, and in certain situations constituting an immediate 
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and vital threat to the security of the United States, destruction of the 
submarine."119 
One of the last Gaither committee recommendations concerned aug­
mentation of U.S. limited military operations capabilities. The committee 
was very worried that the administration's reliance on nuclear weapons as 
the main deterrent against the Soviet Union reduced U.S. military options 
in the event of a crisis and made a nuclear war more likely. This concern 
was echoed by CIA analyst Raymond Garthoff, who argued that "the em­
ployment of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is necessary in the United 
States concept [of war], but not in the Soviet one. The Soviets thus retain 
a greater freedom of choice. If a genuine stalemate in intercontinental ca­
pabilities is achieved in a prehosrilities period, the United States might be 
endangered by the neutralization of its entire strategy, and hence of its 
ability to act, whereas the Soviet strategy would be served by this develop­
ment" (emphasis in original).120 
The debate over limited war capabilities coincided with General Nathan 
Twining's tenure as the JCS chairman. He later claimed that in the late 
1950s, the JCS "never could . . . agree on a definition of limited war."121 
Civilian strategists had been debating various aspects of limited war strate­
gies since at least 1954, with the discussions reaching a peak after the pub­
lication of Henry Kissinger's work in 1957. The Gaither committee did 
not recommend specific increases in limited war capabilities but did call for 
a study of whether the United States was prepared for such conflicts. The 
problem was that there was simply no consensus concerning an appropriate 
limited war strategy. Disputes centered on such issues as whether to use 
nuclear weapons, how to restrict the geographic areas of conflict, how to 
limit political objectives in a conflict, and exactly what forces were neces­
sary to wage limited war. 
Initially, the Defense Department opposed the creation of an interde­
partmental committee to study U.S. limited military operations capabili­
ties, as the Gaither committee recommended. It preferred to make its own 
study, independent of other government agencies. Its proposal ran into 
sharp opposition from the State Department. In fact, the State Depart-
ment's Policy Planning Staff recommended that the NSC accelerate the 
creation of an interdepartmental panel to study limited military operations 
capabilities.122 When the Defense Department, at a January NSC meeting, 
recommended a delay in the study, Secretary of State Dulles raised serious 
questions about a postponement.123 He stressed the importance of a study 
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of limited military operations by an interdepartmental committee, which 
could examine the varied implications of increasing U.S. capabilities.124 
On March 5, the NSC ordered the creation of a study group to examine 
current and future limited war capabilities. For purposes of the study, the 
NSC stated that "Limited Military Operations include any armed conflict 
short of an overt engagement of U.S. and USSR armed forces which has 
been directed by or concurred in by competent political authority. There 
exists the possibility of isolated incidents involving small units of the U.S. 
and USSR forces which would not lead to war. The degree of participa­
tion in limited military operations by the United States may vary from fur­
nishing of military supplies to the engagement of a portion of the U.S. 
armed forces."125 The study group was charged with discovering the most 
likely areas for U.S. involvement in a limited war and with determining 
whether U.S. military forces possessed adequate strength to deal with such 
situations.126 
While the study group performed its examination, the NSC discussed 
limited military operations capabilities in its review of U.S. basic national 
security policies in May 1958. Cutler introduced the subject by explaining 
how the planning board was trying to make changes in U.S. policies in light 
of the emerging nuclear parity between the two superpowers. He argued 
that the proposed changes were "designed to ensure that the United States 
would have a flexible capability so that it could determine the applica­
tion offeree best serving U.S. interests under the circumstances existing in 
each case of limited military aggression."127 Cutler's recommendation re­
ceived support from Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of 
Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Secretary of State Dulles. 
Taylor explained that "the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability was essentially 
a shield, whereas our active military capabilities must be those designed for 
the conduct of limited war."128 Dulles and Admiral Burke made similar 
arguments. Dulles said "new conditions are emerging which do not invali­
date the massive retaliation concept, but put limitations on it and require 
it to be supplemented by other measures."129 "Our need," Burke argued, 
"is not rigidity, but an ability to move effectively into big, intermediate or 
small operations."130 
The Defense Department, the Air Force, and President Eisenhower 
questioned whether the United States did not already possess the neces­
sary capabilities to wage limited military operations. Secretary McElroy 
expressed concern at the increased costs involved in augmenting U.S. 
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conventional forces.131 Deputy Secretary Quarles said he doubted that any 
war with the Soviet Union could be fought without nuclear weapons, and 
he feared that if the United States announced that such a war could occur, 
it would encourage Soviet aggression with conventional weapons.132 Both 
Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas White and JCS Chairman Twining "in­
sisted that the United States already possessed strong capabilities for fight­
ing limited war."133 President Eisenhower acknowledged that he had 
concerns about augmenting U.S. forces for limited military operations. He 
said, "Each small war makes global [nuclear] war more likely."134 He also 
raised the question of cost. He told his advisers: 
We really are faced with two possible courses of action. If we strengthen 
the mobile and tactical types of forces, either we do so by decreasing the 
strength of our nuclear deterrent force or else we will have to accept a massive 
increase in the resources to be devoted to our military defenses. If we accept 
the latter alternative, we have got to decide promptly by what methods we 
are going to maintain very much larger military forces than we have previ­
ously done. These methods would almost certainly involve what is euphemis­
tically called a controlled economy, but which in effect would amount to a 
garrison state.13S 
While the NSC debated limited military operations capabilities, its in­
terdepartmental study group completed a 250-page examination in June. 
Unfortunately, most of its report and the discussions related to it remain 
classified. However, the study group evidently reached several general con­
clusions. While the United States could use more limited war capabilities, 
its current forces were adequate. If a limited war did occur, the United 
States needed to notify the enemy of its intentions. The public needed 
to be educated about the role of nuclear weapons.136 The NSC planning 
board expressed serious concern about informing the enemy of the coun-
try's intentions. It explained: 
The communication of limited objectives to potential aggressors is, as the 
Study states, an important means of minimizing the likelihood of miscalcu­
lation by the aggressor and the risk of general war. However, can communi­
cation of limited intentions be made in advance of every resort to limited 
hostilities without paying the unacceptable cost of encouraging the aggressor 
by reassuring him of the limited extent of the risk he is taking in initiating 
aggression? Should the communication of U.S. limited objectives be made 
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(a) generally, long before a limited military operation may be undertaken, 
(b) a short time before a limited operation may be undertaken, (c) just after 
a limited operation is undertaken?137 
The interdepartmental group's final report did not lead to any substantial 
changes in Eisenhower's programs concerning limited military operations. 
The last two Gaither committee recommendations dealt with the reor­
ganization of the defense establishment and with constructing fallout shel­
ters. Since the beginning of his administration, Eisenhower had attempted 
without much success to make the Defense Department operate more ef­
fectively. In making its recommendation concerning reorganization, the 
Gaither committee concluded that the defense establishment was not in­
corporating scientific and technological advances into its military programs 
in an efficient manner and was plagued by bureaucratic conflicts. Through 
its proposed changes, the committee sought to overcome these problems. 
"The first need," Eisenhower argued in his 1958 State of the Union 
address, "is to assure ourselves that military organization facilitates rather 
than hinders the functioning of the military establishment in maintaining 
the security of the nation."138 He found the defense establishment unable 
to meet the challenges posed by the modern world. He announced that he 
had established a special committee to study how the defense establish­
ment should be organized. The committee members were William Foster 
and Robert Lovett from the Gaither committee, Charles Coolidge, Gen­
eral Alfred Gruenther, General Nathan Twining, Admiral Arthur Radford, 
and General Omar Bradley.139 After receiving the committee's recommen­
dations, the president submitted his proposal to Congress in April. 
Eisenhower made six recommendations for changes in the organization 
of the defense establishment. Troops deployed overseas should be led by a 
"designated unified commander" rather than a commander from a par­
ticular service branch. The designated unified commander should answer 
directly to the secretary of defense, who answered to the president. The 
JCS should serve the secretary of defense directly rather than representing 
particular military branches. Each chief should concentrate on managing 
his respective branch, not on developing operational plans. A new position, 
director of defense research and engineering, needed to be created. Con­
gress should appropriate funds to the secretary of defense rather than to 
the individual services.140 
The president's proposals met some initial resistance in Congress. "The 
152 Chapter Five 
real problem," one scholar explains, "was how to apportion control of the 
modern military establishment, furnishing real security without compro­
mising the traditional balance between executive and legislative power."141 
Some members of Congress, led by the venerable representative Carl 
Vinson (D-GA), believed that the proposals would weaken congressional 
influence over defense policies.142 However, in August, Congress sent Ei­
senhower a bill that contained most of what he had requested. It increased 
the president's control over the defense establishment and strengthened 
the secretary of defense's authority over the service chiefs.143 
The Eisenhower administration's response to the five-year $25 billion 
fallout shelter program was generally negative. Secretary of State Dulles 
found the Gaither committee's argument for shelters unconvincing. 
Sprague recalled that at the November 7 NSC meeting, Dulles asserted 
that the committee "had over-exaggerated our weaknesses and recom­
mended a number of things that were militarily unnecessary and economi­
cally unfeasible. My general distress was that I thought Mr. Dulles had 
pretty well washed down the drain the six months work of, I thought, quite 
a competent group in carrying out an assignment they were asked to do."144 
Dulles explained to Eisenhower later that he was simply temperamentally 
opposed to shelters.145 There may have been personal reasons as well for 
Dulles's rejection of the Gaither committee's recommendation concerning 
shelters. When he discovered that Paul Nitze had participated in writing 
the report, he was dismayed. He even questioned his brother, CIA Direc­
tor Allen Dulles, how Nitze became an adviser to the committee.146 
When the NSC examined the shelter recommendation in January, the 
FCDA was the only government agency to support the program without 
reservations. Leo Hoegh, the FCDA's director, argued that shelters would 
bolster the deterrent power of retaliatory forces, strengthen the position of 
U.S. negotiators, and reduce casualties in a war by 35 to 45 percent.147 
Opponents such as Secretary Dulles, Robert Cutler, and AEC chairman 
Admiral Lewis Strauss questioned the costs and effectiveness of shelters, 
thought they might make war more likely, and wondered about their im­
pact on U.S. allies.148 
Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon expressed serious reservations 
about the effectiveness of shelters in maintaining the viability of the coun­
try after a nuclear exchange. The president "noted that it had been said 
that fallout shelters might save 50 million people, a reduction of 35% in 
casualties. In talking about such figures, we were talking about the com­
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plete destruction of the United States."149 Nixon was even more blunt. He 
"suggested that it be assumed that 40 million people would be killed in 
event of enemy attack if we had shelters, and 60 million would be killed if 
we did not have shelters. If 40 million were killed, the United States would 
befinished. He did not believe we could survive such a disaster. Our major 
objective must be to avoid the destruction of our society."150 After these 
discussions, the NSC decided to reject the Gaither committee's shelter rec­
ommendation. But it did create an interdepartmental committee to study 
passive defenses, to institute a public education program, and to support 
research on different types of shelters.151 
The Gaither committee's steering panel reconvened in February and 
met with Cutler to discuss how the administration was responding to its 
report.152 Cutler wanted to assure the panel members that the administra­
tion was carefully considering their report. The steering panel members 
took the opportunity to question why administration officials seemed to be 
ignoring the recommendation for a nationwide shelter program. They ar­
gued, "The Gaither recommendations with respect to active and passive 
defenses should be regarded as an integrated combination. That is to say, 
a nation-wide fallout shelter program was to be taken in conjunction with 
recommendations for improving active defense and as a complementary 
thereto in protecting American lives."153 
Over the next month and a half, Sprague corresponded with Killian and 
Cutler in an attempt to obtain their support for a shelter program. He 
explained that a one-megaton nuclear ground burst would kill 70 percent 
of the population within 13 square miles of the explosion because of ei­
ther blast pressures or thermal heat. Unsheltered people within a radius of 
600 miles would receive a lethal dose of radiation within seven hours.154 
"These figures," Sprague argued, "give very persuasive support to the ur­
gent need of a fall-out shelter to protect military and civilian personnel, 
whether within urban or rural areas."155 Although Sprague's arguments 
impressed Cutler, Killian was not convinced of the utility of shelters. He 
did not even want to educate the public about shelters lest it generate de­
mands for a nationwide program.156 
After the interdepartmental committee completed its report in March 
1958, the NSC again addressed the question of shelters. Many of the same 
points made at the first meeting were heard again. After FCDA Director 
Hoegh spoke in favor of shelters, Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson ar­
gued, "The problem posed by a shelter program . . . was not only a grave 
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financial problem. The main problem lay in the fact that we simply do not 
know enough at present to determine whether to go ahead with a large 
Federal program of shelter as a means which will really contribute to the 
survival of the United State in a terrible nuclear war."157 Eisenhower later 
claimed that "this was one of the hardest problems in the world on which 
to make a wise decision."158 
The NSC finally recommended spending $35 million in FY 1959 for 
certain minimal shelter studies.159 It proposed the continuation of research 
and the development of prototypes of small fallout shelters. It advised sur­
veying existing facilities nationwide to determine current available shelter 
space, and the construction of fallout shelters in new Federal buildings. 
Finally, it supported the expansion of public education programs address­
ing the consequences of nuclear war.160 
Conclusions 
Although surprised by some of its contents, Eisenhower did not dismiss 
the Gaither report, as some scholars have claimed. Stephen Ambrose ar­
gues that the president ultimately "rejected the Gaither Report. He re­
fused to bend to the pressure, refused to initiate a fallout shelter program. 
It was one of his finest hours."161 This is a rather shortsighted view of the 
influence of the Gaither report. The Gaither committee made recommen­
dations in five main areas: increasing U.S. offensive striking power, reduc­
ing the vulnerability of SAC and the continent, improving U.S. limited 
military operations capabilities, constructing fallout shelters, and reorga­
nizing the defense establishment. In every area except for fallout shelters 
and conventional forces, the administration either made major changes in 
its programs or initiated new studies in 1958. Eisenhower was more reluc­
tant than some of his advisers to alter his programs, but he did accelerate 
U.S. missile development. He also emphasized the need for SAC alert and 
dispersal programs, ordered a study of U.S. limited military operations ca­
pabilities, and reorganized the defense establishment. 
Eisenhower expressed reluctance at increasing the number of first-
generation IKJBMs and ICBMs that the United States should build. How­
ever, he did agree to deploy 130 ICBMs, 180 IRBMs, and additional 
Polaris missile-launching submarines.162 While these force levels are far be­
low the committee's recommendation of 600 ICBMs and 240 IRBMs, the 
distinction is not as clear as it appears. Eisenhower did not oppose increas­
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ing U.S. offensive striking power; he had doubts only about making first-
generation missiles the basis of these forces. Because he had much more 
faith in the delivery capability of heavy bombers, he believed the United 
States should deploy a minimum number of first-generation missiles while 
concentrating on improving their accuracy. Eisenhower told the NSC in 
April 1958 "that he still had more faith in the delivery capabilities of the 
aircraft than he had in all these missiles at the present time."163 Accord­
ingly, while he supported enhanced alert and dispersal programs for SAC, 
he approved only a relatively limited number of first-generation missiles. 
As for augmenting U.S. limited war capabilities, Eisenhower questioned 
the Gaither committee's contentions that small wars would remain limited. 
He did agree, however, to a new study of whether U.S. limited military 
operations capabilities were sufficient to address possible trouble spots in 
the world. The president ultimately based his decision not to expand con­
ventional forces on his belief that future wars would be short and waged 
with nuclear weapons.164 He explained his views in 1956: "I have spent my 
life in the study of military strength as a deterrent to war, and in the char­
acter of military armaments necessary to win a war. The study of the first 
of these questions is still profitable, but we are rapidly getting to the point 
that no war can be won. War implies a contest; when you get to the point 
that the contest is no longer involved and the outlook comes close to de­
struction of the enemy and suicide for ourselves—an outlook that nei­
ther side can ignore—then arguments as to the exact amount of available 
strength as compared to somebody else's are no longer the vital issues."165 
Of all the Gaither committee recommendations, the most palatable to 
Eisenhower was the proposal to reorganize the defense establishment. The 
Gaither committee was only one of many groups recommending change. 
Eisenhower was already well aware of the problems, and he made reorga­
nization one of his legislative priorities in 1958. He successfully persuaded 
Congress to make substantial changes in the defense establishment.166 
While many of the Gaither committee's recommendations received 
widespread support within the administration, its call for a nationwide 
system of shelters met stiff resistance. There was some support from the 
FCDA, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the State Department's 
Policy Planning Staff. However, most of Eisenhower's advisers opposed the 
recommendation because of the costs of shelters, the knowledge that in a 
nuclear exchange millions would die regardless of preventive measures, or 
the implications of a shelter program for U.S. allies. Cutler later recalled 
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the administration's reasons for rejecting the recommendation. He ex­
plained, "All of this about the need for shelter from fall-out overlooks the 
many factors which have puzzled the NSC and are still being researched. 
It is too one-sided. It overlooks foreign repercussion, effect on economy, 
human practicality, whether it shouldn't be done at local level, effect on 
national morale, etc. It argues all on one side."167 
The Gaither committee asked for an incredibly comprehensive secur­
ity system. It requested military capabilities that would have allowed the 
United States to launch a preventive war or an overwhelming retaliatory 
strike, and to wage limited wars with or without nuclear weapons. Al­
though Eisenhower wondered whether he could "carry out all of these 
plans and still maintain a free economy in the United States," he still care­
fully considered the committee's conclusions.168 While he did not accept 
all of them, he did find many of the recommendations necessary and incor­
porated them into his national security programs with a careful eye on lim­
iting their impact on the economy. 
The Legacy of the 
Gaither Committee 
Oy July 1958, the Eisenhower administration had 
thoroughly evaluated the Gaither committee's conclusions and recom­
mendations. In contrast to some interpretations, the committee's findings 
significantly influenced Eisenhower's national security policies.1 While the 
Gaither report itself faded from NSC discussions after 1958, the issues and 
questions it raised continued to dominate policy making. For the remain­
der of his presidency, Eisenhower struggled to guarantee U.S. capabilities 
to strike the Soviet Union and preserve the security of the United States, 
while at the same time not undermining the American way of life that he 
treasured. 
The influence of specific members of the Gaither committee on the Ei­
senhower administration continued to the end of his presidency. James Kil­
lian acted as Eisenhower's national science adviser until 1959. Herbert 
York served as the director of the Defense Department's Office of Research 
and Development. William Foster headed a delegation to Geneva in late 
1958 to discuss with Soviet representatives ways to reduce the possibility 
of a surprise attack.2 Many other committee members also continued to 
serve in a variety of capacities, including as advisers to the President's Sci­
ence Advisory Committee (PSAC) and the Defense Department. 
Although Eisenhower did not believe that the communist leaders in­
tended to launch an attack, the presence of these advisers, additional tech­
nological advances, Soviet bombast, and intelligence estimates indicating 
that the Soviet Union had a quantitative lead in nuclear missiles forced the 
president to reexamine his policies. While he never seriously questioned his 
strategy of deterrence, he did conclude that he needed to strengthen the 
U.S. military. By the time he left office, he had expanded his initial propos­
als for approximately 350 nuclear missiles to almost 1,400. Furthermore, 
157 
158 Chapter Six 
he continued to disperse SAC, improve alert status, construct antimissile 
defenses, and build early warning radar. 
Despite significantly expanding U.S. military programs in the three years 
after Sputnik and the Gaither committee, Eisenhower still faced almost 
constant criticism that his defense policies failed to provide adequate guar­
antees for the nation's security. More specifically, his policies were chal­
lenged in two areas: missile strength and limited war capabilities. Senators 
Stuart Symington, Lyndon Johnson, and John F. Kennedy led a chorus of 
opposition to Eisenhower's military programs. Symington claimed in early 
1958, "It is a tragic fact that, even after the warnings contained in the 
Sputnik launchings, and despite the previously known deficiencies in SAC, 
nothing has been done to rectify those deficiencies."3 The leak of the 
Gaither report played an instrumental role in furthering the perception 
that U.S. missile capabilities were inferior to those of the Soviet Union. 
One recent scholar aptly concludes that while the Gaither report did not 
create the missile gap or fears of a national emergency, it "was essential to 
their circulation beyond the intelligence community and, ultimately, out­
side the administration.''4 
Symington's accusations and the Gaither committee'sfindings were lent 
credence by the Soviet Union's claims of its technological superiority and 
more assertive policies in 1958. Khrushchev wanted the world to believe 
that the Soviet Union had surpassed the United States technologically. The 
Soviet leader and his military commanders regularly bragged about Soviet 
military prowess, especially in the area of rocketry.5 Their bellicose speeches 
and statements appeared to corroborate a more aggressive Soviet foreign 
policy. 1958 witnessed what the Eisenhower administration saw as com­
munist aggression in the Middle East, the Chinese offshore islands of Que­
moy and Matsu, and Berlin.6 Khrushchev's ultimatum in November 1958 
to settle the Berlin question only heightened concerns.7 Although each of 
these incidents was resolved relatively peacefully, they added to the percep­
tion that the United States was in a deadly struggle and needed to be pre­
pared for any possible Soviet actions. 
The debates over Eisenhower's national security policies became pivotal 
in the 1960 presidential campaign.8 Democratic candidate Kennedy and 
his running mate, Lyndon Johnson, argued that the Eisenhower admin­
istration failed to recognize the deficiencies in U.S. military capabilities 
because it was too concerned with balancing the budget and controlling 
inflation. While Kennedy and Johnson saw these policies as admirable 
goals, they believed that the danger posed by the Soviet Union was much 
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greater than Eisenhower and, more important at this time, Republican 
candidate Richard Nixon realized. Capitalizing on perceptions of the mis­
sile gap and deficiencies in the massive retaliation strategy, the Democratic 
nominee challenged whether the United States could survive the continua­
tion of Eisenhower's military policies with Nixon as president. Kennedy 
won the election in part because of his promises to strengthen U.S. war-
fighting capabilities. 
During the 1960 election campaign and then in his presidency, Ken­
nedy sought the advice of numerous Gaither committee members.9 He 
studied the committee's report early in his administration. Paul Nitze, in 
particular, served as Kennedy's primary adviser on defense and foreign 
policy issues and became the new president's assistant secretary of defense 
for international security affairs. Foster helped negotiate the 1963 ban on 
atmospheric nuclear tests. Killian continued to advise Kennedy on science 
and intelligence issues. Jerome Wiesner became Kennedy's national sci­
ence adviser. At least another eight Gaither committee members served the 
Kennedy administration in a variety of capacities. After his inauguration, 
Kennedy immediately began to alter the national security policies he in­
herited from Eisenhower. The new president expanded U.S. strategic mis­
sile capabilities, augmented limited war forces, and improved SAC's alert 
status. He also focused renewed attention on the question of civil defense. 
While it is impossible to tie the Gaither report directly to the policies intro­
duced by Kennedy, the similarities between the committee's recommen­
dations and the new administration's flexible response strategy are readily 
apparent. 
Eisenhower's National Security Policies, 1958-1961 
For the last two and a half years of his presidency, Eisenhower attempted 
to formulate national security policies that would continue his emphasis on 
balancing the country's economic and military needs. While he was also 
worried about Soviet military and technological advances, he questioned 
the willingness of the Kremlin to risk their own destruction by attacking 
the United States. He argued that "until an enemy has enough operational 
capability to destroy most of our bases simultaneously and thus prevent 
retaliation by us, our deterrent remains effective. We would make a mistake 
to credit him with absolute capabilities."10 Rather than seeking to out-
produce the Soviet Union or embarking on expensive and unproven pro­
grams to protect U.S. civilians, he pursued policies that he believed would 
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guarantee U.S. capabilities to retaliate even under the worst possible con­
ditions and would not hurt the economy.11 
During the first six months of 1958, Eisenhower instituted alert and 
dispersal programs, expanded early warning radar coverage, programmed 
anti-aircraft and antimissile defenses, and accelerated the development and 
deployment of several different missile systems. While the specific recom­
mendations do not reflect complete agreement with those of the Gaither 
committee, they do show its considerable influence. After the summer of 
1958, the Gaither report was rarely discussed within the Eisenhower ad­
ministration or mentioned in public debates. However, the report's obscu­
rity during this time does not signify its lack of importance in helping shape 
debates concerning U.S. national security programs. The changes in these 
programs during the first half of 1958 were only the first of many to occur 
before Eisenhower left office. 
While he often approved increases reluctantly, Eisenhower eventually 
accepted recommendations from his advisers to create a missile force sub­
stantially larger than the one proposed by the Gaither committee. Several 
factors influenced Eisenhower's decision making. Until the introduction of 
satellite intelligence at the end of 1960, estimates of Soviet missile capa­
bilities remained speculative and continued to emphasize the communists' 
quantitative superiority.12 The continued Soviet bombast precipitated pres­
sures on the administration to regain the technological and military advan­
tages over the Kremlin.13 Eisenhower also received recommendations from 
his military advisers for expanded missile programs that reflected their in­
ability to overcome interservice rivalries. While Eisenhower did not have to 
accept their recommendations, he faced great opposition if he did not. The 
rapid development of more reliable second-generation missiles, moreover, 
made their deployment more acceptable and important. 
In addition to expanding missile forces, Eisenhower also continued to 
disperse U.S. nuclear delivery systems, increase SAC alert capabilities, ex­
pand radar coverage, and construct active defenses. The president viewed 
these policies as essential to guarantee the capability of the United States 
to retaliate regardless of the circumstances. He agreed with Secretary of 
State Dulles, who asserted that "the United States should not attempt to 
be the greatest military in the world.... In the field of military capabilities 
enough was enough. If we didn't realize this fact, the time would come 
when all our national production would be centered on our military estab­
lishment." 14 By expanding U.S. missile capabilities and reducing their vul­
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nerability, Eisenhower felt confident that the Soviet Union would avoid 
taking any risks that might result in its own destruction. 
The Gaither committee proposed the expansion of five separate offen­
sive missile systems: Thor and Jupiter IRBMs, Atlas and Titan ICBMs, 
and the Polaris SLBM. By the end of FY 1963, it recommended the de­
ployment of 240 IRBMs, 600 ICBMs, and 6 Polaris submarines carrying 
16 SLBMs. In total, these forces would have consisted of almost 940 nu­
clear missiles.15 During his last three years in office, Eisenhower met and 
then surpassed these force levels. In August 1958, the Defense Depart­
ment studied the possibility of expanding the programmed ICBM force to 
200 missiles (110 Titan and 90 Atlas).16 In November 1959, the Defense 
Department proposed and Eisenhower approved a force of 270 ICBMs 
(140 Titans and 130 Atlas).17 By Kennedy's inauguration in January 1961, 
Eisenhower had programmed the deployment of 810 ICBMs (130 Atlas, 
140 Titan, and 540 Minuteman).18 
Eisenhower also supervised a similar expansion of the development of 
Polaris missile submarines. He saw the Polaris as a major hedge against the 
Soviet Union's launching of a surprise attack. By providing a virtually in­
vulnerable second-strike capability, the Polaris would force Soviet leaders 
to consider even more seriously the consequences of attacking the United 
States. In 1958, Eisenhower approved plans to construct 9 Polaris subma­
rines. A year later, he agreed to expand the force even further to 15.19 By 
July 1960, the president approved the construction of 24 Polaris submari-
nes.20 These 24 submarines added 384 SLBMs to the already planned 810­
ICBM force. 
In addition to the ICBM and Polaris forces, the Eisenhower administra­
tion implemented its plans to deploy both Thor and Jupiter IRBMs over­
seas. In April 1958, Eisenhower had agreed to a Defense Department 
recommendation to deploy 12 IRBM squadrons (9 Thor and 3 Jupiter) 
containing 15 missiles each. Ultimately, 4 Thor and 3 Jupiter squadrons 
became operational in Great Britain, Turkey, and Italy between 1959 and 
1962.21 The Eisenhower administration limited the deployment of IRBMs 
to 7 squadrons when it realized that reliable ICBMs would be available, 
which would make the IRBMs unnecessary and obsolete. However, while 
the IRBMs were plagued with shortcomings, they "demonstrated Amer-
ica's resolve to defend its allies and represented the only display of strategic 
missiles in Europe."22 
The ICBM and IRBM forces and the Polaris submarines represented 
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Jupiter C missile being launched at Cape Canaveral Missile Test Annex 
in August 1958. The Gaither committee recommended the deploy­
ment of IRBMs like this Jupiter missile in Europe. (National Archives) 
only two legs of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The third part of the nuclear triad 
remained the SAC bombers. The Gaither committee did not recommend 
substantial increases in bomber force levels, but it did emphasize the im­
portance of reducing SAC vulnerability. It proposed the implementation 
of alert forces, the further dispersal of bomber squadrons, the improve­
ment of early warning, and the construction of active defenses. Eisenhower 
and the NSC focused on each of these issues between 1958 and 1961. 
Additionally, Eisenhower adopted proposals to modernize the composi­
tion of the bomber and tanker forces. While he phased out the B-36 in 
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Polaris missile being tested at Cape Canaveral. The Polaris SLBM represented 
the third leg of the nuclear triad that the Gaither committee thought essential 
for maintaining U.S. security. (National Archives) 
1958 and began to reduce the importance of the B-47 in 1959, he in­
creased the deployment of B-52 bombers from 243 in 1957 to 567 in 
1961. Furthermore, he modernized the tanker force by introducing the 
KC-135.23 
Besides determining strategic force levels, the most pressing military 
question addressed by the Eisenhower administration between 1958 and 
1961 was to determine the optimal force requirements for fighting either 
164 Chapter Six 
Boeing B-52 bomber on a test flight over Florida. To ensure a strong nuclear striking 
force while the weaknesses in early generation missiles were eliminated, the Gaither com­
mittee recommended the modernization of the U.S. Air Force's bomber force through 
the introduction of the B-52. (National Archives) 
general or limited wars. As shown in earlier chapters, the distinction be­
tween limited and general wars had been a controversial topic for military 
strategists. Civilians like Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Robert Osgood, 
Paul Nitze, and William Kaufman insisted that the United States should 
develop greater military capabilities to wage limited wars. However, there 
was no consensus as to how these types of wars should be fought. Should 
nuclear weapons be used or should conventional forces be relied upon? 
How should political objectives be determined and conveyed to an enemy? 
How could the geographical areas of conflict be limited? Without provid­
ing specifics, the Gaither committee recommended that the United States 
perform a study to determine the best composition and role for its limited 
war forces. 
As a result of these recommendations, the NSC created a task force in 
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the spring of 1958 composed of representatives of the State Department, 
Defense Department, JCS, and CIA to study U.S. capabilities to wage lim­
ited wars through July 1961. The task force concluded that "United States 
capabilities for limited military operations are adequate to undertake and 
carry out limited operations."24 However, this opinion was not unanimous 
within the administration. Another study completed in September 1958 
by the Defense Department's Defense Science Board found otherwise: 
"The limited-war capability of the United States is inadequate from the 
viewpoint both of military operations and of research and development."25 
Furthermore, the study argued that the "present capability [of the United 
States] is limited in strength and cannot be exercised quickly or effec-
tively."26 This type of criticism reappeared on several occasions during the 
remainder of the Eisenhower administration. 
In 1960, two separate committees, a PSAC panel and an interagency 
study group, examined U.S. limited war capabilities. The panel found what 
it believed to be several serious deficiencies. It concluded, in particular, that 
the military branches focused so much attention on maintaining forces for 
general war that they neglected "the specialized weapons and systems for 
limited war."27 To remedy these deficiencies, the panel recommended aug­
menting U.S. airlift capabilities, developing ground support aircraft for 
limited war, and placing more emphasis on the development of nonnuclear 
28 weapons.
The interagency study group, composed of representatives from the 
CIA, State Department, and the Department of Defense, performed a 
study similar to the one instigated by the Gaither committee recommen­
dations in 1958. The impetus for this examination was the belief among 
some members of the Eisenhower administration that the 1958 study 
failed to resolve the role of nuclear weapons in limited war.29 The group's 
final report remains classified, but discussions concerning its conclusions 
provide a revealing look at the disagreements over limited military opera-
tions.30 The study group examined five possible locations of limited war 
confrontations: Berlin, Iran, Laos, Korea, and the Chinese offshore islands 
of Quemoy and Matsu.31 It concluded that the United States had "an ade­
quate capability for any one of the situations studied but cannot handle 
two at once."32 More specifically, it stressed: 
U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our Allies are generally ade­
quate to conduct any one of the limited military operations studied but these 
capabilities are dependent on prompt action, as required in each case, to 
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a. Initiate partial mobilization. 
b. Augment existing military [air]lift capabilities. 
c. Expand the war production base. 
d. Waivefinanciallimitations.33 
The State Department found that U.S. capabilities in these fields were 
insufficient. State Department representative Gerard Smith told Secretary 
of State Christian Herter, "Although the language of the present study's 
conclusions is carefully hedged, its import seems to me inescapable. The 
US does not have now an adequate limited war capability."34 Undersecre­
tary of State Livingston Merchant emphasized, "There is unanimity in the 
State Department about the need for a greater limited war capability" (5), 
explaining further that "the State Department. . . believes it is difficult to 
have an effective and successful foreign policy if the US lacks the capability 
of dealing with at least two limited war situations concurrently without an 
unacceptable degradation of our general war capability" (6). 
U.S. military leaders also analyzed the interagency group's report. Their 
overriding conclusion was "that our limited war capability is basically de­
pendent on our general war capability and our determination to risk gen­
eral war."35 One of the key questions they could not answer was whether 
nuclear weapons would be used in limited war situations. JCS Chairman 
Twining explained that "we must assume that when we get in a shooting 
war we will have to have a supplemental budget and step up our airlift. . .  . 
On the use of atomic weapons we cannot prejudge" (2). Army Chief 
of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer concurred. He argued that it is not "possible 
to decide in advance whether to use nuclear weapons. . . . Therefore, it 
is necessary to have a proper balance between nuclear and conventional 
forces so we won't get musclebound" (4). Overall, the JCS stressed that 
"the United States does not have forces in being adequate to cope with all 
envisaged limited war situations."36 
Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Arleigh Burke and Air Force Chief of Staff 
General Thomas White raised the issues of U.S. prestige and will. Burke 
argued, "The US will is important. The Soviets will push us at every op­
portunity and we need to have the will to resist." He then provided as an 
example the crisis in Berlin, explaining that "in the Berlin situation it is 
easy to consider letting Berlin go rather than fight a general war. How­
ever, we need to stand up to the enemy if we want to keep the free world 
on our side. We must keep Berlin or lose our prestige and respect. If general 
war is necessary, we might as well have it now and take the risk of losing 
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our nation."37 White expressed his complete agreement. "We need," he 
stressed, "national determination in a situation where general war must be 
risked. We should use whatever weapons are necessary" (4). 
Questions concerning U.S. capabilities to wage limited wars were also 
raised by Nitze and General Maxwell Taylor, who retired as the Army's 
chief of staffin 1959. Taylor believed that Eisenhower's reliance on massive 
retaliation significantly limited U.S. capabilities to respond to military cri­
ses short of general war. He argued that "Massive Retaliation as a guiding 
strategic concept has reached a dead end and that there is an urgent need 
for a reappraisal of our strategic needs. In its heyday, massive retaliation 
could offer our leaders only two choices, the initiation of general nuclear 
war or compromise and retreat."38 Taylor claimed that the United States 
needed to expand the capabilities of its conventional forces to wage limited 
wars in order to insure that it would not have to respond to every military 
crisis with nuclear weapons.39 
Nitze was the most vocal proponent on the Gaither committee for ex­
panding limited war capabilities. In June 1959, he argued that as pro­
grammed by the Eisenhower administration, U.S. military forces were 
inadequate to meet the range of threats posed by the U.S.S.R. He ex­
plained, "If one grades the various threats which Soviet-Communist initia­
tive can present to the free world in order of the violence of the means 
involved, one finds a wide band starting with reasonably mild but disturb­
ing words at one end of the spectrum and an all-out surprise nuclear attack 
on the United States at the other end of the spectrum."40 He believed that 
the United States needed to be prepared for all contingencies. The United 
States should possess a secure retaliatory capability, expanded limited war 
capabilities, and strong security alliances.41 
Eisenhower saw several basicflaws in the arguments of the critics of his 
limited war policies.42 He believed that they underestimated the deterrent 
factor of U.S. strategic capabilities and the convertibility of these forces for 
limited war operations. He questioned whether any limited war between 
U.S. and Soviet forces would remain that way for very long since he be­
lieved that any engagements would quickly escalate into a general war. He 
further argued that any other limited conflicts could be controlled with 
existing forces in being at least until the United States had time to mobilize 
additional manpower and armaments.43 Accordingly, during his last few 
years in office, he did not waver from his reliance on nuclear weapons and 
strategic delivery systems as the principal deterrent to the Soviet Union.44 
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The last major issue that the Gaither committee addressed and the Ei­
senhower administration had to discuss was the question of civil defense, 
and in particular, fallout shelters. The Gaither committee recommended 
that the United States should spend $25 billion overfive years to construct 
fallout shelters for the civilian population. No one seriously questioned 
that a system of fallout shelters would reduce substantially the number of 
casualties from a Soviet nuclear attack. As the NSC studied the Gaither 
committee's recommendation for shelters, it ordered an examination of 
the consequences of a massive nuclear exchange (approximately 15 million 
kilotons). The study concluded that in an attack of this magnitude, only 
94 million out of the estimated U.S. population of 192 million would sur­
vive even with a nationwide fallout shelter system.45 While the study found 
that 67 million people would have lived because of the shelters, the ques­
tion was whether the loss of almost 100 million people would allow the 
continued existence of the United States as a nation. 
Eisenhower and his advisers continually struggled with this question. 
The cost of the shelters created a dilemma. When FCDA director Leo 
Hoegh recommended modifying existing federal buildings for use as shel­
ters at a cost of $5 million in FY 1960, Eisenhower did not oppose the 
idea. He simply did not feel "he knew exactly what to do about it."46 In 
December 1958, the NSC decided to authorize up to $35 million to con­
tinue research, construct a small number of shelters, survey potential exist­
ing structures for shelter spaces, initiate a public education program, and 
incorporate shelters in new federal buildings.47 
By the end of his administration, Eisenhower's civil defense programs 
revealed little influence from the Gaither committee. Based on the 1958 
program, the FCDA studied possible existing shelter facilities and built al­
most 150 prototype shelters. However, it did not incorporate shelters into 
new federal buildings as was earlier planned, because of inadequate fund­
ing. A lack of consensus concerning shelters hamstrung the FCDA and the 
new Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM).48 While certain 
groups, like the Gaither committee and the Rockefeller Panel, and indi­
viduals, like Congressman Chet Holifield, recommended the construction 
of shelters, neither the public nor Congress showed a strong willingness 
to support expanded expenditures for shelters. Although people supported 
the idea of a community shelter, only 39 percent supported spending $500 
to build a private, family shelter in I960.49 Even more glaringly, Congress 
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Proposed fallout shelter outside Kansas City, Missouri. The Gaither committee pro­
posed using existing industrial spaces like these limestone caves as fallout shelters in the 
event of a nuclear attack. (National Archives) 
cut the OCDM budget 40 percent between 1959 and 1961.50 Without a 
consensus on shelters, Eisenhower felt no concerted pressure to expand his 
civil defense policies. 
The Missile Gap and the 1960 Presidential Election 
As Eisenhower and his advisers attempted to devise plans for strengthening 
U.S. strategic forces, they faced some of the same problems experienced by 
the Gaither committee. They wanted to maintain sufficient military capa­
bilities to deter the Soviet Union from launching a nuclear war. To do this, 
they needed to know approximately how large the Soviet bomber and mis­
sile forces were and what the Kremlin's intentions were. Intelligence ana­
lysts from the CIA, military branches, and other government agencies had 
to rely on limited information to derive their estimates of Soviet capabili-
ties.51 A leading scholar of the missile gap controversy persuasively argues 
that after Sputnik "the question of Soviet intent assumed an even greater 
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Storage survival supplies for a 258-person fallout shelter in Baltimore, Maryland. Part of 
the Gaither committee's plans for the survival of the United States was to stockpile sup­
plies for use in the case of a nuclear war. (National Archives) 
importance in any effort to determine the future course of Russian missile 
programs and the Soviet's willingness to use this power to pursue their 
foreign policy goals."52 
Claims of a missile gap periodically resurfaced between 1958 and the 
1960 presidential election.53 Senator Symington wrote Eisenhower in the 
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summer of 1958 that "we [Symington and his advisers] believe our na­
tional intelligence system is underestimating the enemy's current and fu­
ture ballistic missile capability. . .  . As a result we also believe that our 
national defense plans and programs are not being effectively related to 
sound estimates of Soviet capability."54 Others criticized the administra­
tion for failing to recognize and overcome the emergence of the alleged 
Soviet quantitative lead in missile capabilities. If the Soviet Union did have 
such a lead, Eisenhower's critics argued that the communist leaders might 
be more willing to take policy risks in pursuit of its goal of world domina­
tion. Senator Lyndon Johnson's chief legal counsel captured the essence of 
the critics' concerns when he argued that "we [U.S. leaders] have been 
unwilling to face the disagreeable facts that we are actually in a state of war, 
that the enemy has prepared for war and that unless we work 365 days a 
year with an urgency, as though we were in a war, we are liable to be licked 
and become a second-class country."55 
Although the critics were wrong, there were legitimate reasons for con­
cluding that there was a missile gap. The national intelligence estimates 
during these years consistently predicted a prospective Soviet missile force 
much larger than the one possessed by the United States. While the pro­
jected gap was always in the future, the estimates pointed to a period in the 
early 1960s when the Soviet Union would have a substantial quantitative 
lead in ICBMs. A NIE in June 1958 estimated that the Soviet Union could 
have 100 ICBMs in 1959, 500 in 1960, and 1,000 in 1961.56 A NIE later 
in the same year predicted that the Soviet Union would have 10 ICBMs 
in 1959, 100 in 1960, and 500 by 1962.57 NIE 11-8-59, which was not 
released until February 1960, estimated that the Soviets would have 35 
ICBMs by mid-1960 and between 140 and 200 by mid-1961.58 Finally, 
NIE 11-8-60 estimated that the Soviet Union would have between 10 and 
35 ICBMs in 1960 and between 50 and 200 in 1961.59 
The problem for intelligence analysts was determining the intentions of 
an adversary who resided in a restricted society and whose assumed goal 
was world domination. As Herbert York and Alan Greb explain, "In such 
circumstances [where the enemy resides in a closed society], it often be­
comes necessary to plan to cope with what the other side might be doing 
rather than what it actually is doing. And what it might be doing is limited 
only by human imagination rather than by physical reality" [emphasis in 
original].60 When the Gaither committee made its estimates, it assumed 
that the Soviet Union would produce military hardware at maximum 
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levels. Based on this assumption, it reached some frightening conclusions. 
The intelligence community had to deal with some of the same problems. 
In 1959, Defense Secretary Neil McElroy attempted to explain to a con­
gressional committee one of the difficulties in making accurate intelligence 
estimates. He testified, "We concede the capacity of the Soviets to do a 
good many things, if they make the determination to do so. . .  . We do 
concede them capacity, but no one that I know can be inside of the Rus­
sian mind and decide what proportion of that capacity they are going to 
use."6 1 Because of the difficulty in determining Soviet intentions, the in­
telligence analysts adopted "the position that they were not very much 
interested in intentions, they were only interested in capabilities."62 JCS 
Chairman General Nathan Twining elaborated on the difficulties of esti­
mating Soviet capabilities, telling the Senate Foreign Relations Commit­
tee, "I would like to establish a point which should be borne in mind at all 
times when considering the United States versus the Soviet weapons com­
parison: Our information on what we now have is exact, while that given 
for the Soviets is often estimated from assumptions and requirements. . . . 
In other words, because we can do things, we assume they can and they 
have requirements, therefore, they are developing these missiles."63 
With little concrete evidence, intelligence analysts had difficulty devel­
oping conclusive estimates. Their efforts were made even more difficult 
by Soviet propaganda highlighting that country's missile strength. Soviet 
leaders bragged in May 1959 that they possessed the nuclear capabilities 
"to wipe from the face of the earth all of our probable opponents."64 The 
result was an overestimation of Soviet capabilities and, accordingly, a 
potentially much greater threat to the United States.65 George Reedy, a 
legislative assistant to Senator Johnson, explained how these exaggerated 
estimates led to the belief of a missile gap: 
We [the members of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee] didn't realize a 
very simple thing, that what they [the intelligence analysts] were doing was 
extrapolating on the basis of Russian capabilities, but using actualfigures for 
what the United States was doing. Now their assumption was that the Soviet 
Union was producing missiles to capacity, and so when they extrapolated on 
that from the standpoint of what they knew the Soviet Union produced at 
one point, they were able to get such a tremendous imbalance between the 
Soviet Union and the United States.66 
The press also made substantial claims about the supposed missile gap. 
Joseph Alsop reported in July and August 1958 that the United States was 
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falling dangerously behind the Soviets in missile capabilities. He argued 
that while the U.S.S.R. would have 100 ICBMs in 1959,500 in I960, and 
1,000 in 1961, the United States would have 0 in 1959, 30 in 1960, and 
70 in 1961.67 Taken together, all of these calculations painted a frightening 
picture. Although they were only estimates, if they proved accurate the 
United States faced a potentially deadly threat. Robert Amory, a CIA ana­
lyst, remembered, "Taking our earliest estimate of when they [the Sovi­
ets] could have five hundred [ICBMs] and then comparing that with the 
known projection of American strengths,. . . you came up with & potential 
missile gap" (emphasis in original).68 
The 1960 presidential election brought into focus many of the criti­
cisms of Eisenhower's national security policies. Democratic candidate 
Kennedy and his running mate, Senator Johnson, were among the most 
vociferous critics of the Eisenhower administration. As the Senate majority 
leader and the chairman of the preparedness subcommittee, Johnson main­
tained constant pressure on the administration to improve U.S. military 
strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. He told Defense Secretary McElroy in 
July 1958 that he was disappointed in the progress made since the prepar­
edness subcommittee reached its initial conclusions at the beginning of 
that year.69 
Kennedy was an even more persistent critic. In August 1958, he de­
livered a scathing attack on Eisenhower's national security policies. He 
claimed the president and his advisers "tailored our strategy and military 
requirements to fit our budget—instead of fitting our budget to our mili­
tary requirements and strategy."70 He then accused the administration of 
losing the military advantage to the Soviet Union. "The fact of the mat­
ter," Kennedy argued, "is that during that period when emphasis was laid 
upon our economic strength instead of our military strength, we were los­
ing the decisive years when we could have maintained a lead against the 
Soviet Union in our missile capability" (41). 
After lambasting Eisenhower's national security policies, Kennedy de­
scribed what the United States needed to do to overcome its military 
deficiencies. He advocated adding more tanker aircraft to SAC's forces; 
accelerating the development and deployment of ICBMs, IRBMs, and 
SLBMs; improving continental defenses; expanding airlift capabilities; and 
increasing manpower for limited military operations (42). He complained 
that if these measures were not implemented, the Soviet "missile power 
will be the shield from behind which they will slowly, but surely, advance— 
through Sputnik diplomacy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect non-overt 
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aggression, intimidation, and subversion, internal revolution, increased 
prestige or influence, and the vicious blackmail of our allies. The periphery 
of the Free World will slowly be nibbled away. The balance of power will 
gradually shift against us."71 
In a subsequent interview, Kennedy made similar claims: 
In military preparedness I think that the reasoning of the Eisenhower ad­
ministration is comparable to the prediction of Britains [sic] Stanley Bald­
win during the Thirties—the enemy's capabilities are grossly and constantly 
underestimated. There isn't any doubt that the Russians are able to build 
accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles. I believe that the dangers of an 
unbalanced budget are far less than the danger to which the administration is 
determined to subject us by keeping us behind the Soviet Union in the ulti­
mate weapon. When some people still say we are equall [sic] with the Russians 
in military strength, I would ask how much of our strength will be left after 
we have sustained a surprise blow; How equal are we after thefirst attack had 
been made by them on us?72 
As Kennedy sought the Democratic nomination, he turned to Paul Nitze 
and several other Gaither committee members for advice on national se­
curity issues.73 Kennedy asked Nitze to chair a committee that included 
former Gaither committee member James Perkins, Roswell Gilpatric, and 
David Bruce to make recommendations concerning U.S. national security 
policies. During its deliberations, the group talked to many experts on de­
fense issues, including Foster, Lincoln, and Robert Lovett from the Gaither 
committee. The group concluded that U.S. nuclear forces had to be ex­
panded and improved to meet any possible Soviet challenge.74 
These conclusions proved appealing to the new president. In his run for 
the presidency, he advocated increased defense spending and the accelera­
tion of U.S. missile capabilities. Specifically, he proposed reducing SAC 
vulnerability by maintaining 25 percent of its planes in the air at all times, 
accelerating the production of Atlas missiles, increasing spending for the 
development of both the Polaris and Minuteman missiles, and augmenting 
conventional forces.75 Kennedy recognized that these programs would re­
quire higher spending and possibly unbalanced budgets. He explained to 
his Senate colleagues the dilemma faced by U.S. decision makers and made 
a clear distinction between his position and that of the Eisenhower admin­
istration. He argued, "We cannot be certain that the Soviets will have, dur­
ing the term of the next administration, the tremendous lead in missile 
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striking power which they give every evidence of building—and we cannot 
be certain that they will use that lead to threaten or launch an attack upon 
the United States. Consequently those of us who call for a higher defense 
budget are taking a chance on spending money unnecessarily. But those 
who oppose these expenditures are taking a chance on our very survival as 
a nation."76 
In a campaign speech in October 1960, Kennedy cited the Gaither 
report in his arguments that Eisenhower was not doing enough to meet 
the Soviet threat. He claimed that during the Eisenhower administration, 
"The Soviet Union decided to go all out in missile development. But here 
in the United States, we cut back in funds for missile development. We 
slashed our defense budget. We slowed up the modernization of our con­
ventional forces—until, today, the Soviet Union is rapidly building up a 
missile striking force that endangers our power to retaliate—and thus our 
survival itself."77 
Eisenhower reacted in dismay to such criticisms. He adamantly believed 
in the adequacy of U.S. military programs. He simply considered it foolish 
to expand U.S. military power further when there was little likelihood that 
it would ever be needed. Despite intense pressure, he successfully resisted 
demands for significant increases in military spending. He failed, however, 
to allay the nation's great concerns.78 McGeorge Bundy succinctly explains 
this failure: 
Eisenhower did not adequately explain himself. His failure to give a full ex­
planation of his disbelief in a prospective missile gap was reinforced in its 
unfortunate effects not only by his failure to spell out publicly his view of the 
deterrent strength of the forces on both sides, but also by his failure to press 
on his countrymen the understanding he had expressed so clearly back in 
1954, that in matters of this magnitude Soviet leaders would predictably be 
most cautious. So while he did sensible things and resisted foolish ones, he 
allowed the ensuing public arguments to be led by men who did not under­
stand matters as well as he did.79 
The 1960 election proved a great disappointment to Eisenhower. Al­
though he was not completely enamored of Nixon, he was adamantly 
opposed to Kennedy. When Nixon's chances looked dim in the month 
leading to the election, Eisenhower began to campaign vigorously for his 
vice president. His efforts proved to no avail. While still personally popular, 
Eisenhower could not rally the Republican party to victory. In one of the 
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closest presidential races ever, Kennedy won by less than 120,000 votes of 
the 68 million that were cast.80 Eisenhower viewed the results as a repudia­
tion of his eight years in office.81 
Kennedy's Defense Policies—An Overview 
After winning the election, Kennedy resolved to alleviate any deficiencies 
in U.S. military strength and raise U.S. prestige abroad. Jean Smith con­
cludes, "On military policy Kennedy's views remained fixed: the United 
States should maintain forces in being to deter and defeat aggression at any 
point on the spectrum of violence."82 To carry out such a policy, Kennedy 
rejected the massive retaliation doctrine of the Eisenhower administration 
and adopted a strategic approach that emphasized the maintenance of a 
greater variety of military options to meet any possible challenge. While 
many factors influenced the development of these policies, the importance 
of the Gaither committee should not be overlooked. Over a dozen of the 
committee's members served as advisers to Kennedy, including Wiesner, 
Nitze, York, Foster, Killian, Robert Sprague, Spurgeon Keeny, Vincent 
McRae, Brockway McMillan, Richard Bissell, and John McCloy.83 Further­
more, during his first weeks in office, Kennedy studied the Gaither report.84 
Kennedy's strategy to expand U.S. military capabilities encompassed 
three requirements: augmenting U.S. nuclear forces, enlarging U.S. con­
ventional forces for limited military operations, and strengthening civil 
defense.85 Kennedy succeeded in expanding U.S. missile capabilities even 
beyond the levels prescribed by the Eisenhower administration. He placed 
a greater emphasis on limited war capabilities, and especially, the develop­
ment of counter-insurgency forces. Finally, he announced a civil defense 
plan that, although not varying greatly from Eisenhower's approach, had a 
much greater impact because of the president's public pronouncements. 
Despite his initial reluctance in 1957 and 1958, Eisenhower greatly ex­
panded U.S. nuclear capabilities before he left office. Kennedy inherited 
the nuclear triad—SAC bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs—that formed the 
foundation of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Reflecting the advice of Nitze's ad­
visory committee, Kennedy believed that the United States needed more. In 
his first message to the Congress in January 1961, the new president pro­
posed the expansion of the entire missile program. By the time he was as­
sassinated in November 1963, the United States had deployed 631 ICBMs 
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and 160 SLBMs and had programmed the deployment of an additional 
800 missiles.86 
When Kennedy entered the White House, he had access to a new source 
of intelligence that had only become available in the last few months of the 
Eisenhower administration. In August I960, Eisenhower received the first 
satellite photographs, which "in one mission provided more photographic 
coverage of the Soviet Union than all previous U-2 missions."87 Although 
it is unclear whether Kennedy was informed of the new intelligence during 
the campaign, he did gain access to the intelligence information after the 
November election.88 The satellite photographs dispelled any possibility of 
a missile gap in favor of the Soviet Union.89 Despite this knowledge, Ken­
nedy remained determined to expand U.S. missile capabilities. He imme­
diately initiated plans to increase Eisenhower's proposed FY 1962 defense 
budget of $40.8 billion. During his first nine months in office, Kennedy 
added an additional $1.95 billion to the defense budget in March, $225 
million in May, and $3.45 billion in July. By August 1961, Kennedy had 
expanded the defense budget by nearly $6 billion.90 
The March 1961 appropriations were geared primarily to accelerate the 
expansion of U.S. strategic forces. In particular, Kennedy wanted to aug­
ment the Polaris submarine forces. While Eisenhower had planned to build 
19 submarines carrying a total of 304 missiles by June 1965, Kennedy's 
program accelerated the deployment to 29 submarines carrying 464 mis­
siles. In addition to expanding the Polaris forces, Kennedy also added 
60 Minuteman ICBMs to Eisenhower's program of 540.91 In the FY 1963 
budget, Kennedy completed the deployment of the Atlas ICBMs (129 mis­
siles) and Titan ICBMs (108 missiles) and funded 16 squadrons of Min­
uteman ICBMs totaling 800 missiles. Kennedy also again augmented the 
planned deployment of Polaris submarines to 41 carrying 656 missiles. Fi­
nally, he increased the B-52 bomber force to 600 aircraft.92 
As part of the policy offlexible response, Kennedy advocated the growth 
of U.S. conventional military capabilities. As early as 1957, he had argued 
that the United States needed to adopt a military strategy that maintained 
large nuclear forces and sufficient conventional forces to meet any possible 
challenge.93 The new president had been influenced by the thinking of 
General Maxwell Taylor, General James Gavin, and Nitze, who argued that 
the United States needed to expand its military options to meet the variety 
of military threats posed by the Soviet Union. In particular, Taylor and 
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Nitze saw the need for expanded conventional forces to wage limited wars. 
Herbert York, who served in both the Eisenhower and Kennedy adminis­
trations, remembered the change in emphasis in defense policies: "There 
was a definite change in attitude between the Eisenhower administration 
and the Kennedy administration. . .  . I never got anywhere trying to sell 
much in the way of limited war ideas to Tom Gates [Eisenhower's last 
Secretary of Defense], or persuading him that it needed more, whereas 
[Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara started off with the 
assumption, that more needs to be done in that area."94 
Kennedy and his advisers believed that "a posture offlexible response 
was deemd [sic] to be more credible in support of American security inter­
ests and foreign policy objectives, because a clearer and closer correspon­
dence could be struck between the military force that was to be applied by 
the President and the political stakes and the scope of the military conflict 
at issue between the United States and an enemy power."95 In the March 
additions to the FY 1962 defense budget, $850 million was directed to 
improve U.S. limited war capabilities. Reflecting a general agreement with 
the limited war studies completed in 1960, most of the funding went to 
the expansion of air and sea lift forces and the procurement of conventional 
weapons. In May, Kennedy added $237 million to the defense budget to 
enhance U.S. limited war capabilities. The final $3.2 billion increase in 
July for FY 1962 facilitated increases in both conventional and nuclear ca­
pabilities. By the end of July 1961, Kennedy had proposed and Congress 
accepted the expansion of U.S. military personnel from the 2,493,000 
requested by Eisenhower to 2,743,000. Over half the increase went to 
the army.96 
Kennedy did not announce a position on civil defense during the presi­
dential campaign. However, during his first year in office he gave more 
public attention to it than any other previous president. Kennedy stated in 
May 1961 that shelters should be viewed "as insurance for the civilian 
population in the event of such a miscalculation [a Soviet attack]. It is in­
surance we trust will never be needed—but insurance which we could 
never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe." He then 
added that "there is no point in delaying the initiation of a nationwide 
long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and 
providing shelter in new and existing structures. Such a program would 
protect millions of people against the hazards of radioactive fallout in the 
event of a large-scale nuclear attack."97 
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In the midst of the renewed Berlin crisis two months later, Kennedy told 
a TV audience: 
In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a 
nuclear blast and fire can still be saved if they can be warned to take shelter 
and if that shelter is available. We owe that kind of insurance to our families, 
and to our country. 
In contrast to our friends in Europe, the need for this type of protection 
is new to our shores. But the time to start is now. In the coming months, I 
hope to let every citizen know what steps he can take without delay to protect 
his family in case of attack. I know you would not want to do less.98 
Secretary of Defense McNamara presented Kennedy's civil defense plans to 
the Senate Appropriations Committee the next day. As the first phase of 
a plan to find shelter spaces for over 100 million people, McNamara re­
quested $207.6 million to identify existing shelter spaces and to stock 
them with necessary emergency supplies. With the Berlin crisis acting as 
an impetus, Congress approved the entire amount." When compared to 
the Eisenhower programs, there was not much difference. However, Ken-
nedy's public announcements raised a national hysteria.100 
Kennedy's proposals to build community shelters met much less success 
with Congress. Billed as the Shelter Incentive Program, Kennedy proposed 
giving $25 per shelter space to nonprofit facilities such as hospitals, librar­
ies, and schools that built shelters. For FY 1963, the newly formed Office 
of Civil Defense (OCD) requested $695 million for this shelter program, 
but Congress only granted $113 million. For FY 1964, the OCD re­
quested $346.9 million and received $11.6 million.101 Congress' response 
to Kennedy's proposals reflected its general unwillingness to support major 
expenses for the construction of new shelters.102 
Conclusions 
Eisenhower reacted cautiously to the Gaither report and attempted to limit 
its influence on his national security policies. He approved those recom­
mendations that he believed would strengthen the United States but re­
sisted those proposals that he thought would undermine U.S. economic 
security. As a result of his caution, he constantly resisted calls for significant 
increases in defense spending; therefore, while he did expand U.S. nuclear 
capabilities and improve U.S. defenses, he refused to adopt a nationwide 
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shelter program because he did not believe it would insure the continued 
viability of the United States after a nuclear war. In his mind, the cost of 
shelters simply would not reap many benefits. He also rejected demands to 
increase U.S. limited war capabilities because he believed that the United 
States already possessed the military forces to meet any likely conflicts of 
this type. 
Eisenhower justified his military policies on two primary grounds. He 
continually argued that the Soviet Union would not risk a nuclear war in 
pursuit of its policy goals. Additionally, he stressed that there was little pos­
sibility of a limited war with the Soviet Union because such a conflict 
would quickly escalate into a nuclear war. He emphasized to the NSC in 
1960 that "the only hostilities the U.S. was really concerned about was an 
all-out atomic attack."103 Eisenhower did not mean to imply that limited 
wars might not occur, but he believed such conflicts would be waged be­
tween U.S. and non-Soviet forces. In these types of engagements Eisen­
hower was confident that U.S. forces in being were more than adequate.104 
Although Eisenhower felt strongly that his policies would guarantee 
U.S. security, many people shared the Gaither committee's view that the 
United States needed to spend more on defense. Stimulated by Sputnik, 
the leak of the Gaither report, and Khrushchev's extraordinary claims, crit­
ics of the Republican administration claimed that Eisenhower was allowing 
the Soviet Union to obtain a lead over the United States in ballistic missile 
capabilities. These assertions of a missile gap dogged Eisenhower until he 
left office. In retrospect, it is clear that Eisenhower held a more nuanced 
view of the Cold War in the late 1950s than his critics. In actuality, there 
was little Eisenhower could have done to dispel his critics' claims. Almost 
all of the available evidence, both within the government and circulating in 
the public, pointed to a Soviet lead in missile development and deploy­
ments. The U-2 photographs, which helped confirm for Eisenhower the 
myth of the missile gap, would have provided little help in convincing a 
skeptical public, since they provided only limited coverage of the Soviet 
Union and could not refute the existence of extensive Soviet capabilities. 
What Eisenhower failed to do was to clearly articulate the deterrent value 
of existing U.S. military forces.105 He realized what the public never un­
derstood. The United States possessed sufficient capabilities to absorb a 
Soviet attack and still launch a devastating counterstrike. Unfortunately 
for Eisenhower, he was never able to persuade the American public that 
the Soviet Union would have faced sure destruction if it had attacked the 
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United States. This failure allowed the Democrats to capitalize on the mis­
sile gap issue and regain the White House in 1960. 
During his campaign and presidency, Kennedy asked many former mem­
bers of the Gaither committee to serve in important advisory roles. The 
new president shared many of the committee's views and attempted to in­
clude them in his policies. In particular, he turned to Paul Nitze for advice 
on defense and foreign policy issues. After his election, Nitze continued to 
advise the president, along with Wiesner, Killian, Foster, and others from 
the Gaither committee. Not surprisingly then, by the end of 1963, most of 
the committee's recommendations, with the significant exception of fall­
out shelters, had become part of U.S. policy. 
Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy "believed that the economy could benefit 
from government spending, and he was therefore less concerned about al­
lowing the military budget to rise during his presidency."106 He expanded 
U.S. nuclear forces even more, increased U.S. capabilities to wage lim­
ited wars, and recommended an enlarged civil defense program. In imple­
menting these changes, he increased expenditures for the military services 
from $41.3 billion in 1960 to $47.9 billion in 1963 and added approxi­
mately 225,000 military personnel to Eisenhower's recommendations.107 
At a news conference in 1963, Kennedy boasted, "The fact of the matter 
is, when we came into office we had 11 combat ready divisions; we now 
have 16. We increased the scheduling of Polaris, nearly double per year. 
We've increased the number of planes on 15 minute alert from 33 percent 
of our strategic air force to 50 percent. In a whole variety of ways . .  . we've 
strengthened ourselves in defense and space."108 

Conclusion 
Beginning in 1957, Eisenhower faced tremen­
dous pressures to reexamine U.S. national security policies. Through his 
first term, he had attempted to moderate the defense policies of the Tru­
man administration and achieve a balanced budget. He was successful. 
However, with significant scientific and technological advances in nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems, the president's New Look policies came un­
der increasing attack. One of the most important criticisms raised in 1956 
and 1957 was whether the United States was doing enough to protect its 
civilian population. To answer this question, Eisenhower asked a panel of 
experts to examine U.S. active and passive defenses. The Gaither commit­
tee, as the panel became known, concluded that there were significant de­
ficiencies in U.S. national security policies that could be rectified only by 
increased defense spending and expanded civil defense programs. 
This study illuminates Eisenhower's decision-making process concern­
ing national security issues. Until recently, records related to the Gaither 
committee remained hidden from the scholar's view. Although the Gai­
ther report itself was declassified in the 1970s, most of the documents re­
lated to its development and dissemination continued to be restricted until 
the 1990s. The recent release of many of these records has allowed a clearer 
understanding of the significance of the committee's conclusions and, at 
the same time, provided another avenue to evaluate Eisenhower as a deci­
sion maker. 
This study has drawn heavily from the depositories at the Eisenhower 
Library, the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Massachu­
setts Institute of Technology, the George C. Marshall Foundation, and 
the United States Military Academy. By piecing together widely scattered 
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documents, this study reveals that the Gaither committee was of vital im­
portance in creating the impression of a missile gap and pressuring Eisen­
hower to change his national security policies. Furthermore, it underlines 
the difficulties Eisenhower experienced in trying to assess and implement 
the committee's recommendations. The president attempted to maintain a 
balance between the needs of national security and what the nation could 
afford.1 Eisenhower feared that if he disrupted the economy through ex­
cessive spending on defense programs, the government would have to be­
come more directly involved in everyday life. In his mind, such involvement 
would undermine the individual rights that he viewed as the basis of the 
American system of government and way of life. 
When Eisenhower created the Gaither committee, he used an advisory 
system that had worked well previously. He entered the presidency believ­
ing that one of the central ingredients to decision making was to obtain 
advice that had been thoroughly discussed and analyzed by his key advis­
ers. He viewed the NSC as the organization that could evaluate issues re­
lated to national security most effectively. During hisfirst months in office, 
Eisenhower quickly approved the reorganization of the NSC to solidify its 
position in his decision-making system. For the remainder of his adminis­
tration, the NSC served in this unprecedented role as one of the president's 
most important advisory organizations.2 
In addition to revamping the NSC, Eisenhower turned to consultants 
outside the government for policy advice. The new president had realized 
during World War II that science and technology were evolving so quickly 
that no one person or group could understand all of the changes. The ad­
vances in nuclear weaponry and delivery systems in the late 1940s and 
1950s made it even more difficult to comprehend the implications of the 
technological changes. While the members of the NSC were highly trained 
in certain fields, they lacked the expertise to understand fully the impact 
that scientific and technological advances would have. Eisenhower, there­
fore, sought the advice of specialists who had expertise in specific fields or 
a broad understanding of the technological changes that might impact 
U.S. national security.3 
On three occasions during his two terms in office, Eisenhower asked the 
NSC to create advisory panels to evaluate national security issues. In 1953, 
the newly elected president initiated Project Solarium to study different 
strategies. Composed of three panels of consultants, Project Solarium pro­
vided advice that Eisenhower and the NSC used to develop the administra­
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tion's New Look national security strategy. In 1954, Eisenhower again 
turned to a group of consultants, known as the Killian committee, to evalu­
ate the threat of a surprise attack. After the committee submitted its report 
to the NSC in early 1955, Eisenhower accelerated U.S. missile programs 
and initiated the top secret U-2 intelligence program. Finally, in 1957, he 
created the Gaither committee to examine the effectiveness of U.S. active 
and passive defenses against an attack. 
Since the completion of its examination in November 1957, the Gai­
ther committee has been misunderstood by historians and other scholars. 
The committee has been described as of little importance.4 This study does 
not corroborate this conclusion. The Gaither committeefinished its report 
at a time of extremely high tension in the Cold War. The Soviet launch of 
Sputnik I in October and Sputnik II in November raised serious questions 
of the vulnerability of the United States. While it was much easier to launch 
a rocket into space than to hit a target with a nuclear weapon thousands of 
miles away, the Soviet satellites seemed to indicate that country's nuclear 
superiority over the United States. Khrushchev's claims that his country 
possessed this capability only heightened concerns. The American appre­
hension was shortsighted, especially when U.S. Strategic Air Command 
bombers were included in a comparison of U.S. and Soviet strengths. 
However, it was hard for most Americans to feel secure when Sputnik 
could pass over the United States with impunity. 
The Gaither committee was not immune to the fears created by Sputnik. 
Its conclusions were pessimistic, and its recommendations reflected deeply 
held fears of the Soviet Union. But, with a few exceptions, the commit­
tee members did not want war, and in fact saw the strengthening of U.S. 
military forces as the only way to avoid it. The views held by the Gaither 
committee were not at the extremes of American society. There was a wide­
spread fear of the Soviet Union and a belief that the United States needed 
to expand its military power. Consequently, the Gaither committee rec­
ommendations served as a catalyst for the revaluation of Eisenhower's na­
tional security policies in late 1957 and early 1958. 
Eisenhower ordered the creation of the Gaither committee after serious 
questions were raised about U.S. civil defenses and their ability to defend 
against a Soviet attack. The growing fears about radioactive fallout led 
the FCDA to recommend in early 1957 the construction of a nationwide 
system of fallout shelters. The advent of ballistic missiles brought into 
doubt U.S. capabilities to detect the launch of a Soviet attack, to defend 
186 Conclusion 
the country if such an attack did occur, and to retaliate if necessary. These 
questions did not have easy answers; therefore, Eisenhower turned to con­
sultants who either had expertise in specific technological fields or a broad 
understanding of the problems of active and passive defenses. 
The committee met sporadically in the summer of 1957 and then much 
more intensely in the fall. It received briefings from the nation's ranking 
military leaders, examined numerous reports evaluating U.S. military poli­
cies, and studied intelligence estimates of Soviet military strength. By the 
time the committee presented its final report to the NSC in November 
1957, it had examined U.S. military policies as thoroughly as time would 
allow. Its conclusions were frightening and its recommendations were un­
settling, but based on the evidence it examined, perfectly understandable. 
The committee concluded that within two years the United States 
would lose its nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, therefore pos­
siblyfinding itself vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack. With these conclu­
sions in mind, the committee recommended increasing nuclear forces to 
maintain U.S. superiority or, at a minimum, the ability to retaliate; ex­
panding U.S. early warning radar capabilities; dispersing SAC forces; con­
structing antimissile defenses; building fallout shelters; reorganizing the 
Defense Department; and augmenting limited war capabilities. These pro­
grams would not be cheap. The committee estimated that they would cost 
$44.2 billion more than currently programmed in the defense budgets for 
FY 1959 through 1963. 
The committee's recommendations created a dilemma for the Eisen­
hower administration. Spending, on average, an additional $9 billion a year 
would have meant increasing annual defense budgets by nearly 25 per­
cent. If Eisenhower had accepted these increases, he would have had to 
accept higher taxes and deficits—both of which he abhorred. The presi­
dent feared that higher taxes and deficit spending would force the govern­
ment to regiment the economy and intrude on the rights of the individual. 
Nevertheless, Eisenhower was willing to accept higher spending if national 
security depended on it. In evaluating the Gaither report, Eisenhower 
sought to balance the consequences of higher defense spending with the 
preservation of national security. 
Between November 1957 and July 1958, the Gaither report remained 
the centerpiece of NSC discussions. Various government agencies—in-
cluding the Defense Department, the JCS, the State Department, the CIA, 
the Treasury Department, the Budget Bureau, and the FCDA—evaluated 
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the Gaither report and presented their recommendations to the NSC. Af­
ter numerous discussions, Eisenhower adopted changes to his national 
security policies that reflected the influence of the Gaither committee's 
recommendations. By July 1958, he increased force levels for IRBMs, 
ICBMs, and SLBMs; ordered the dispersal of SAC forces to more airfields 
and improvement in SAC's alert status; expanded early warning radar cov­
erage; constructed additional antimissile defenses; reorganized the Defense 
Department; and initiated studies of U.S. limited war capabilities and fall­
out shelters. While he did not accept all of the Gaither committee's rec­
ommendations, their impact is nonetheless clear. 
The influence of the Gaither committee did not end in the summer of 
1958. For the remainder of his presidency, Eisenhower continually reeval­
uated the policies that the Gaither committee had brought into focus. 
During these years, the specific Gaither committee recommendations lost 
their relevance as new reports and intelligence estimates forced the admin­
istration to reevaluate U.S. strategic needs. However, the import of the 
committee's conclusions, specifically its calls for greater strategic capabili­
ties, limited war forces, and fallout shelters, provided a continued impetus 
for discussions of U.S. national security needs. 
Part of the lasting influence of the Gaither report rested in the political 
atmosphere it helped create. More than anything, Sputnik raised awareness 
that U.S. technological superiority was not guaranteed.5 After the Gaither 
report was leaked to the press in December 1957, it furthered this fear by 
posing the possibility of a missile gap in favor of the Soviet Union. Without 
trivializing their real concerns about U.S. security, many Democrats saw 
the "missile gap" as an issue that they could use to criticize the Republican 
administration.6 Eisenhower's refusal to release the report to congressional 
leaders fueled fears that the president was trying to hide the country's 
weaknesses. Until it was finally dispelled by new satellite intelligence in 
1960 and 1961, the notion of a missile gap remained pivotal in debates 
about U.S. national security. 
Senator John Kennedy was one of the most vocal proponents of the 
missile gap theory and harshest critics of the Eisenhower administration. 
He attacked U.S. military deficiencies on the Senate floor in 1958 and 
1959. and campaigned against the Republican administration's policies in 
1960. During his presidential run and administration, Kennedy on several 
occasions turned to former Gaither committee members for advice and 
even read the Gaither report. It would be too much to argue that the 
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Gaither report specifically influenced Kennedy's policies, but the ideas it 
espoused were surely important in the development of the new administra-
tion'sflexible response strategy. 
When Kennedy entered office in 1961, he saw two areas of U.S. mili­
tary power that needed strengthening—nuclear missiles and conventional 
forces. Kennedy expanded the nuclear triad he inherited from the Eisen­
hower administration to insure U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union and 
augmented U.S. conventional forces to control conflicts short of general 
war. He further revisited the Gaither committee's call for a nationwide sys­
tem of fallout shelters. During his three years in office, Kennedy success­
fully increased U.S. nuclear forces, augmented limited war capabilities, and 
located new shelter sites. 
Along with showing the influence of the Gaither committee on the Ei­
senhower and Kennedy administrations, this study evaluates why the com­
mittee reached the conclusions it did. As they met in the summer and fall 
of 1957, committee members struggled to develop recommendations that 
reflected their understanding of the Soviet threat. While they were selected 
to advise Eisenhower, their opinions did not always coincide with the presi-
dent's own views. They perceived a much greater Soviet threat than did 
Eisenhower. At later Senate hearings, both Robert Sprague and James Per­
kins questioned whether Eisenhower and his advisers really understood the 
threat posed by the Soviet Union. "I believe," Sprague testified, " . .  . that 
the danger is more serious than the President has expressed himself to the 
American public." 7 Even more scathingly, Perkins argued that "the nature 
of the threat was not fully realized," and later concluded that "the Govern­
ment did not have its eyes open in the summer and fall of 1957."8 
Most of the committee members entered the study with deeply held 
opinions. With few exceptions, they had participated in other studies that 
addressed some of the issues found in the Gaither report. It is striking 
how closely the committee's conclusions resembled the findings of the 
MIT summer studies, Project East River, Project Solarium, and the Killian 
committee. Many members of these groups served on the Gaither com­
mittee. Furthermore, most of the members were influenced by their past 
or current affiliations. While it does not appear that the committee directly 
sought to benefit one group or another, its conclusions supported many of 
its members' affiliated groups. For instance, James Doolittle and Mervin 
Kelly were closely tied to the Air Force; James Fisk had been a consistent 
proponent for increased funding for research and development; and James 
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Killian, Albert Hill, and James McCormack maintained very close ties to 
MIT and were advocates for obtaining financing for improved early warn­
ing radar. The members' institutional ties and the knowledge they gained 
from earlier studies helped formulate the opinions they held when they 
began the Gaither study. 
Once the committee began its examination, the members' preconceived 
opinions were reinforced by the evidence they analyzed. The military lead­
ers consistently stressed deficiencies in their respective military branches 
and requested additional funding. Various reports created by government 
and civilian organizations concluded that the United States was deficient 
in strategic missile strength and vulnerable to a Soviet missile attack. Fi­
nally, the intelligence estimates predicted Soviet missile force levels that, if 
accurate, could have posed a significant threat to the United States. Taken 
together, this evidence provided committee members no reason to alter 
their earlier opinions. 
In his memoirs, Eisenhower criticized the Gaither committee for failing 
at  o see the totality of the national and international situation."9 However, 
with their backgrounds and the available evidence, it is difficult to criticize 
the committee too much. It reached conclusions and made recommenda­
tions that were widely accepted.10 Nevertheless, two significant criticisms 
can be directed at the committee. It made recommendations for significant 
increases in U.S. military force levels, yet it never articulated how or when 
they should be used. The implication of the committee's recommendations 
was that the United States should prepare for all possible contingencies 
without regard for their probability, their economic consequences, or their 
impact on foreign policy.11 
Even more telling, the committee developed its conclusions based on 
an assumption about Soviet intentions rather than on a careful evaluation 
of why the Soviet Union might take particular actions.12 At the beginning 
of its report, the committee stated that the Soviet Union's goal was world 
domination. At no point in the subsequent pages did the committee at­
tempt to evaluate whether this really was the Soviet Union's goal or what 
risks its leaders would be willing to take to achieve it. The committee had 
available studies of the casualties that the United States could expect in a 
nuclear war, including several that predicted 100 million Americans would 
be killed. For the Soviet Union to risk a nuclear exchange with the United 
States, it would have had to consider the possible consequences for its 
own population. In making its recommendations, the committee failed to 
190 Conclusion 
evaluate the likelihood of the risks the Soviet Union might take to achieve 
its goals; therefore, it proposed major increases in defense spending that 
did not reflect the improbability of a Soviet attack. 
These criticisms are significant because without articulating a new 
strategy for how to utilize the expanded military forces and failing to ana­
lyze Soviet intentions, the committee placed a much greater emphasis on 
Soviet capabilities than it might have otherwise done. In doing so, it rec­
ommended the expansion of military forces to preserve the superiority of 
the United States without truly evaluating whether those forces and the 
costs associated with them were necessary. 
As already explained, Eisenhower and his advisers carefully evaluated the 
Gaither report and, after much study, modified some of the administra-
tion's national security policies. Questions still remain as to the effective­
ness of Eisenhower's decision-making system in dealing with the Gaither 
report. Was the establishment of the Gaither committee the best way to 
obtain the advice he wanted? Did his "hands-off " approach to manage­
ment permit the committee to overstep the intended scope of its study? 
Did he articulate his administration's response to Sputnik and the Gaither 
report in a clear and reassuring manner? Did his national security policies 
after 1957 reflect a nuanced assessment of the Soviet threat and U.S. stra­
tegic needs? The answers to these questions provide a unique opportunity 
to reevaluate the effectiveness of Eisenhower as president. 
During his administration, Eisenhower followed a strategy of deterrence 
in developing his national security programs. In pursuit of this strategy, he 
attempted to maintain a strong military while limiting defense spending. 
He believed his presidential responsibilities included protecting the na-
tion's physical integrity as well as preserving a way of life. He recognized 
that a strong military could provide national security, but spending too 
much could undermine the economy and challenge freedoms guaranteed 
by the Constitution. He told a friend during the 1958 congressional elec­
tion campaigns, "The brickbats that will be thrown at me I shall ignore, 
and I shall concentrate, as I have tried to do in the past, upon our national 
security, upon inching toward a just and durable peace for all the world, 
and upon sustaining the health of the American economy."13 He therefore 
always carefully evaluated the economic impact of potential policies. 
The changes Eisenhower made in his policies in 1958 and beyond rep­
resented his attempt to maintain a balance in his programs. He wanted to 
preserve national security, maintain an economy based on low inflation and 
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balanced budgets, and protect individual rights. Although he was not con­
vinced of the existence of a missile gap, he recognized that if the intelli­
gence estimates were close to being accurate, he could not allow the Soviet 
Union to acquire a lead in missile capabilities. He thus reluctantly increased 
the country's offensive and defensive military capabilities. 
Eisenhower established the Gaither committee to obtain advice that 
would allow him to find the proper balance in his policies. As he recalled, 
"With no vested interest in a particular department, and no federal jobs to 
protect, the panel was a means of obtaining independent judgments."14 If 
he really believed that he could obtain such c'independent" advice, he was 
mistaken. More important, this statement represents his failure to compre­
hend the views already held by the Gaither committee members. He had 
access to the reports of Project East River, Project Solarium, and the Killian 
committee, and had received briefings from Sprague, Doolittle, Killian, 
and Fisk concerning their perceptions of weaknesses in U.S. military or 
intelligence operations. Eisenhower knew their views and should have fore­
seen their conclusions. To have expected otherwise was remarkably short­
sighted. There was simply no way the Gaither committee or any other 
group of experts could reach conclusions unaffected by preconceived be­
liefs or past affiliations. 
Furthermore, Eisenhower's use of specialists and experts who were not 
elected and whose activities were generally unknown to the public brings 
into question his true understanding of the democratic principles that he 
readily espoused. He did face a dilemma. Because of the ever-expanding 
importance of specialized knowledge, Eisenhower needed to be able to 
acquire the best advice. However, by turning to experts who were neither 
elected, appointed by Congress, nor in any other way subject to the 
people's oversight, Eisenhower widened the gulf between democratic par­
ticipation and decision making. By using this advisory system, Eisenhower 
severely hampered the citizenry's ability to oversee the activities of the gov­
ernment. Eisenhower belatedly recognized in his farewell address the dan­
gers of becoming "the captive of a scientific-technological elite," but he 
failed to provide a possible solution to the individual's diminishing influ­
ence on decision making. 
This assessment leads to a necessary revaluation of Eisenhower's deci-
sion-making system. Fred Greenstein persuasively argues that Eisenhower 
followed a "hands-off" approach to decision making.15 This approach is 
readily apparent in the president's supervision of the Gaither committee. 
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After ordering its creation, Eisenhower allowed his subordinates to oversee 
the selection of the committee members and their activities. Other than 
once in July, Eisenhower did not have direct contact with the group be­
tween May and the end of October. While it must be recognized that he 
had to allow the committee to do its work, his lack of oversight permitted 
the committee to expand its mandate well beyond an examination of active 
and passive defenses. The result was a report that evaluated the entire U.S. 
national security program and made extensive calls for revisions—an out­
come the president did not want.16 
After receiving the committee's report, Eisenhower and his advisers 
carefully evaluated its recommendations and conclusions. This stage of Ei-
senhower's decision-making system worked well. The NSC assigned the 
respective government departments relevant sections of the report to ana­
lyze. After receiving feedback, the NSC held discussions and made rec­
ommendations to the president. Through the entire process, Eisenhower 
participated actively in the NSC discussions and then made his decisions. 
By July 1958, the entire Gaither report had been thoroughly evaluated. 
Where did Eisenhower's decision-making system fail him? In at least 
two places its shortcomings are readily apparent. By allowing the commit­
tee great autonomy, the president inadvertently permitted it to interpret 
its purpose broadly. The one time Eisenhower did meet with the commit­
tee members during their deliberations only strengthened their belief that 
they were supposed to review all U.S. national security programs. By re­
maining uninformed during the course of the committee's study, Eisen­
hower was unable to control the scope of its findings. Of equal importance, 
he never fully realized the importance of clearly articulating his views to the 
committee and, more important, to the population as a whole. He as­
sumed his views were understood and accepted by most Americans. He 
was wrong. While Eisenhower was readily liked and respected, during his 
second term there were grave doubts about his policies. If he wanted the 
Gaither committee to limit the scope of its study and the people to trust 
his policies, he needed to articulate his views in a more effective manner. 
His failure to do so severely hampered his ability to govern during his sec­
ond term. 
Who was right? Did the Gaither committee illuminate a more potent 
threat than Eisenhower recognized, or was Eisenhower's caution a reflec­
tion of a more prudent analysis of the available evidence? In retrospect it 
seems clear that Eisenhower's more cautious approach was the most appro­
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priate one. From the standpoint of the late 1950s, however, this view was 
hard to defend. The briefings, intelligence estimates, and the studies ex­
amined by the Gaither committee clearly indicate that many leading ex­
perts, both civilian and military, believed that the Soviet Union posed a 
significant threat to the United States. Although this assessment was inac­
curate, it does not negate the fact that many people agreed with it.17 
David Rosenberg has criticized Eisenhower for failing to regulate the 
expansion of the United States nuclear arsenal during the 1950s. He ar­
gues that Eisenhower recognized that the United States possessed suffi­
cient nuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet Union but allowed the arsenal 
to continue to grow.18 This conclusion has much validity, but it does over­
look the control that Eisenhower maintained over delivery systems. The 
president faced tremendous pressure over his last few years in office to ex­
pand defense budgets and military programs even more. It is to his credit 
that he kept spending as low as he did. His shortcoming was his failure 
to convince the American people that his policies were the best for the 
country. 
Eisenhower's handling of the Gaither report provides clear evidence of 
his struggle to limit defense spending. While defense spending increased 
after Sputnik and the Gaither report, these funds were used to address spe­
cific strategic needs. Even though Eisenhower did not think the Soviet 
Union would attack and believed that the intelligence estimates exagger­
ated Soviet capabilities, he recognized that he had to plan on the possibility 
that he might be wrong. He showed remarkable prudence in the imple­
mentation of his missile programs. He recognized the limitations of first-
generation missiles and deliberately restricted their deployment. He only 
expanded ICBM force levels when the second-generation missiles, and es­
pecially the Minuteman, became available. Additionally, he foresaw the de­
terrent value of Polaris. Was it "overkill," as Rosenberg suggests? Yes, but 
it was predicated on the belief that the forces might be necessary to deter 
an enemy whose intentions remained unclear. 
'Bincd Thoughts 
Heretofore, the history of the Gaither committee and its influence on the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations was obscure. Changes in U.S. 
national security policies in the last few years of the Eisenhower presidency 
generally have been explained as the administration's reaction to Sputnik. 
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This study reveals that Sputnik offered only the most obvious incentive for 
change. The Gaither committee provided a blueprint for meeting any chal­
lenges posed by the Soviet Union. It recommended a U.S. military pro­
gram that would have allowed the president to pursue any policy he chose. 
Eisenhower did not accept all of the committee's findings, but he was suf­
ficiently persuaded by the panel of experts that he did modify some of his 
national security policies. Now, forty years later, it is clear that the Gaither 
committee played a pivotal role in the escalation of the Cold War in the 
late 1950s. 
Much can be learned from this study of the Gaither committee. Eisen­
hower clearly made decisions based on well-defined principles and after 
receiving advice from a well-organized decision-making system. There is 
much to applaud in both areas. Eisenhower's basic values enabled him to 
develop policies that remained generally consistent throughout his admin­
istration. While it can be criticized, the president's New Look strategy was 
based on the belief that only by constraining defense spending could the 
United States maintain a political system based on democratic principles and 
an economic system based on capitalism. Eisenhower's decision-making 
system permitted thorough discussions of policy alternatives, allowing the 
president to receive the best possible advice. Eisenhower should be com­
mended for his commitment to basic principles and effective organization. 
On a more critical note, this study reveals several weaknesses in Eisen-
hower's presidency. His cchands-off" approach at times gave too much 
autonomy to advisory groups like the Gaither committee. As long as the 
president's objectives were clearly understood and accepted, the system 
worked well. The examples of Project Solarium and the Killian committee 
reveal the system at its best. However, when the president's views were not 
accepted, then problems could develop. This was clearly the case with the 
Gaither committee. Its members perceived a much greater Soviet threat 
than Eisenhower did and operated under assumptions that challenged 
some of the president's policies. Eisenhower's "hands-off" approach did 
not account for such differences of opinion. 
Additionally, this study raises questions about how a president should 
define his policies. Throughout his administration, Eisenhower espoused 
basic principles, yet at times, as in the case of the Gaither committee, his 
decision-making system generated certain contradictions. In particular, 
Eisenhower's use of experts suggests that he was not as wedded to demo­
cratic principles as he led many to believe. His administration witnessed 
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decision making that was even further removed from public oversight than 
it was in earlier presidencies. Also, as clearly as he sometimes articulated his 
views to government agencies, he was unable to define his policies in his 
second term in a manner that was reassuring to the people. As a result of 
this failure, he had to make a last-gasp admonition in his farewell address 
for the people to be vigilant in combating the military-industrial complex. 
In the final analysis, how should Eisenhower be judged? He should be 
seen as a commander in chief who did his best to lead his country through 
a tumultuous decade. He followed a basic set of values and used a well-
organized decision-making system. However, neither his values nor his 
decision-making system were perfect. He did not always apply his values 
consistently or articulate his views clearly. On the other hand, his decision-
making system did normally provide him thoroughly evaluated advice and 
an opportunity to devise policies based on his principles. A testament to its 
effectiveness is Eisenhower's ability to resist the pressures on his adminis­
tration to spend more on national security programs during his last few 
years in office. A president without Eisenhower's convictions and organi­
zational capabilities would have been unable to do so. 
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